Supreme Court Allows Accused's Appeal in TADA Case Due to Wrong Invocation. Statutory Prior Approval Requirement Under Section 20A(1) TADA Not Fulfilled as DSP Abdicated Discretion to Higher Authority, Rendering TADA Invocation Invalid.

In Favour of Accused
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Case Note & Summary

The case involved an appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court against the order of the Designated Court rejecting the bail application of the appellants. The appellants were accused of offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), along with provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Arms Act, in connection with the murder of Jayantilal Vadodaria, a Patel community leader, on 15 March 1995 near Ashapura Dam, Gondal, Gujarat. The prosecution alleged that the deceased was murdered by four assailants who came in a white Ambassador car, fired shots, and inflicted knife injuries. The four accused were arrested on 16 March 1995. It was further alleged that after the murder, the assailants went to the field of appellant No.1 Anirudhsinh Jadeja, a Sarpanch, and left weapons with him; appellant No.2 Digubha Jadeja helped conceal the weapons. On 18 March 1995, appellant No.1 was produced before the Executive Magistrate and a case was registered under Section 25(1)(b) of the Arms Act. The District Superintendent of Police (DSP), instead of granting prior approval under Section 20A(1) TADA, wrote to the Additional Chief Secretary on 17 March 1995 seeking permission to invoke TADA, detailing alleged communal tensions between Darbar and Patel communities. The Additional Chief Secretary gave consent on 18 March 1995. The appellants' bail application was rejected by the Designated Court on 18 April 1995. The core legal issue was whether the invocation of TADA was valid when prior approval of the DSP under Section 20A(1) had not been obtained. The appellants contended that prior approval was mandatory and that the DSP had not exercised his own discretion but had abdicated it to the Additional Chief Secretary, rendering the TADA proceedings non est. The State relied on the DSP's report and the consent of the Additional Chief Secretary. The Supreme Court analysed Section 20A of TADA, which requires prior approval of the DSP for recording information about an offence under the Act. The Court held that the DSP did not exercise the jurisdiction vested in him but referred the matter to the Additional Chief Secretary, thereby abdicating his statutory discretion. Relying on Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1952 SCR 135, the Court reiterated that a statutory authority must exercise its discretion independently and cannot act under the direction of a higher authority. Consequently, the invocation of TADA against the appellants was held to be non est. The Court allowed the appeal on the sole ground of wrong invocation of TADA, without examining other points, and the appellants became entitled to bail. The decision underscored the mandatory nature of prior approval under Section 20A(1) TADA and the principle that statutory discretion must be personally exercised.

Headnote

A) Criminal Law - Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 - Sections 3, 5, 20A - Prior Approval for Recording Information - Condition precedent for recording information about commission of an offence under TADA is prior approval of District Superintendent of Police under Section 20A(1); no court can take cognizance without previous sanction of Inspector-General of Police or Commissioner of Police under Section 20A(2) - In the present case, the DSP did not give prior approval on his own but referred the matter to Additional Chief Secretary seeking permission to invoke TADA, thereby failing to exercise jurisdiction vested in him - Held that the invocation of TADA against the appellants was non est and the appeal deserved to be allowed on this sole ground (Paras 6-11).

B) Administrative Law - Exercise of Statutory Discretion - Section 20A(1) Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 - Statutory Authority Must Exercise Own Discretion - If a statutory authority vested with jurisdiction exercises discretion under direction or in compliance with higher authority's instruction, it amounts to failure to exercise discretion altogether - Reliance placed on Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1952 SCR 135 where action of Commissioner at behest of State Government was not upheld - Held that the DSP abdicated his jurisdiction by referring the matter to Additional Chief Secretary instead of forming his own independent judgment (Paras 11-12).

C) Criminal Procedure - Bail - Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 - Section 20A - Effect of Invalid Invocation on Detention - The appellants were in jail accused of offences under Sections 3 and 5 TADA and their bail was rejected by the Designated Court - Since the TADA invocation was invalid for want of prior approval under Section 20A(1), the proceedings under TADA were non est and the appellants were entitled to be released on bail - Held that appeal deserves to be allowed on the sole ground of wrong invocation of TADA (Paras 1, 8-9).

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Issue of Consideration

Whether the invocation of Sections 3 and 5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 against the appellants was valid when prior approval of District Superintendent of Police under Section 20A(1) was not obtained, and whether the appellants were entitled to bail.

