Case Note & Summary
The appeal arose from a dispute between John D'Souza, a workman, and the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC). The workman joined as a bus conductor in 1984 and was a union activist. He remained absent from duty from 18 August 2005 without prior permission. After a notice, he was served with a charge sheet on 23 June 2006. A domestic enquiry was held, and the workman participated but failed to produce evidence despite multiple adjournments. The enquiry officer found the charges proved, and the disciplinary authority dismissed him from service on 11 October 2010. Since an industrial dispute was pending before the Labour Court, the Corporation sought approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court initially held the enquiry fair but later rejected the approval application, finding that the workman had applied for leave and reported for duty, and that there was victimisation. The Corporation challenged this, leading to multiple rounds of litigation. The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the Labour Court's order, holding that the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction by considering additional evidence not part of the domestic enquiry. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Division Bench's order and restoring the Labour Court's order, holding that the Labour Court's jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) is limited but includes considering allegations of victimisation if supported by material on record. The Court found that the Labour Court had not exceeded its jurisdiction and that the Division Bench erred in interfering.
Headnote
A) Industrial Law - Section 33(2)(b) - Scope of Enquiry - The Labour Court's jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is limited to examining whether a prima facie case for dismissal exists and whether the employer has complied with the conditions of the section, including payment of one month's wages. The court cannot permit parties to adduce fresh evidence not produced in the domestic enquiry or act as an appellate authority. However, the court may consider allegations of victimisation or unfair labour practice if supported by material on record. (Paras 3, 14-20) B) Industrial Law - Section 33(2)(b) - Prima Facie Case - The test for a prima facie case is whether on the evidence led, it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question, not whether that was the only conclusion possible. The Labour Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the disciplinary authority. (Paras 8, 20) C) Industrial Law - Section 33(2)(b) - Additional Evidence - The Labour Court cannot rely on documents or evidence that were not part of the domestic enquiry proceedings, as the scope of enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) is restricted to the material already on record. (Paras 11, 20) D) Industrial Law - Section 33(2)(b) - Victimisation - The Labour Court may consider whether the dismissal amounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice, but such finding must be based on material that was part of the domestic enquiry or otherwise available on record, not on fresh evidence adduced before the Labour Court. (Paras 10, 20)
Issue of Consideration
What is the scope and ambit of the enquiry to be held by a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal while granting or refusing approval for the discharge or dismissal of a workman under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
Final Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 30 November 2018, and restored the order of the First Additional Labour Court, Bangalore dated 28 October 2016 rejecting the Corporation's application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Law Points
- Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act
- 1947
- scope of enquiry
- prima facie case
- victimisation
- unfair labour practice
- additional evidence
- domestic enquiry
