Bombay High Court Dismisses Airport Authority's Appeal Against Refusal of Injunction in Lease Dispute with Hotel Company. Court holds that a lessor cannot restrain lessee from creating third-party rights in assets or shareholding without a contractual bar, and that the lessee's use of FSI from one plot for construction on another does not constitute breach of lease terms.

High Court: Bombay High Court Bench: BOMBAY
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Case Note & Summary

The appellant, Airport Authority of India (AAI), a statutory authority under the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994, filed an appeal against an order of the Bombay Civil Court at Borivali Division, Dindoshi, Mumbai, dismissing its notice of motion seeking a temporary injunction. The respondent no.1, M/s Hotel Leela Ventures Ltd., is a hospitality company that operates 'The Leela' hotel near Mumbai International Airport. AAI had leased two adjacent plots of land to the respondent: one of 18,000 sq. meters (leased in 1994) for constructing a hotel, and another of 11,000 sq. meters (leased on 7 February 1996) for setting up a 150-room hotel. The lease for the 11,000 sq. meters plot was for 30 years from 1 April 1994 to 31 March 2024. It was admitted that the respondent had not constructed any hotel on the 11,000 sq. meters plot but had used its FSI for additional construction on the existing hotel on the 18,000 sq. meters plot. AAI alleged that this constituted a breach of the lease deed and that the respondent was attempting to create third-party rights in its assets and shareholding, which would prejudice AAI's rights. The trial court dismissed the notice of motion, leading to the present appeal. The High Court framed the issues of whether the trial court was justified in refusing the injunction and whether the use of FSI from one plot for construction on another was a breach. The court analyzed the lease deeds and found that the lease for the 11,000 sq. meters plot expressly permitted the lessee to use the FSI for construction on the demised land or any other land held by the lessee. Thus, no breach was established. Regarding the injunction, the court held that the lease deeds did not contain any restriction on the lessee's right to deal with its assets or shares. The court applied the principles of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, and Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which bars an injunction to restrain a person from doing an act he is not bound to do. The court found that AAI failed to make out a prima facie case, and the balance of convenience was in favor of the respondent, as an injunction would hamper its business operations. The court also noted that any loss to AAI could be compensated by damages. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the trial court's order was upheld.

Headnote

A) Lease Law - Interpretation of Lease Deeds - Breach of Lease Terms - The court examined whether the lessee's use of FSI from one plot (11000 sq. meters) for additional construction on another plot (18000 sq. meters) constituted a breach of the lease deed. The court held that the lease deed for the 11000 sq. meters plot permitted use of FSI for construction on the demised land or any other land held by the lessee, and thus no breach was established. (Paras 2-5)

B) Injunction Law - Temporary Injunction - Prima Facie Case - The court considered whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case for injunction restraining the lessee from creating third-party rights in its assets or shareholding. The court held that the lease deeds did not contain any restriction on the lessee's right to deal with its assets or shares, and the plaintiff failed to show any breach of lease terms. (Paras 6-10)

C) Injunction Law - Balance of Convenience and Irreparable Loss - The court assessed the balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The court held that the balance of convenience was in favor of the lessee, as the injunction would prevent the lessee from raising funds for its business, and the plaintiff could be compensated by damages if ultimately successful. (Paras 11-15)

D) Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 41(b) - Bar to Injunction - The court noted that under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, an injunction cannot be granted to restrain a person from doing an act which he is not bound to do. Since the lease deeds did not prohibit the lessee from creating third-party rights, no injunction could be granted. (Para 16)

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Issue of Consideration

Whether the trial court was justified in refusing a temporary injunction restraining the lessee from creating third-party rights in its assets or shareholding, and whether the lessee's use of FSI from one leased plot for construction on another plot constitutes a breach of lease terms.

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Final Decision

Appeal dismissed. The impugned order of the trial court refusing temporary injunction is upheld. No order as to costs.

