Supreme Court Allows Appeal of Karikho Kri in Election Dispute Over Non-Disclosure of Vehicles and Dues — High Court's Declaration of Void Election Set Aside. Non-disclosure of vehicles registered in names of dependent wife and son does not amount to corrupt practice under Section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and improper acceptance of nomination under Section 100(1)(d)(i) requires proof that election was materially affected.

Election petition challenging the election of the returned candidate on grounds of improper acceptance of nomination due to non-disclosure of assets and dues.

Nuney Tayang sought declaration that the election of Karikho Kri was void and that he himself be declared duly elected.

Alleged non-disclosure of vehicles owned by wife and son, non-submission of no dues certificate for electricity charges, and non-disclosure of municipal tax liabilities in the affidavit filed with the nomination.

The High Court allowed the election petition in part, declaring the election of Karikho Kri void under Sections 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i), and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act, but rejected the prayer to declare Nuney Tayang duly elected.

Whether non-disclosure of vehicles registered in the names of the appellant's dependent wife and son in Form No. 26 amounts to a corrupt practice under Section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Whether such non-disclosure renders the election void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act without proof that the election was materially affected.

Karikho Kri argued that the vehicles were sold or gifted prior to the election and were not owned by him, and that non-disclosure did not amount to corrupt practice. Nuney Tayang argued that the vehicles remained registered in the names of the wife and son, who were dependents, and thus should have been disclosed, and that non-disclosure constituted corrupt practice and improper acceptance of nomination.

Non-disclosure of assets of dependent family members in an election affidavit does not automatically constitute corrupt practice under Section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, unless it is shown to have influenced voters. Further, for an election to be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) due to improper acceptance of nomination, it must be proved that the election was materially affected.

The High Court held against Karikho Kri on Issue No 1, in relation to three out of the four vehicles... The High Court was of the opinion that, notwithstanding the sale... these vehicles continued to stand in the names of Bagilu Kri and Goshinso Kri... As Karikho Kri admitted such non-disclosure in his Affidavit in Form No. 26, the High Court held against him on this count. The High Court referred to case law and held that such non-disclosure amounted to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951. The High Court opined that when the nomination of the returned candidate was shown to have been improperly accepted by the Returning Officer, there is no necessity to further prove that the election was ‘materially affected’.

Nuney Tayang filed Election Petition No. 01(AP) of 2019 before the Itanagar Bench of the High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. The High Court allowed the petition in part on 17.07.2023. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court under Section 116A of the Act. The Supreme Court initially directed that no election be held for the constituency but later stayed the High Court's judgment on 20.03.2024, allowing Karikho Kri to contest the upcoming election subject to final outcome.

• Representation of the People Act, 1951: 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i), 100(1)(d)(iv), 116A, 116B(2), 123(2)
• Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961: Form No. 26, Clause 7(vi), Clause 8(ii)(B)
• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: