Case Note & Summary
This appeal arose under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 against a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Election Petition No.6 of 1991. The election for the Thane Parliamentary Constituency was held on 15.6.1991, and the appellant Prof. Ramchandra G. Kapse, the BJP candidate, was declared elected on 17.6.1991 with 3,02,928 votes against 2,74,611 votes polled by the respondent, the Congress (I) candidate. On 1.8.1991, the respondent filed an election petition alleging corrupt practices based on three speeches: by Sadhvi Reethambara on 21.5.1991, by L.K. Advani on 1.6.1991, and by Pramod Mahajan on 11.6.1991. The High Court by judgment dated 15.4.1994 declared the election void under Section 100(1)(b) and named Sadhvi Reethambara and Pramod Mahajan under Section 99 for corrupt practices under Sections 123(3) and 123(3A), while rejecting the allegation regarding L.K. Advani's speech. During the trial, on 7.8.1992, questions to Prof. Kapse regarding his absence from the 21.5.1991 meeting were disallowed as there was no specific denial in his written statement; his application to amend the written statement was dismissed on 10.8.1992, and a special leave petition against that order was dismissed on 27.8.1992. His evidence was closed on 7.9.1992. Notices under Section 99 were issued on 24.9.1992. In March 1993, noticee Sadhvi Reethambara filed a reply denying the candidate's presence and applied to call evidence to prove his absence; the High Court rejected that application on 8.4.1993, and her special leave petition was dismissed on 12.5.1993. Arguments concluded on 12.4.1994. The central legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether a noticee under Section 99 has an independent right to plead and prove the absence of the candidate's consent, even if the candidate himself had not specifically denied presence. The Court examined the proviso to Section 99(1) and held that a noticee has the same opportunity as a party to the petition, including the rights to cross-examine witnesses, call evidence, and be heard. The candidate's omission to deny a constituent fact does not preclude the noticee from denying it. Consequently, denial of that opportunity by the High Court vitiated the inquiry under Section 99. The Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in rejecting the noticee's application to lead evidence on the issue of absence. The final operative order was not set out in the available text, but the Court's reasoning indicated that the matter required reconsideration with adequate opportunity to the noticee.
Headnote
A) Election Law - Corrupt Practices - Consent of Candidate - Representation of the People Act, 1951, Sections 123(3) and 123(3A) - The High Court held that the returned candidate's written statement impliedly admitted his personal presence at the meeting of 21.5.1991 where an allegedly corrupt speech was made, thereby proving his consent; the Supreme Court examined whether this pleading could be construed as admission and whether the candidate could be precluded from denying presence. Held that the noticee's independent right under Section 99 required allowing denial of presence regardless of the candidate's pleading (Paras Not mentioned). B) Election Law - Noticee under Section 99 - Independent Right to Defend - Representation of the People Act, 1951, Section 99(1) proviso - A noticee under Section 99 has the same opportunity as a party to the petition to cross-examine witnesses, call evidence, and be heard; the candidate's omission to deny a constituent fact does not preclude the noticee from denying it. Denial of this opportunity vitiates the inquiry under Section 99. Held that the High Court erred in rejecting the noticee's application to lead evidence on absence of the candidate (Paras Not mentioned).
Issue of Consideration
Whether a noticee under Section 99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 has an independent right to plead and prove absence of the returned candidate's consent, notwithstanding the candidate's failure to specifically deny it, and whether denial of that opportunity vitiates the inquiry under Section 99.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court held that the noticee under Section 99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 has an independent right to plead and prove all constituent facts of the alleged corrupt practice, including absence of the candidate's consent, and that the denial of such opportunity by the High Court vitiated the inquiry under Section 99. The final operative order was not specified in the available text.
Law Points
- Noticee under Section 99 of Representation of the People Act
- 1951 has independent right to show cause why he should not be named
- same opportunity as party to petition
- right to cross-examine witnesses
- call evidence and be heard
- candidate's omission to deny constituent fact does not preclude noticee from denying it
- denial of opportunity to noticee vitiates Section 99 inquiry
