Case Note & Summary
The appellant, Vilas Trimbak Sanap, filed a partition suit (RCS No. 499/2014) against his father and brothers (respondent Nos. 4–6) claiming a 1/4th share in ancestral properties. On the same day the suit was filed, 29 December 2014, the parties entered into a compromise and the trial court passed a consent decree. Thereafter, respondent Nos. 1–3, who claimed to be legal heirs of a co‑owner and asserted an existing share in the same properties, challenged the decree by filing Regular Civil Appeal No. 50/2015 before the District Judge‑1, Beed. They contended that the decree was obtained by fraud and collusion, without impleading them as necessary parties, and that earlier suits for partition had been withdrawn. The first appellate court, vide judgment and order dated 12 January 2016, set aside the consent decree, allowed the appeal, and remanded the matter to the trial court with a direction to implead respondent Nos. 1–3 and decide afresh. Aggrieved, the original plaintiff filed the present appeal from order (AO No. 30/2016) before the High Court. The appellant’s primary ground was that the decree being a consent decree, an appeal against it was barred by Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and that a third party could not maintain such an appeal. He relied on the Supreme Court decisions in Daljit Kaur v. Muktar Steels Pvt. Ltd. and Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh. The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that they had a right to challenge the decree because it was obtained by fraud and by concealing material facts. They highlighted that their names were recorded in the revenue records as successors to a share in the suit lands, that earlier suits had been filed and withdrawn, and that the compromise was a collusive act to defeat their rights. They placed reliance on Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, Kishun v. Bihari, Kantaben T. Shah v. Devendrakumar C. Shah, and Chandrabhan Chunilal Agarwal v. Sharad Ramgopal Radhavallab Agarwal. After hearing both sides and perusing the record, the High Court framed three questions for determination: (1) Whether the appeal before the first appellate court was maintainable; (2) Whether the decree of 29 December 2014 could be treated as a consent decree; and (3) Whether the impugned judgment of the first appellate court was sustainable. The court then began examining the merits, noting that the trial court had decreed the suit in terms of the compromise deed. The available text of the judgment does not contain the final decision, as it ends abruptly during the analysis. Therefore, the ultimate holding, ratio decidendi, and operative directions are not mentioned in the provided extract.
Headnote
A) Civil Procedure - Consent Decree - Appeal by Third Party - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 96(3) - The court considered whether a consent decree passed in a partition suit could be challenged by non-parties claiming a share, despite the bar on appeals from consent decrees. Appellant argued the decree was unappealable; respondents contended fraud and collusion vitiated the decree and the bar did not apply. (Paras 4,9) B) Property Law - Partition Suit - Fraud on Court and Necessary Parties - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order I Rule 10 - The respondents alleged that the consent decree was obtained by concealing their pre-existing rights as legal heirs recorded in revenue records, and by not impleading them as necessary parties. The court examined whether such circumstances rendered the decree vulnerable. (Paras 5-8) C) Civil Procedure - Appellate Remand - Scope of Interference - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XLI Rule 23 - The first appellate court remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh adjudication after impleading the third parties. The High Court examined the correctness of that approach in light of the Section 96(3) bar and allegations of fraud. (Paras 3,9-10)
Issue of Consideration
i) Whether the appeal filed by present Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 before the first appellate court against the decree passed on 29th December, 2014 by the trial court was maintainable? ii) Whether the decree passed by the Trial Court on 29th December, 2014 can be held to be a consent decree? iii) Whether the impugned judgment is sustainable?
Law Points
- Section 96(3) CPC bars appeal from consent decree by party to compromise
- third party may challenge consent decree obtained by fraud or collusion
- necessary party must be impleaded in partition suit
- fraud vitiates all proceedings
