Case Note & Summary
The Supreme Court heard a criminal appeal by special leave against the concurrent conviction of the appellant under Section 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The appellant, a stall owner in Cuttack, was accused of selling adulterated groundnut oil used for frying potato chops. On July 17, 1965, a Food Inspector purchased 375 grams of groundnut oil from the appellant's stall after giving notice, divided the sample into three parts, sealed the bottles, sent one to the public analyst, and the analyst found the oil adulterated as it did not conform to prescribed standards. The Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Cuttack, gave written consent for prosecution under a notification dated December 16, 1964, which generally authorised that officer to give written consent for prosecutions for offences under the Act within Cuttack Municipality. The appellant was convicted by the Magistrate First Class, Cuttack, and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500, with a default sentence of six weeks. The Additional Sessions Judge and the Orissa High Court dismissed his appeal and revision respectively. The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the written consent for prosecution was valid under Section 20(1) of the Act as it stood before its amendment by Act 49 of 1964. The appellant argued that the pre-amendment provision required the authority to give consent to be in respect of a specified individual offence, and thus the general notification was invalid. The State contended that the notification was valid and that Section 20(1) permitted a general authority. The appellant also sought to raise a new plea regarding non-compliance with Section 10(7) of the Act, which requires the Food Inspector to call independent witnesses, but the Court declined to entertain it because it had not been raised before the High Court and involved questions of fact. The Court examined the language of Section 20(1) before and after the amendment. It found nothing in the pre-amendment provision that made it imperative to specify a particular offence. The words 'in this behalf' indicated that the authority conferred related to the giving of written consent for institution of prosecutions for offences under the Act generally, not to a specified individual offence. The Court observed that if the appellant's interpretation were accepted, no general authority could be conferred even under the amended section, which would render the words 'by general or special order' meaningless. The amendment by Act 49 of 1964, effective from March 1, 1965, only made more clear what was already contemplated by the section. The Court also noted that the legislature had a twofold object: to prevent institution of prosecutions except with written consent and to relieve the State Government or local authority from the necessity of dealing with each individual case. Requiring individual authorisation would defeat this purpose by forcing a two-step process instead of one. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction. It held that the notification dated December 16, 1964 was valid under the pre-amendment Section 20(1) and confirmed the sentence. The judgment approved the decisions in Corporation of Madras v. Arumagham, Laxman Sitaram Pai v. State of Mysore, and Public Prosecutor v. Thatha Rao.
Headnote
A) Food Adulteration - Prosecution Sanction/Consent - Section 20(1) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (pre-amendment) - General written consent valid; no need to specify individual offence - The appellant contended that pre-amendment Section 20(1) required authority in respect of each specified offence, but the Court rejected this, holding that the language did not impose such a requirement and the words 'in this behalf' relate to giving consent for offences under the Act generally. The amendment by Act 49 of 1964 adding 'by general or special order' clarified the existing position. Held that the notification dated December 16, 1964 authorising Superintendent of Police, Vigilance for Cuttack Municipality was valid. (Pages 1-6) B) Criminal Procedure - New Plea at Supreme Court - Section 10(7) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 - Plea of non-compliance with requirement to call independent witnesses not permitted when not raised before High Court - The appellant attempted to argue for the first time in the Supreme Court that the Food Inspector did not call independent witnesses at the time of sample collection; this involved questions of fact and was not allowed. Held that the appellant cannot agitate a new factual plea. (Pages 1-6) C) Statutory Interpretation - Object of Section 20(1) - Twofold object: prevent prosecutions without written consent and relieve government from individual consideration - Requiring individual authorisation would defeat the section's purpose because it would necessitate a two-step process instead of one. Held that the interpretation permitting general authority advances legislative intent. (Pages 1-6)
Issue of Consideration
Whether under Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 as it stood before its amendment by Act 49 of 1964, the State Government or local authority could authorise a person by general order to give written consent for prosecutions for offences under the Act, or whether such authority had to relate to a specified individual offence.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant under Section 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The Court held that the notification dated December 16, 1964 authorising the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance to give written consent for prosecutions for offences under the Act within Cuttack Municipality was valid even under pre-amendment Section 20(1), as there was nothing requiring specification of a particular offence. The words 'in this behalf' related to the giving of written consent generally, and the amendment by Act 49 of 1964 only clarified the existing position. The plea regarding non-compliance with Section 10(7) was not allowed to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. The conviction and sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500 were confirmed.
Law Points
- Section 20(1) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
- 1954 before amendment by Act 49 of 1964 permitted State Government or local authority to authorise a person by general order to give written consent for prosecution for offences under the Act
- no requirement to specify individual offence
- words 'in this behalf' relate to giving written consent generally
- amendment by Act 49 of 1964 only clarified existing position
- object of section to prevent prosecutions without written consent and relieve government from dealing with each individual case
- general authority valid
