Case Note & Summary
The Supreme Court of India heard two writ petitions together, both seeking reconsideration of the earlier decision in H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, which had held that requisition orders under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 cannot continue indefinitely. The first petition, Writ Petition (C) No. 404 of 1986, originated from a letter to the Chief Justice of India and concerned residential premises requisitioned under the Act. The second petition, Writ Petition No. 53 of 1993, was filed by Grahak Sanstha Manch, an association of cooperative societies running fair price ration shops in commercial premises requisitioned under the same Act. Some of these cooperative societies had received notices from the State Government to vacate the premises by 26 December 1992 so that the premises could be derequisitioned. The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus directing the State Government not to evict them from the requisitioned premises, effectively asking the court to reconsider and reverse the H.D. Vora ruling. The core legal issue was whether an order of requisition under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 could lawfully continue for an indefinite period, and whether the State Government was bound to revoke such orders and derequisition the premises after a reasonable time. The court examined the fundamental distinction between requisition and acquisition under the Constitution, noting that requisition involves only temporary taking of control over property without acquiring ownership rights, whereas acquisition transfers title permanently. The court reiterated that if requisitioning could continue for an indefinite period, the distinction between requisition and acquisition would become blurred, allowing the government to effectively take over property without paying full market value as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which would be a fraud on the power conferred. The court held that the power of requisition is exercisable only for a public purpose of a transitory character; if the purpose is permanent from inception, the government must acquire the property rather than requisition it. In H.D. Vora, continuation of a requisition order for about 30 years was found unreasonable, and the State was directed to revoke the order, derequisition the flat, evict the allottee, and hand over vacant possession to the owner. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the orders of requisition could not be continued indefinitely and that the State Government was bound to revoke them and derequisition the premises. The judgment affirmed that a writ petition challenging an order of requisition after a long lapse may be entertained when the ground is that the order by its very nature is temporary and has outlived its validity. The decision favored the State of Maharashtra, upholding its duty to derequisition properties held under requisition for unreasonable periods.
Headnote
A) Constitutional Law - Requisition and Acquisition - Distinction - Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List III, Entry 42 and Article 31(2) - Requisition involves taking only domain or control over property without acquiring rights of ownership and is temporary by nature, while acquisition means acquiring entire title with permanence and finality; indefinite continuation of requisition would blur the distinction and allow government to substantially take over property without paying full compensation under Land Acquisition Act, 1894, constituting fraud on power. Held that an order of requisition cannot endure for an indefinite period and ceases to be valid after reasonable period; continuation for 30 years was unreasonable and the State was bound to revoke and derequisition. (Paras 4-6) B) Administrative Law - Exercise of Requisition Power - Public Purpose of Transitory Character - Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, Section 6(4)(a) - The power of requisition is exercisable only for a public purpose that is of a transitory character; if the public purpose is perennial or permanent from inception, the property cannot be requisitioned but must be acquired. Held that the government cannot use requisition to achieve permanent taking; continuing requisition beyond reasonable period is invalid and the State Government must derequisition the premises and restore possession to the owner. (Paras 4-5)
Issue of Consideration
Whether an order of requisition under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 can continue for an indefinite period, and whether the State Government is bound to derequisition premises after lapse of a reasonable period.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions and upheld the decision in H.D. Vora; it held that requisition orders under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 cannot continue indefinitely and the State Government is bound to revoke them and derequisition the premises, restoring possession to owners.
Law Points
- Requisition is temporary in nature
- cannot continue indefinitely
- Distinction between acquisition and requisition
- Public purpose for requisition must be transitory
- Indefinite requisition is fraud on power
- State bound to derequisition after reasonable period
