Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose from the dismissal of a Head Constable of Police in Punjab without holding a departmental inquiry, under proviso (b) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The appellant challenged the dismissal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which dismissed his writ petition. Aggrieved, he appealed to the Supreme Court. The disciplinary authority, Senior Superintendent of Police, Tarn Taran, dismissed him on February 21, 1992, citing his alleged links with extremists and involvement in supplying secret police information to terrorists. The order stated that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry because no witness was likely to depose against him due to fear of injury to life. The appellate authority, Inspector General of Police, Border Range, Amritsar, dismissed the appeal on June 22, 1993, affirming the disciplinary findings and the impracticability of an inquiry. The High Court accepted these reasons. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that except a confession/admission made during police interrogation in connection with FIR No.219/90, there was no other material to justify dismissal; such confession was inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act; no material had been placed to show that holding an inquiry was not reasonably practicable; and he had been acquitted by the designated court under TADA for the same incident. The State supported the High Court's reasoning. The Supreme Court examined the scope of proviso (b) and clause (3) of Article 311, referring to Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, and reiterated that the disciplinary authority's satisfaction about reasonable practicability is final but subject to judicial review. On the confession, the Court held that the strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply to departmental inquiries; only principles of natural justice govern. It referred to State of Mysore v. S.S. Makapur and State of Assam v. S.K. Das, and quoted Kuruma v. The Queen, approved in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection, that evidence is admissible if relevant, regardless of how it was obtained. The Court noted that if the disciplinary authority concluded the confession was voluntary and true, it could act upon it. Observing that the case involved a difficult choice and that the situation in Punjab during 1990-91 was extraordinary, the Court found no reason to interfere with the High Court's finding that proviso (b) was validly invoked. It held that once proviso (b) was validly applied, the only remaining challenge could be to the proportionality of punishment, and if the confession was believed, the punishment was not excessive. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the dismissal from service.
Headnote
A) Constitutional Law - Article 311(2) proviso (b) - Dispensing with Departmental Inquiry - Constitution of India, Article 311(2) proviso (b) and clause (3) - The disciplinary authority dismissed a Head Constable without holding an inquiry on the ground that no witness was likely to depose due to fear of injury, invoking proviso (b). The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary authority's satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry is final under clause (3), but subject to judicial review on grounds of relevancy and proper application, not as a court of appeal; the High Court's acceptance of the reasons was not disturbed. Held that proviso (b) was validly invoked. (Paras 1-6) B) Evidence Law - Admissibility of Confession in Departmental Inquiry - Sections 25 and 26, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - The appellant's confession made to police during interrogation was relied upon as the sole material for dismissal. The Court held that the strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply to departmental inquiries; only compliance with principles of natural justice is required. Held that the disciplinary authority could consider the confession if satisfied it was voluntary and true, despite its inadmissibility in a criminal trial. (Paras 4-5) C) Service Law - Sufficiency of Evidence and Punishment - Dismissal based solely on confession - Constitution of India, Article 311; Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 25-26 - The appellant argued that there was no material other than the confession, and that he had been acquitted by the designated court under TADA. The Court, while acknowledging the difficult choice, accepted the High Court's finding that there was enough material to conclude that holding an inquiry was not reasonably practicable, and that if the confession was believed voluntary and true, the punishment was not excessive. Held that once proviso (b) was validly invoked, the only remaining challenge was to the proportionality of punishment, which failed. (Paras 1-6)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the disciplinary authority validly invoked proviso (b) to Article 311(2) dispensing with the inquiry; whether a confession made to police during interrogation is admissible in a departmental inquiry despite Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act; whether absence of material other than the confession vitiated the dismissal; whether acquittal by the designated court under TADA rendered the dismissal invalid.
Final Decision
Supreme Court accepted the High Court's finding that the disciplinary authority had validly invoked proviso (b) to Article 311(2); held that rules of Evidence Act do not apply to departmental enquiries and the confession could be considered if voluntary and true; upheld the dismissal and dismissed the appeal.
Law Points
- Article 311(2) proviso (b) allows dispensing with inquiry if not reasonably practicable
- satisfaction of disciplinary authority is final under Article 311(3) but subject to judicial review
- Indian Evidence Act Sections 25 and 26 do not apply to departmental inquiries
- only principles of natural justice govern departmental inquiry
- confession to police can be considered if voluntary and true
- acquittal in criminal case does not automatically invalidate departmental action
- judicial review is limited and not as appellate court
