Case Note & Summary
This common judgment concerned a batch of writ appeals filed by individuals who completed apprentice training at Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), Trichy. The appellants, holders of ITI certificates in various trades such as welders and fitters, had undergone apprenticeship under BHEL and sought employment against sanctioned vacancies without being subjected to open market recruitment. The dispute arose from the second round of litigation between the trained apprentices and BHEL. In the first round, a Single Judge of the Madras High Court had by order dated 12.10.2007 allowed similar writ petitions, directing BHEL to induct apprentices under the old recruitment policy, relying on Section 22(2) of the Apprentices Act, 1961, and the distinction between apprentices covered by Section 22(1) (mere training) and Section 22(2) (training with promise of absorption). This was upheld by a Division Bench, and BHEL's appeal to the Supreme Court was later withdrawn following a settlement between the parties. Subsequently, leftover apprentices who had completed training either before or after the earlier litigation filed about 100 writ petitions covering approximately 1400 individuals. In this second round, the Single Judge dismissed all petitions by common order dated 04.08.2014, distinguishing the earlier batch on the grounds that a new recruitment policy had been introduced on 14.08.2007, which explicitly stated that apprenticeship training would not guarantee any preferential treatment in employment, and that the terms of the contract between trainer and trainee were clear. The present writ appeals challenged that dismissal. Before the Division Bench, the appellants argued that the change in recruitment policy could not retrospectively defeat their legitimate expectation arising from the old policy and the earlier judicial interpretations. They contended that the rules of the game cannot be altered after commencement and that the doctrine of merger did not apply because the Supreme Court's withdrawal was based on a settlement, not a merits decision, leaving the earlier Division Bench judgment binding. They also relied on Section 8 of the Apprentices Act, which mandates industries to provide apprentice training proportionate to their workforce, and on the fact that similarly placed apprentices had obtained employment in the first round. BHEL, represented by its standing counsel, opposed the appeals, asserting that the new recruitment policy and the express terms of the apprenticeship contract negated any right to employment and that the settlement in the Supreme Court had resolved the matter conclusively. The Division Bench heard extensive arguments from both sides and reserved judgment on 13.03.2025, pronouncing it on 21.03.2025. The extracted text does not contain the final operative part or the reasoning of the Division Bench; thus, the specific outcome and directions remain unstated in the provided portion.
Headnote
A) Labour Law - Apprentices Act, 1961 - Section 22(2) - Right to Preferential Employment - Apprentices Act, 1961, Sections 22(1) and 22(2) - The earlier Division Bench had interpreted Section 22(2) to confer a right of preferential employment where the employer's policy promised absorption, distinguishing it from Section 22(1) which applies to mere training without promise. The present batch of apprentices contended that the same interpretation should apply to them as they completed training before the policy change. Held: The earlier interpretation of Section 22(2) created a legitimate expectation for apprentices trained under the old recruitment policy. (Paras 3-4, 8-9) B) Administrative Law - Legitimate Expectation - Change in Recruitment Policy - Apprentices Act, 1961, Sections 22(2) - The appellants argued that the new recruitment policy of 14.08.2007 could not be applied retrospectively to deny them employment, as the rules of the game cannot be changed after commencement. They relied on Clauses 4.4 and 4.6 of the old recruitment policy and the earlier Division Bench judgment. Held: The matter involves the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the context of employment policy amendments. (Paras 9, 12) C) Civil Procedure - Doctrine of Merger - Consent Orders - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (principle) - The appellants contended that the withdrawal of the Supreme Court appeal based on a settlement did not merge the earlier Division Bench judgment into a final order on merits, and thus the precedent still holds the field. Held: The doctrine of merger does not apply to consent orders where the court does not adjudicate on merits. (Para 12)
Issue of Consideration
Whether apprentices who completed training before change in recruitment policy are entitled to employment under old policy and Section 22(2) of Apprentices Act, and whether the withdrawal of Supreme Court appeal on settlement merges the earlier Division Bench judgment.
Final Decision
Decision not clearly stated
Law Points
- Legal points not extracted
- distinction between Section 22(1) and Section 22(2) of Apprentices Act
- 1961
- legitimate expectation of employment
- preferential treatment for trained apprentices
- change in recruitment policy cannot be applied retrospectively
- doctrine of merger not applicable to consent orders
