High Court of Judicature at Bombay Rejects Petitioners' Choice of Forum in Section 29-A Extension and Section 9 Petitions Under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Due to Prior District Court Consent. District Court Consent for Two Extensions Under Section 29-A Reaffirmed Original Seat at Karjat/Thane, Rendering Section 42 Bar to High Court Jurisdiction.

Commercial arbitration petitions under Sections 9 and 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, concerning territorial jurisdiction, extension of arbitral mandate, and release of title documents from escrow.

Petitioners sought extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29-A and release of title documents from escrow under Section 9.

Arbitration proceedings had continued since 2017 and mandate was to expire; petitioners filed Section 29-A petition in High Court after withdrawing from District Court, and Section 9 petition to release escrow due to arbitral tribunal postponing Section 17 application.

Section 11 Court held arbitration agreement did not survive; Supreme Court appointed arbitrator on November 6, 2017. District Court allowed first and second Section 29-A extension applications on April 29, 2018 and June 15, 2020. Arbitral Tribunal passed status quo order under Section 17 on March 7, 2018. Third Section 29-A application pending before District Court was withdrawn on June 30, 2025.

Whether the High Court of Judicature at Bombay had territorial jurisdiction to entertain a Section 29-A petition when the original seat was Karjat/Thane but parties recorded consent to change seat to Mumbai. Whether the minutes of meeting dated November 27, 2017, before the arbitrator, recording consent to seat at Mumbai, effected a change of seat or merely of venue. Whether prior consent of parties before the District Court for two extensions under Section 29-A reaffirmed the original seat and attracted Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Application of the principle in Ravi Ranjan Developers (P) Ltd. v. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee regarding court under Section 2(1)(e) and Section 11 court in light of subsequent conduct.

Petitioners argued that the seat of arbitration was changed to Mumbai by mutual consent recorded in the minutes of meeting before the arbitrator on November 27, 2017, and therefore the High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Section 29-A petition. Respondents argued that the reference to 'seat' in the minutes was to be read as a reference to venue only, and that the seat remained Karjat/Thane because the petitioners had filed Section 29-A applications before the District Court three times, and the first two extensions were obtained with mutual consent. Respondents further argued that Section 42 of the Act barred the High Court from entertaining the Section 9 and Section 29-A petitions because all prior applications had been filed before the District Court, which was the court under Section 2(1)(e). Petitioners relied on the fact that the Section 11 petition had been filed on the Appellate Side of the High Court, but the court noted that this alone did not determine the seat because subsequent consent and conduct before the District Court indicated primary jurisdiction.

Consent of parties determines the seat of arbitration; subsequent conduct of the parties, including obtaining extensions from a particular court, can reaffirm the original seat. A change of seat recorded before the arbitrator can be reconciled as a change of venue when the parties later repeatedly approach the District Court by consent. The court under Section 2(1)(e) is determined by the parties' consistent understanding, and Section 42 bars subsequent applications in another court when the first application was made to the District Court.

The phrase “ peculiar facts of the case ” is so routinely used that it tends to not speak to real peculiarity. However, in the instant case, the factual matrix arising out of the conduct of the parties, renders this case, a true tale of the peculiar. If one were to infer consent to change the seat from the minutes of meeting before the Learned Arbitral Tribunal one would also need to interpret the same parties’ consent before the District Court, made twice over, when the Section 29-A Applications filed there came up for consideration. In this view of the matter, a plausible and reasonable means of reconciling the conflicting positions emerging from the parties’ conduct (all by consent) would be that there was a foundational reinforcement of what was in any case, originally contained in the agreements as the seat, owing to the parties getting two extensions from the District Court.

On March 6, 2010, parties executed an Agreement for Sale for 108.9 acres; on March 9, 2010, a Memorandum of Understanding added 22.9 acres. In April 2010, an escrow agent was given title documents. The agreements were terminated on August 22, 2015, and arbitration was invoked on January 25, 2016. The Section 11 Court held that the arbitration agreement did not survive, but the Supreme Court appointed an arbitrator on November 6, 2017. Minutes of meeting on November 27, 2017 recorded consent to seat at Mumbai. The Arbitral Tribunal passed a status quo order under Section 17 on March 7, 2018. The District Court allowed first and second Section 29-A extension applications on April 29, 2018 and June 15, 2020; the third was filed on June 16, 2021. Respondents chose damages over specific performance on April 10, 2019. Petitioners made a Section 17 application on January 31, 2024 to release escrow, and filed a Section 9 petition in the High Court in 2024. Petitioners filed the Section 29-A petition in the High Court on June 9, 2025 and withdrew the District Court application on June 30, 2025. The available excerpt ends during the court's analysis of jurisdiction without recording the final disposal.

• Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: 2(1)(e), 9, 11, 17, 29-A, 42