Supreme Court Upholds High Court Ruling That Time Limit Under Section 14 of SARFAESI Act is Directory. The provision requiring District Magistrate to pass possession order within 30 days (extendable to 60 days) is directory, as non-compliance does not invalidate proceedings or prejudice the borrower.

  • 5
Judgement Image
Font size:
Print

Case Note & Summary

The appeal arose from a judgment of the Kerala High Court which held that the time limit under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) for the District Magistrate to pass an order for taking possession of secured assets is directory, not mandatory. The appellant, a borrower, challenged this decision, arguing that the provision is mandatory because it uses the word 'shall' and provides for an extended period of 60 days only upon recording reasons. The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 14, its provisos, and the object of the Act, which is to facilitate expeditious recovery of non-performing assets. The Court noted that the time limit was inserted to ensure quick action, but non-compliance does not result in any penalty or divestment of jurisdiction. Applying settled principles of statutory interpretation, the Court held that provisions relating to performance of public duties are generally directory if non-compliance does not cause prejudice to the affected party. Here, the borrower is not adversely affected by a delay, while the secured creditor would be prejudiced if the provision were mandatory, as it would require filing a fresh application. The Court also relied on precedents such as Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin, Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, and Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen, which held that time limits for public officers are directory unless the statute expressly provides for consequences of non-compliance. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the time limit under Section 14 is directory.

Headnote

A) Interpretation of Statutes - Mandatory vs Directory Provisions - Time Limit for Public Duty - Section 14, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 - The question was whether the time limit of 30 days (extendable to 60 days) for the District Magistrate to pass an order for taking possession of secured assets under Section 14 is mandatory or directory. The Court held that the provision is directory, as non-compliance does not invalidate the proceedings and the borrower is not prejudiced. (Paras 1-12)

B) Interpretation of Statutes - Use of 'Shall' - Context and Scheme - The Court reiterated that the use of 'shall' does not necessarily make a provision mandatory; the court must ascertain the real intention of the legislature by examining the whole scope of the statute. (Paras 7-8)

C) Public Duty - Consequences of Non-Compliance - The Court applied the principle that when a statute relates to performance of a public duty, and holding acts done in neglect as void would cause serious inconvenience or injustice, the provision should be construed as directory. (Paras 8-9)

Subscribe to unlock Headnote Subscribe Now

Issue of Consideration

Whether the time limit of 30 days (extendable to 60 days) under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 for the District Magistrate to pass an order for taking possession of secured assets is mandatory or directory.

Subscribe to unlock Issue of Consideration Subscribe Now

Final Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the time limit under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is directory and not mandatory. The High Court's judgment was affirmed.

Law Points

  • Interpretation of statutes
  • mandatory vs directory provisions
  • time limit for public duty
  • Section 14 SARFAESI Act
  • use of 'shall' in statutes
Subscribe to unlock Law Points Subscribe Now

Case Details

2020 LawText (SC) (11) 4

Civil Appeal No. 3441 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 12381 of 2020) (Diary No. 46087 of 2019)

2020-01-01

Hemant Gupta, J.

C. Bright

The District Collector & Ors.

Subscribe to unlock Case Details (Citation, Judge, Date & more) Subscribe Now

Nature of Litigation

Civil appeal against the judgment of the Kerala High Court regarding the interpretation of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.

Remedy Sought

The appellant sought to set aside the High Court's judgment holding the time limit under Section 14 as directory.

Filing Reason

The appellant challenged the High Court's decision that the time limit for the District Magistrate to pass an order under Section 14 is directory.

Previous Decisions

The Kerala High Court held that the time limit under Section 14 is directory.

Issues

Whether the time limit of 30 days (extendable to 60 days) under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act for the District Magistrate to pass an order for taking possession of secured assets is mandatory or directory.

Submissions/Arguments

The appellant argued that the use of 'shall' and the provision for recording reasons for extension make the time limit mandatory; if not complied with, the proceedings abate. The respondent (secured creditor) argued that the provision is directory, as non-compliance does not invalidate the proceedings and the borrower is not prejudiced.

Ratio Decidendi

The time limit prescribed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act for the District Magistrate to pass an order for taking possession of secured assets is directory. This is because the provision relates to performance of a public duty, non-compliance does not cause prejudice to the borrower, and the statute does not specify consequences for non-compliance. The use of 'shall' does not automatically make a provision mandatory; the court must consider the context and object of the statute.

Judgment Excerpts

The High Court held that the time limit stipulation in the amended Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is directory and not mandatory. A well settled rule of interpretation of the statutes is that the use of the word 'shall' in a statute, does not necessarily mean that in every case it is mandatory. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold acts done in neglect of this duty as null and void, would cause serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, the practice of the courts should be to hold such provisions as directory.

Procedural History

The Kerala High Court, by order dated 19.7.2019, held that the time limit under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is directory. The appellant filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, which was converted into Civil Appeal No. 3441 of 2020.

Acts & Sections

  • Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002: 14, 13(4), 15, 17(2)
  • Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993:
Subscribe to unlock full Legal Analysis Subscribe Now
Related Judgement
Supreme Court Supreme Court Upholds High Court Ruling That Time Limit Under Section 14 of SARFAESI Act is Directory. The provision requiring District Magistrate to pass possession order within 30 days (extendable to 60 days) is directory, as non-compliance does no...
Related Judgement
Supreme Court "Supreme Court Upholds Restoration of Suit for Specific Performance Despite Initial Procedural Dismissal: Cause of Action Distinction Under Order II Rule 2 CPC Clarified" "Procedural bars must yield to substantive justice when causes of action in se...