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Final Decision

Appeal allowed. The Court held that the invocation of TADA against the appellants was wrong because prior approval under Section 20A(1) was not given by the District Superintendent of Police, who instead abdicated his jurisdiction to the Additional Chief Secretary. Consequently, the TADA proceedings were non est and the appellants were entitled to bail.

Law Points

  • Prior approval of District Superintendent of Police under Section 20A(1) TADA mandatory before recording information
  • DSP must exercise own discretion
  • abdication to higher authority invalid
  • statutory authority cannot act under direction
  • invocation of TADA non est
  • bail allowed
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Case Details

1995 LawText (SC) (08) 87

1995-08-11

B.L. Hansaria, A.M. Ahmadi (CJ), S.C. Sen

1995 AIR 2390, 1995 SCC (5) 302, JT 1995 (6) 146, 1995 SCALE (4)715

Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja & Anr.

State of Gujarat

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Nature of Litigation

Appeal by special leave against rejection of bail by Designated Court in a criminal case involving offences under TADA, IPC, and Arms Act.

Remedy Sought

Appellants sought release on bail from Supreme Court after Designated Court denied bail on 18 April 1995.

Filing Reason

Appellants were arrested and accused of offences including Sections 3 and 5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 for allegedly concealing weapons used in a murder; their bail application was rejected by Designated Court.

Previous Decisions

Executive Magistrate initially remanded appellants, then sent them to judicial custody; bail application rejected by Designated Court on 18 April 1995; hence appeal by special leave to Supreme Court.

Issues

Whether prior approval of District Superintendent of Police under Section 20A(1) Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 was obtained before recording information about commission of an offence under TADA. Whether the District Superintendent of Police abdicated his statutory jurisdiction by seeking permission from Additional Chief Secretary instead of exercising his own discretion under Section 20A(1) TADA. Whether the invocation of TADA against the appellants was valid and whether the appellants were entitled to bail.

Submissions/Arguments

Appellants contended that prior approval under Section 20A(1) TADA was not obtained from the District Superintendent of Police, rendering the TADA proceedings non est. The State relied on the report of the District Superintendent of Police to the Additional Chief Secretary, which detailed communal terror and sought permission to invoke TADA, and on the consent given by the Additional Chief Secretary.

Ratio Decidendi

Prior approval of District Superintendent of Police under Section 20A(1) Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 is a mandatory condition precedent for recording information about commission of an offence under TADA. A statutory authority vested with discretion must exercise it independently and cannot abdicate it to a higher authority; if discretion is exercised under direction or in compliance with higher authority's instruction, it amounts to failure to exercise discretion altogether. Consequently, invoking TADA without such valid prior approval renders the proceedings non est.

Judgment Excerpts

the appeal deserves to be allowed on the sole ground of wrong invocation of TADA in the case of the appellants (Para 1) condition precedent for recording an information about the commission of an offence under TADA is the approval of the District Superintendent of Police and cognizance of any offence under TADA cannot be taken by any court ‘without the previous sanction of the Inspector-General of Police, or, as the case may be, the Commissioner of Police’ (Para 7) The DSP did not exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under Section 20A (1). On the contrary, he abdicated his jurisdiction and referred the matter to the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department (Para 9) If a statutory authority has been vested with jurisdiction, he has to exercise it according to its own discretion. If the discretion is exercised under the direction or in compliance with some higher authority’s instruction, then it will be a case of failure to exercise discretion altogether (Para 11)

Procedural History

On 15 March 1995, Jayantilal Vadodaria was murdered near Ashapura Dam, Gondal. On 16 March 1995, four accused were arrested and car recovered. On 18 March 1995, appellant Anirudhsinh was produced before Executive Magistrate and case registered under Section 25(1)(b) Arms Act. On 23 March 1995, Executive Magistrate directed police not to ill-treat appellants. On 24 March 1995, accused were sent to hospital till 27 March 1995. On 27 March 1995, all accused were remanded to judicial custody. On 28 March 1995, appellants filed bail application. On 18 April 1995, Designated Court rejected bail. Appeal by special leave to Supreme Court; judgment delivered on 11 August 1995 allowing appeal.

Acts & Sections

  • Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987: 3, 5, 20A
  • Indian Penal Code, 1860: 302, 120-B
  • Arms Act, 1959: 25(1)(b), 25(1)(c)
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