Case Note & Summary
The Criminal Revision Application arose from proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act). The applicant, a Jain Hindu woman originally married to Shantaram Mahadu Ughade, claimed she obtained a customary divorce in 2011. She converted to Islam and married respondent no. 2, a Muslim man who was already married, in a Nikah ceremony in 2012, and they had a child together. After disputes arose, she filed an application under Section 12 of the DV Act seeking reliefs against him. The Judicial Magistrate First Class allowed her application, holding that the relationship was 'in the nature of marriage' and fell under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. Respondent no. 2 appealed, and the Additional Sessions Judge reversed the order, ruling that because both parties had prior marriages in subsistence, a legal marriage between them was not possible, and therefore the relationship did not qualify as a 'domestic relationship' under Section 2(f). The applicant challenged this appellate order before the High Court. The core issue was whether the relationship qualified as a 'relationship in the nature of marriage' under Section 2(f), given that both were already married and those marriages were subsisting. The applicant argued that her first marriage had ended by customary divorce, that respondent no. 2's personal law permitted polygamy, and that the Nikahnama and child's birth certificate proved they lived as husband and wife. The respondent contested that both marriages were subsisting, so no valid marriage could be contracted, and the relationship was not covered by the DV Act. The High Court examined the definition in Section 2(f) and the Supreme Court's interpretation in Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, which requires that parties be of legal age, hold themselves out as spouses, be otherwise qualified to marry including being unmarried, and cohabit voluntarily. The Court observed that not every live-in relationship is covered; only those that could have ripened into a legal marriage qualify. The Court emphasized the principle that statutes must not be interpreted to promote illegality; reading Section 2(f) to cover an adulterous relationship would offend Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the words 'relationship in the nature of marriage' must be construed to require that a legal marriage is possible. On the facts, the applicant admitted her first marriage subsisted, and even if respondent no. 2's personal law allowed multiple marriages, her own incapacity prevented a valid marriage. Consequently, the relationship was not a 'domestic relationship' under the DV Act, and she was not entitled to relief. The High Court upheld the appellate order and dismissed the revision.
Headnote
A) Domestic Violence - Interpretation of 'Domestic Relationship' under Section 2(f) - Requirement of 'Relationship in the Nature of Marriage' - Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Section 2(f) - The court held that for a relationship to qualify as a 'relationship in the nature of marriage', the parties must be eligible to legally marry each other; they must be unmarried or otherwise qualified. The applicant's first marriage was subsisting, so a legal marriage with respondent no. 2 was impossible, thus the relationship did not fall under Section 2(f) (Paras 9-10, 12). B) Statutory Interpretation - Harmonious Construction - Avoidance of Promoting Illegality - Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 494 - The court reasoned that Section 2(f) of the DV Act cannot be interpreted to cover a relationship that would be adulterous and punishable under Section 494 IPC. The interpretation must be harmonious and not promote illegality. Thus, even if the parties held themselves out as spouses, such a relationship cannot be recognized under the DV Act if it offends criminal law (Paras 11-12). C) Domestic Violence - Distinction between Live-in Relationship and Relationship in the Nature of Marriage - Criteria Laid Down in Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal - Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Section 2(f) - The Supreme Court's criteria in Velusamy were applied: the couple must be of legal age to marry, hold themselves out as spouses, be otherwise qualified including being unmarried, and cohabit voluntarily for a significant period. The court found that the applicant and respondent no. 2 did not satisfy the qualification of being unmarried, hence the relationship could not be deemed 'in the nature of marriage' (Paras 9, 12).
Issue of Consideration
Whether the relationship between the applicant and respondent no. 2, who were both previously married and whose marriages were subsisting, qualifies as a 'domestic relationship' under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, particularly as a 'relationship in the nature of marriage'
Final Decision
Revision dismissed. The court held that the relationship was not a domestic relationship under Section 2(f) of the DV Act because the applicant's first marriage was subsisting, making a legal marriage with respondent no. 2 impossible, and thus she was not entitled to relief under the DV Act. The order of the Additional Sessions Judge was upheld.
Law Points
- Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act
- 2005 defines domestic relationship
- a relationship in the nature of marriage requires that a legal marriage between parties must be possible
- parties must be unmarried or otherwise qualified to marry each other
- not all live-in relationships are covered
- statute interpretation must not promote illegality
- interpretation must not offend penal provisions like Section 494 IPC
- Velusamy criteria apply
- the existence of a marriage ceremony and a child does not suffice if prior marriage subsisting
