Case Note & Summary
The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against the High Court's judgment which declared that a compromise decree dated 25 March 1976, entered into between the appellant (a purchaser) and three sons of the propositus (defendants 2-4) in an execution appeal, did not bind the plaintiffs (respondents 1-6 and 10), who were the grandsons of the propositus and coparceners. The dispute originated from a joint family property originally purchased by Chikkanna (propositus). His three sons sold the property in 1950 with a reconveyance clause. After a series of litigations, the sons obtained a decree for reconveyance in 1969, which became final. In execution, possession was restored to them in 1974. Thereafter, the appellant filed an execution appeal, and the three sons entered into a compromise with the appellant, dividing the property. The plaintiffs, who were minors at the time and not parties to the compromise, later filed a suit seeking a declaration that the compromise was not binding on them. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the High Court reversed, holding that the property was joint family property and the compromise without the plaintiffs' consent was not binding. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that upon reacquisition through the court decree, the property reverted to its character as joint family property. Therefore, any compromise affecting the property required the consent of all coparceners, including the plaintiffs. The compromise was thus not binding on them.
Headnote
A) Hindu Law - Joint Family Property - Character of Property - Property reacquired by coparceners through a court decree in execution of a reconveyance clause reverts to its original character as joint family property in their hands, as the reconveyance enures to the benefit of the entire family. (Paras 16-17)
B) Civil Procedure - Compromise Decree - Binding Nature - A compromise decree entered into by some coparceners in an execution appeal, without the knowledge and consent of other coparceners who were not parties to the compromise, is not binding on the non-consenting coparceners, as they have an independent right, title, and interest in the joint family property. (Paras 9, 11, 17-18)
C) Hindu Law - Coparcenary - Alienation - Any alienation of joint family property, including by way of compromise, requires the consent of all coparceners; otherwise, it is not binding on the non-consenting coparceners. (Paras 9, 17)
Issue of Consideration
Whether a compromise decree entered into by some coparceners in an execution appeal, without the consent of other coparceners, is binding on the non-consenting coparceners in respect of joint family property.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment and decree dated 31 March 2005, which declared that the compromise decree dated 25 March 1976 was not binding on the plaintiffs (respondent nos. 1-6 and 10) and granted permanent injunction in their favor.
Law Points
- Joint family property
- Coparcenary
- Compromise decree
- Binding nature
- Consent of coparceners
- Hindu Succession Act
- 1956
- Section 6
- Code of Civil Procedure
- 1908
- Order 23 Rule 3
Case Details
Civil Appeal No(s). 7141 of 2008
Doddamuniyappa (Dead) Through LRs.
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Nature of Litigation
Civil suit for declaration that a compromise decree is not binding on the plaintiffs and for permanent injunction.
Remedy Sought
Declaration that the compromise dated 25 March 1976 entered into between the appellant and respondent nos. 7-9 did not bind the rights of the plaintiffs (respondent nos. 1-6 and 10) and for permanent injunction.
Filing Reason
The plaintiffs, who were grandsons of the propositus and coparceners, were not parties to the compromise and alleged that it was entered into without their knowledge and consent, and that the compromise affected their rights in the joint family property.
Previous Decisions
The trial court dismissed the suit on 19 June 1999, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish the property as joint family property. The High Court in Regular First Appeal No. 611 of 1999 reversed and decreed the suit on 31 March 2005, holding the property as joint family and the compromise not binding on the plaintiffs.
Issues
Whether the subject property was joint family property in the hands of the sons of the propositus after reacquisition through a court decree.
Whether a compromise decree entered into by some coparceners without the consent of other coparceners is binding on the non-consenting coparceners.
Submissions/Arguments
Appellant's counsel argued that the property was not joint family property as it was sold by the sons jointly in 1950, and the compromise did not change its character; the trial court's finding was correct.
Respondents' counsel argued that upon reacquisition through the court decree, the property reverted to joint family property, and the compromise without the plaintiffs' consent was not binding on them.
Ratio Decidendi
Property reacquired by coparceners through a court decree in execution of a reconveyance clause reverts to its original character as joint family property. Any compromise or alienation of such property requires the consent of all coparceners; otherwise, it is not binding on non-consenting coparceners.
Judgment Excerpts
The property inherited from the father by his sons becomes joint family property in the hands of the sons as held by this Court in Smt. Dipo Vs. Wassan Singh and Others 1983(3) SCC 376.
There remain no controversy on the issue that if the subject property stands reassumed in its original character of joint family property on restoration of possession in pursuance to the decree of the Court dated 7th March, 1974, no compromise could have been arrived at between the parties at the stage of execution appeal without the consent of respondent nos. 1 to 6(plaintiffs) and such a compromise would not bind the rights of the respondent nos. 1 to 6 herein.
Procedural History
The propositus Chikkanna purchased the suit property. His three sons sold it in 1950 with a reconveyance clause. The sons filed O.S. No. 297 of 1964 for reconveyance, which was dismissed. They appealed in Regular Appeal No. 128 of 1967, which was allowed on 27 August 1969. The appellant's Regular Second Appeal No. 69 of 1970 was dismissed. Execution proceedings (Execution No. 121 of 1972) led to court execution of reconveyance deed and delivery of possession on 7 March 1974. The appellant filed Execution Appeal No. 2 of 1974, in which a compromise was entered on 25 March 1976. The plaintiffs (grandsons) filed O.S. No. 5575 of 1980 challenging the compromise. The trial court dismissed the suit on 19 June 1999. The High Court in Regular First Appeal No. 611 of 1999 allowed the appeal on 31 March 2005. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 7141 of 2008.
Acts & Sections
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order 23 Rule 3, Section 107
