Case Note & Summary
The Supreme Court dealt with appeals arising from the Bombay serial bomb blasts of 12 March 1993, which killed over 250 people, injured 730, and destroyed property worth about Rs 27 crores. The CBI investigation led to a charge-sheet against 145 persons under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA). The Designated Court constituted under Section 9 of TADA, by order dated 10 September 1995, framed charges against 127 persons and discharged 26; one accused died and two became approvers. Four of the charged accused—Abu Asim Azmi, Amjad Aziz Meharbaksh, Raju alias Raju Code Jain, and Som Nath Thapa—approached the Supreme Court aggrieved by the refusal to discharge them, while the State of Maharashtra sought cancellation of bail granted to Thapa. The Court identified three questions of law: the ingredients of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A of the Indian Penal Code; when charge can be framed; and the effect of the repeal of TADA. The available excerpt focused on the first question. The Court noted that Sections 120-A and 120-B were introduced by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1913, to make conspiracy a substantive offence. Section 120-A defines criminal conspiracy as an agreement between two or more persons to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means. The proviso requires some act besides the agreement unless the agreement is to commit an offence, and the explanation states it is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object or merely incidental. The accused argued, through senior counsel Ram Jethmalani, that conspiracy requires knowledge of the illegal act or illegal means by a co-conspirator along with intent to further that illegal act. The Additional Solicitor General, KTS Tulsi, initially contended that knowledge alone sufficed, but later accepted that intent is necessary; however, he argued that intent may be inferred from knowledge, especially when no legitimate use of the goods or services exists. He also submitted that the prosecution need not prove that the conspirator knew the goods would be used for the Bombay blasts. The Court examined foreign and domestic precedents: R v Hawkesley, where knowledge learned during a taxi ride was insufficient absent evidence of acting in concert; Natwarlal Shankarlal Mody v State of Bombay, which similarly required knowledge of conspiracy; and People v Lauria, where a telephone answering service operator was charged with conspiracy because he knew his service was used by prostitutes. Lauria, relying on United States v Falcone and Direct Sales Co v United States, distinguished between innocuous goods like sugar and dangerous products like drugs, stating that distributors of dangerous products must exercise greater discrimination. The Court quoted from Direct Sales that the step from knowledge to intent and agreement may be taken when there is informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation, more than mere suspicion or acquiescence. Applying this, the Court observed that sometimes criminal intent may be inferred from knowledge when no legitimate use for the goods or services exists, and that RDX or bombs cannot be put to any legitimate use but only to illegitimate use. The excerpt ends before the Court's analysis of charge framing, repeal of TADA, and individual cases; therefore, the final disposition of the appeals is not included in the provided text.
Headnote
A) Criminal Law - Criminal Conspiracy - Definition and Ingredients - Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 120-A and 120-B - Section 120-A defines criminal conspiracy as agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means; proviso requires some act besides agreement unless agreement is to commit an offence; explanation states immaterial whether illegal act is ultimate object or incidental - Court examined ingredients and noted section introduced by Criminal Law Amendment Act 1913 - Held that conspiracy consists in either doing an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means, emphasizing need to consider illegality of means and group action (Paras 7-9). B) Criminal Law - Criminal Conspiracy - Knowledge and Intent Requirement - Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 120-A - Accused argued that to find conspiracy there must be knowledge of illegal act or illegal means by co-conspirator along with intent to further illegal act; Additional Solicitor General initially contended knowledge alone enough, then accepted intent required but argued intent may be inferred from knowledge - Court discussed Hawkesley and Natwarlal, which held mere knowledge that somebody would commit offence not sufficient unless evidence of acting in concert or agreement - Held that knowledge alone insufficient; intent is gist of conspiracy (Paras 10-13). C) Criminal Law - Criminal Conspiracy - Inference of Intent from Knowledge - Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 120-A - Court examined Lauria and Direct Sales; held sometimes criminal intent may be inferred from knowledge when no legitimate use for goods or services exists; RDX or bombs cannot be put to any legitimate use but only to illegitimate use - Additional Solicitor General relied on this to submit that prosecution need not prove conspirator had knowledge goods would be used for Bombay blasts - Held that intent may be inferred from knowledge taking step from knowledge to intent and agreement (Paras 14-16).
Issue of Consideration
What are the ingredients of criminal conspiracy as defined in Section 120-A of the Indian Penal Code; When can charge be framed; What is the effect of repeal of TADA
Law Points
- Criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A IPC requires agreement to do illegal act or act by illegal means
- mere knowledge of illegal act insufficient without intent to further
- intent may be inferred from knowledge when no legitimate use for goods or services exists
- RDX and bombs cannot be put to any legitimate use but only to illegitimate use
- charge framing and repeal of TADA raised as questions of law but not analysed in available excerpt
