Supreme Court Allows High Court's Interlocutory Application as Special Leave Petition in Territorial Jurisdiction Dispute Under Clause 14 of High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. Division Bench's Interpretation That Explanation to Section 141 CPC Altered Law on Lucknow Bench Jurisdiction Was Held Perverse and Contrary to Binding Supreme Court Precedent.

Interlocutory application by High Court of Judicature at Allahabad through its Registrar in a Special Leave Petition arising from a Division Bench judgment on the territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench under Article 226 and Clause 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948.

High Court sought permission from Supreme Court to file special leave petition against the judgment of its own Division Bench in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P.; also sought resolution of the Registry's functional crisis due to conflicting directions from Division Bench and Full Bench.

The Division Bench in Chini Mill case had held that Lucknow Bench lacked jurisdiction over writ petition concerning sugar mills outside Oudh; Full Bench later overruled that judgment; the Registry faced conflicting directions, and the earlier special leave petition was disposed of as infructuous; High Court sought to set aside the Division Bench judgment.

Division Bench of Allahabad High Court (B.M. Lall and S.R. Singh JJ) delivered judgment on 23-09-1994 in Chini Mill case; a coordinate Bench referred the same question to Full Bench on 05-09-1994; Full Bench overruled Division Bench on 15-11-1994; Supreme Court disposed of the special leave petition on 02-12-1994 as infructuous.

Whether the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 in respect of sugar mills situated outside Oudh area under Clause 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. Whether the Division Bench was correct in holding that the interpretation in Nasiruddin v. STA Tribunal ceased to apply after the Explanation to Section 141 CPC was added from 1.2.1977. Whether the High Court could be permitted to file special leave petition against its own Division Bench judgment.

Before the Lucknow Bench, it was contended that since five out of six sugar mills proposed for sale were situated outside Oudh, the Lucknow Bench had no jurisdiction under Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, and the Division Bench accepted this contention. The Division Bench reasoned that Clause 14 confined Lucknow Bench to cases 'pertaining to' Oudh area and that the Amalgamation Order was special law overriding the general cause of action theory under CPC; it further held that Explanation to Section 141 CPC from 1.2.1977 excluded Sections 15 to 20 CPC from writ proceedings, rendering Nasiruddin's case inapplicable. The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench fell into patent error; Nasiruddin did not rely on CPC provisions, so the Explanation to Section 141 had no bearing; the High Court's reasoning was wholly perverse.

A judgment is the judgment of the court, not of individual judges, and must be followed until set aside or doubted by a higher court; once a higher court doubts its correctness, the judgment is treated as non-est and lower courts must bow to it. The Division Bench erred in refusing to follow Nasiruddin v. STA Tribunal on the ground that the Explanation to Section 141 CPC altered the law; Nasiruddin did not rely on CPC provisions, so the interpretation of Clause 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 remains binding: the Lucknow Bench's jurisdiction under Article 226 is confined to cases where the right of the petitioner arose first at a place within Oudh.

The jurisprudence governing court-functioning in this country makes a judgment, delivered by a judge or a Bench comprising of more than one judges, the judgment of the court and not of the person holding the judicial office. Once the correctness of a judgment is doubted by the higher court the judgment no longer remains the law of the land and is treated as non- est. We have no hesitation in holding that the reasoning of the High Court in not following the law laid down by this Court in Nasiruddin’s case was wholly perverse. The meaning of the expression "in respect of cases arising in such areas Oudh" in the first proviso to paragraph 14 of the order was answered by the High Court that with regard to applications under Article 226 the same will be " a case arising within the areas in Oudh " only if the right of the petitioner in such an application arose first at a place within an area in Oudh.

Writ Petition No.35951 of 1994 was filed before the Lucknow Bench challenging a Uttar Pradesh Government notification for sale of six sugar factories. On 23-09-1994, a Division Bench of B.M. Lall and S.R. Singh JJ delivered judgment in Chini Mill case holding that Lucknow Bench had no jurisdiction for mills outside Oudh. On 05-09-1994, another Bench of S.R. Sharma and Shobha Dixit JJ had referred the identical question to a Full Bench. On 15-11-1994, the Full Bench overruled the Division Bench in Chini Mill case. On 02-12-1994, the Supreme Court disposed of the special leave petition as infructuous in view of the Full Bench judgment. The High Court Registrar then filed an interlocutory application seeking permission to file SLP against the Division Bench judgment. The Supreme Court treated the application as a special leave petition, granted special leave, and held the Division Bench's reasoning perverse.

• Constitution of India: Article 226
• High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948: Clause 3, Clause 14
• Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 141, Sections 15 to 20