Bombay High Court Allows Discharge in Rape Case Based on Consensual Relationship and Breach of Promise Not to Marry. The court held that a mere breach of promise to marry does not constitute rape under Section 376 IPC if the promise was not false from inception, and the provisions of the SC/ST Act are not attracted when the parties belong to the same caste.

High Court: Bombay High Court Bench: NAGPUR In Favour of Accused
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Case Note & Summary

The appellant, Prathamesh Surendra Sohale, aged 24, was charged under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 2015, based on a complaint lodged by the victim, aged 21, on 03.04.2021 at Sadar Police Station, Nagpur. The victim alleged that the appellant had sexual relations with her on the false promise of marriage and later refused to marry her. The appellant filed a discharge application under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which was rejected by the trial court on 03.08.2022. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred the present appeal under Section 14A of the Atrocities Act. The High Court examined the material on record, including WhatsApp chats and the victim's statement, and found that the relationship was consensual and that the appellant had initially agreed to marry but later changed his mind due to family opposition. The court distinguished between a mere breach of promise and a false promise made from inception, holding that the consent was not vitiated as the promise was not false at the time it was made. The court also noted that the appellant and victim belonged to the same caste, and thus the provisions of the Atrocities Act were not attracted. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court's order, and discharged the appellant from all charges.

Headnote

A) Criminal Law - Rape - Consent obtained on false promise of marriage - Distinction between mere breach of promise and false promise from inception - The court examined whether the accused had a fraudulent intention from the beginning or whether there was a subsequent change of circumstances leading to breach of promise. Held that if the promise was not false from inception, the consent is not vitiated and no offence of rape is made out (Paras 2, 5-10).

B) Criminal Procedure - Discharge under Section 227 CrPC - Scope of court's power at framing of charge - The court has to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case is made out. If the material gives rise to strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, charge must be framed; otherwise, discharge is warranted (Paras 4-5).

C) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 2015 - Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(5) - Applicability in cases of consensual relationship - The court held that where the relationship is consensual and the accused does not belong to a different caste, the provisions of the Atrocities Act are not attracted. The mere fact that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste does not automatically bring the case under the Act (Paras 11-12).

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Issue of Consideration

Whether the appellant/accused is entitled to be discharged under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on the ground that the material on record does not disclose a prima facie case for the offences under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 2015.

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Final Decision

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court's order dated 03.08.2022, and discharged the appellant from all charges under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) IPC and Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(5) of the SC/ST Act.

Law Points

  • Consent obtained on false promise of marriage constitutes rape only if promise was false from inception
  • mere breach of promise does not amount to rape
  • Section 376 IPC
  • Section 376(2)(n) IPC
  • Section 3(1)(w)(i) SC/ST Act
  • Section 3(2)(5) SC/ST Act
  • Section 227 CrPC
  • discharge at framing of charge
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Case Details

2023 LawText (BOM) (01) 303

Criminal Appeal No. 587 of 2022

2023-01-16

Vinay Joshi, Valmiki Sa Menenzes

Mr. A.S. Manohar for Appellant, Mr. S.S. Doifode for Respondent No.1/State, Mrs. S.T. Godbole (Appointed) for Respondent No.2

Prathamesh Surendra Sohale

State of Maharashtra and XYZ

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Nature of Litigation

Criminal appeal against rejection of discharge application under Section 227 CrPC in a case involving allegations of rape and offences under the SC/ST Act.

Remedy Sought

The appellant sought discharge from the charges framed against him under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) IPC and Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(5) of the SC/ST Act.

Filing Reason

The appellant was accused of having sexual relations with the victim on the false promise of marriage and later refusing to marry her, leading to the registration of Crime No.134/2021.

Previous Decisions

The trial court rejected the discharge application vide order dated 03.08.2022, holding that there were sufficient grounds to proceed against the appellant.

Issues

Whether the consent given by the victim was vitiated due to a false promise of marriage, constituting rape under Section 376 IPC? Whether the provisions of the SC/ST Act are attracted in the facts of the case? Whether the appellant is entitled to discharge under Section 227 CrPC?

Submissions/Arguments

The appellant argued that the relationship was consensual and the promise to marry was not false from inception; the breach occurred due to family opposition. The respondent/State argued that the appellant had no intention to marry from the beginning and made a false promise to obtain consent for sexual relations.

Ratio Decidendi

For an offence of rape based on a false promise of marriage, it must be established that the promise was false from the inception and the accused had no intention to marry. A mere breach of promise due to subsequent circumstances does not vitiate consent. At the stage of framing charge, the court must sift and weigh the evidence to determine if a prima facie case exists. If the material does not disclose strong suspicion, the accused is entitled to discharge.

Judgment Excerpts

This appeal once again occasioned us to delve upon the issue to decide on facts and circumstances of the case, whether it is a case of mere breach of promise, or a case of false promise made since inception for obtaining consent for sex. The court has power to sift and weigh the evidence for limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case is made out. If the promise was not false from inception, the consent is not vitiated and no offence of rape is made out.

Procedural History

The victim lodged a report on 03.04.2021 leading to registration of Crime No.134/2021. Investigation culminated in filing of charge sheet. The appellant filed a discharge application under Section 227 CrPC, which was rejected by the trial court on 03.08.2022. The appellant then filed the present appeal under Section 14A of the SC/ST Act. The High Court reserved judgment on 11.01.2023 and pronounced it on 16.01.2023.

Acts & Sections

  • Indian Penal Code, 1860: 376, 376(2)(n)
  • Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 2015: 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(5)
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 227
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