Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose from the termination of life membership of four members (the petitioners) by the Executive Committee of Vidarbha Youth Welfare Society, a public trust, through Resolution No. 7 passed on 3 March 2015. The petitioners filed a civil suit seeking declarations that the resolution was null and void and a permanent injunction restraining its implementation. Pending suit, they sought temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The trial court dismissed the application on 1 October 2016, finding no prima facie case, balance of convenience against the petitioners, and no irreparable loss. The appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) was dismissed by the District Court, affirming the trial court's view. The petitioners then approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The core legal issue was whether Clause 23(ix) of the society's memorandum of association, which empowered the Executive Committee to approve members, implicitly authorized removal of life members. The petitioners argued that the power was not conferred and the action was ultra vires. The respondents contended that the power to approve includes the power to remove, relying on the judgment in Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. They also raised estoppel, alleging the petitioners had earlier used the same clause to remove a member, and argued that interim relief would amount to final relief, delay of over three years, and conduct disqualified the petitioners. The High Court held that Clause 23(ix) could not be read to include the power to remove life members. Removal being penal and draconian, such power must be explicit. The memorandum of association, being a scheme under Section 50A of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950, has the force of a decree and thus must be strictly construed. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was held inapplicable as the clause was not a Central Act or statutory regulation. The court rejected the lower courts' approach, finding the prima facie case clearly in favour of the petitioners. The court noted that the impugned resolution was without authority and thus the balance of convenience and irreparable injury tests were satisfied. It held that even if the injunction effectively granted final relief or there was delay, the lack of authority demanded interference. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the orders of the lower courts, and granted temporary injunction restraining the respondents from giving effect to Resolution No. 7.
Headnote
A) Public Trust – Memorandum of Association – Interpretation of Power to Approve Membership – Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950, Section 50A – Clause 23(ix) of the memorandum of association empowers the Executive Committee only to approve persons eligible as members; it does not confer implied power to remove life members, as such removal is penal and requires explicit authorization. The memorandum has the force of a decree under Section 50A and must be strictly construed. Held that the lower courts erred in finding no prima facie case and refusing temporary injunction. (Paras 6, 10) B) General Clauses Act, 1897 – Section 21 – Inapplicability to Private Bye-laws – Section 21, which provides that a power to issue orders includes power to rescind, applies only to Central Acts or statutory regulations; it cannot be invoked to imply a power of removal from a society's memorandum of association. Held, reliance on Section 21 by the respondents was misplaced. (Para 10) C) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Temporary Injunction – Article 227 Interference – Where the lower courts have taken a legally untenable view on a pure question of law and failure to recognize lack of authority vitiates the refusal of interim relief, the High Court can exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. Even if granting injunction may amount to final relief or there is delay, an act wholly without jurisdiction or authority can be restrained. Held, petition allowed; temporary injunction granted to restrain implementation of resolution terminating life membership. (Paras 11, 13)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the Executive Committee of a public trust has the power to terminate the life membership of members under Clause 23(ix) of the memorandum of association, which only provides for approval of membership; and whether the High Court should interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution in a temporary injunction matter when lower courts have taken a plausible view.
Final Decision
The writ petition is allowed. The impugned judgment of the District Court and the order of the trial Court dismissing the application for temporary injunction are set aside. The application (Exh. 5) for temporary injunction is allowed, restraining the respondents from giving effect to Resolution No. 7 dated 03/03/2015. Rule made absolute accordingly.
Law Points
- Power to approve membership does not imply power to remove life members
- memorandum of association of public trust is a scheme under Section 50A of Maharashtra Public Trusts Act
- 1950
- and has force of a decree
- Section 21 of General Clauses Act
- 1897
- not applicable to private bye-laws
- temporary injunction may be granted even if it results in final relief when act is without authority
- High Court can interfere under Article 227 when lower court view is legally untenable.