Law Points

  • Lease agreement interpretation
  • Temporary injunction principles
  • Prima facie case
  • Balance of convenience
  • Irreparable loss
  • Specific performance of contract
  • Section 41(b) Specific Relief Act
  • 1963
  • Section 38 Specific Relief Act
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Case Details

2019 LawText (BOM) (10) 53

APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.960 OF 2019 WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1136 OF 2019

2019-10-18

S.C. GUPTE, J.

Mr. Ashutosh Kumbhakoni, Senior Advocate (Advocate General), a/w. Mr. Ajay Khaire, Mr. Ashish Prasad, Mr. Shailesh Poria, Mr. Rohit Sharma and Mr. C. Keswani, i/b. Economic Laws Practice, for the Appellant. Mr. Rafique Dada, Senior Advocate, a/w. Mr. Ankoosh Mehta, Ms. Dhvani Shah, i/b. Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas & Co., for Respondent No.1. Mr. Ravi Kadam, Senior Advocate, a/w. Dr. Birendra Saraf, Mr. Rohan Kadam, Ms. Saumyata Panwar and Ms. Kritika Sethi, i/b. Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas & Co., for Respondent Nos.3 and 4. Mr. Vivek Menon, a/w. Mr. S.R. Tejpal and Mr. Ashok Varma, i/b. Tejpal & Co., for Respondent Nos.9 to 11. Mr. Janak Dwarkadas, Senior Advocate, a/w. Mr. Rohit Gupta, Ms. Rishika Harish and Mr. Nikhil Rajani, i/b. M/s V. Deshpande & Co., for Respondent No.13.

Airport Authority of India

M/s Hotel Leela Ventures Ltd. And Others

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Nature of Litigation

Civil appeal from order dismissing notice of motion for temporary injunction in a lease dispute.

Remedy Sought

Appellant (plaintiff) sought temporary injunction restraining respondent no.1 (defendant no.1) from creating third party rights in respect of assets or shareholding of defendant no.1.

Filing Reason

Appellant alleged that respondent no.1 breached lease terms by using FSI of one plot for construction on another and was attempting to create third party rights, which would prejudice appellant's rights.

Previous Decisions

Trial court dismissed the notice of motion, leading to the present appeal.

Issues

Whether the trial court was justified in refusing a temporary injunction restraining the lessee from creating third-party rights in its assets or shareholding. Whether the lessee's use of FSI from one leased plot for construction on another plot constitutes a breach of lease terms.

Submissions/Arguments

Appellant argued that the lease deed for the 11,000 sq. meters plot required construction of a hotel with 150 rooms, and the lessee's failure to construct and use of FSI for other construction was a breach. Also, the lessee was attempting to create third-party rights in assets, which would affect appellant's reversionary interest. Respondent argued that the lease deed permitted use of FSI for construction on any land held by the lessee, and there was no restriction on creating third-party rights in assets or shareholding. The balance of convenience was in favor of the lessee.

Ratio Decidendi

A lessor cannot obtain an injunction restraining a lessee from creating third-party rights in its assets or shareholding unless the lease deed expressly prohibits such action. The use of FSI from one leased plot for construction on another plot is not a breach if the lease deed permits such use. The principles of temporary injunction require a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, which were not satisfied in this case.

Judgment Excerpts

The impugned order has been passed on a notice of motion taken out by the Appellant (original plaintiff) seeking a temporary restraint against Respondent No.1 (original defendant no.1) from creating third party rights in respect of assets or shareholding of defendant no.1. The plaintiff is an authority constituted under the provisions of Airports Authority of India Act, 1994. It is an admitted position that defendant no.1 has not made any construction on this property as of this date. Entire FSI of this plot of land has, however, been used by defendant no.1 for carrying out additional construction on the existing hotel building on the plot of 18000 sq. meters, i.e. The Leela.

Procedural History

The appellant (plaintiff) filed a suit in the Bombay Civil Court at Borivali Division, Dindoshi, Mumbai, and took out a notice of motion for temporary injunction. The trial court dismissed the notice of motion. The appellant then filed the present appeal from order before the High Court of Bombay.

Acts & Sections

  • Airports Authority of India Act, 1994:
  • Specific Relief Act, 1963: Section 41(b), Section 38
  • Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): Order 39 Rules 1 and 2
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