Case Note & Summary
The appeal arose from a departmental inquiry and subsequent dismissal of a Telephone Operator, A. Nagamalleshwar Rao, who was appointed provisionally on 24 June 1981 and regularly on 20 May 1983 by the Divisional Engineer, Telecom, Eluru. On 8 May 1984, he was asked to produce his original SSC marks certificate for verification. He claimed he had submitted it with his application and it had not been returned. Despite repeated demands, he failed to produce either the original or a duplicate certificate. The Divisional Engineer made inquiries with the school headmaster and learned that the respondent had secured only 48.6% marks, whereas entries in the Z register showed he had represented 79.80% marks. Consequently, a departmental inquiry was held under Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The charge was held proved and he was dismissed on 29 March 1989. His appeal and revision were dismissed. He then filed O.A. No. 1139 of 1992 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench. The Tribunal set aside the dismissal, holding that the evidence of Sanyasi Rao, the official who explained the practice of making entries in the Z register, was useless because he had no personal knowledge of the 1980 practice or the specific entry. The Tribunal also rejected the extract from the Z register as secondary evidence lacking proof of authenticity. It observed that departmental inquiries are quasi-criminal and require inferences from legal evidence, not absence of evidence. The Tribunal accepted the respondent's version that he had submitted correct information showing 48.6% marks and concluded the finding of guilt was based on no evidence. The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court. The main legal issues were whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence as a court of appeal, whether the official register extract was admissible as a public document, and whether the dismissal was justified given the discrepancy in marks and failure to produce the certificate. The appellant contended that the Tribunal's approach was erroneous because strict rules of evidence do not apply to departmental inquiries, the official register was a public document duly authenticated, and the respondent could not have been selected had he disclosed his true marks since the last selected candidate had 70.6%. The respondent, as reflected in the Tribunal's reasoning, argued that the original documents were missing and not shown to have been suppressed by him, and that the extract was not legal evidence. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred in law and exceeded its jurisdiction. It emphasized that in departmental inquiries, the standard is preponderance of probabilities and strict rules of procedure and proof do not apply. The Court found that Sanyasi Rao's evidence could not be discarded merely because he lacked personal knowledge of the 1980 practice; he was conversant with office practice. The Z register was maintained as an official record, in the nature of a public document, duly authenticated by a competent officer, and its extract was legal evidence. The Court noted that the Tribunal had itself acknowledged the relaxed evidentiary standard but then applied strict rules. The Court also highlighted that the respondent's failure to produce the certificate despite demands, the discrepancy in marks (48.6% actual vs 79.80% represented, while last appointed had 70.6%), and the disappearance of original records strongly indicated fraud or at least a mistake without which he would not have been appointed. Therefore, the dismissal was proper. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's order, and dismissed the O.A. filed by the respondent, with no order as to costs.
Headnote
A) Administrative Law - Departmental Inquiry - Standard of Proof and Admissibility of Evidence - Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, Rule 3(1)(iii) - In a departmental inquiry, strict rules of procedure and proof do not apply; the test is preponderance of probabilities based on legal evidence. The Central Administrative Tribunal erred by treating the inquiry as a criminal appeal and discarding evidence of an official witness and an official register extract as no evidence. Held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in reappreciating evidence as a court of appeal. B) Evidence - Public Documents - Admissibility of Official Register Extract - Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 - A register maintained in the office of the Divisional Engineer as an official record is in the nature of a public document, and when duly authenticated by a competent officer, an extract from it is legal evidence. The Tribunal committed an error of law in holding that the extract was secondary evidence and could not be relied upon without proof of authenticity. C) Service Law - Dismissal - Fraud and Misrepresentation in Appointment - Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, Rule 3(1)(iii) - Where an employee secured appointment by misrepresenting SSC marks (79.80% claimed versus 48.6% actual) and the last selected candidate had 70.6%, the appointment was vitiated by fraud or mistake. The employee failed to produce the original or duplicate certificate despite repeated demands, and original records disappeared. Held that the dismissal was proper and the Tribunal erred in quashing it.
Issue of Consideration
Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating evidence as a court of appeal in a departmental inquiry and erroneously discarding legal evidence such as official register extracts, and whether the dismissal of the respondent was justified.
Final Decision
Appeal allowed; order of the Central Administrative Tribunal set aside; O.A. filed by the respondent dismissed; no order as to costs.
Law Points
- Departmental inquiry standard is preponderance of probabilities
- strict rules of evidence do not apply
- official registers are public documents and duly authenticated extracts are legal evidence
- tribunal cannot sit as court of appeal over inquiry findings
- fraud or mistake vitiating appointment justifies dismissal
