Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose from the medical retirement of a driver employed by Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSRTC), successor to Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. The appellant was appointed as a driver on 01.05.2014 after fulfilling eligibility criteria and was declared medically fit at entry. During a routine periodical medical examination, he was found to be colour blind and declared unfit for the post of driver. His appeal and subsequent representation to the Medical Board were rejected, affirming the unfitness. The corporation rejected his request for alternate employment on the ground that extant rules did not provide for such relief to colour blind drivers, and by order dated 27.01.2016 retired him with effect from 06.01.2016, granting additional monetary benefits. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 5164 of 2016 before the High Court challenging the retirement order and seeking alternate employment, contending that colour blindness falls within disablement under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, and that denying alternate employment violated Section 47 of the Act and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. He also relied on Clause 14 of a Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979 entered under Section 12(3) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which provided alternate employment to drivers found colour blind. The Single Judge allowed the writ petition on 10.03.2016, holding that colour blindness falls within disablement under the Act. The corporation appealed, and the Division Bench of the High Court by order dated 21.08.2017 in Writ Appeal No. 1343 of 2017 set aside the Single Judge's order, relying on Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. B.S. Reddy, (2018) 12 SCC 704, and directed the appellant to make a representation to the corporation seeking benefits under existing regulations and schemes. The Supreme Court framed four issues: whether retirement without alternate employment was sustainable; whether the 1979 settlement clause remained valid despite 1986 settlement and circulars; whether the corporation made a bona fide assessment of alternate employment options; and whether reliance on B.S. Reddy was tenable. The appellant argued that the 1979 MOS was binding under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, that he acquired disability during service and was entitled to alternate employment under Kunal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 524, and under Section 47 of the 1995 Act, and relied on Mohamed Ibrahim v. Chairman and Managing Director, Civil Appeal No. 6785 of 2023. The respondent corporation contended that the 1979 MOS was replaced by a 1986 settlement whose Clause 5(d) only required identification of suitable alternative job 'to the extent possible', that colour blindness was not a disability under Section 2(i) of the Act as it did not meet the 40% threshold, that no suitable post existed for an illiterate appellant, and that internal circulars justified retirement. The Court held that medical unfitness for a specific post does not mean total incapacity for public service; colour blindness disqualifies only from driving, not from all non-driving roles. The appellant had requested reassignment as a Shramik, which did not require normal colour vision, but the corporation made no effort to assess suitability or availability of such posts. Regulation 6A(5)(b) only prescribed terminal benefits and did not bar alternate employment. Clause 14 of the 1979 MOS specifically provided alternate job with pay protection for colour blind drivers and remained valid; the later 1986 settlement was general and did not expressly or impliedly override the specific clause. Internal administrative circulars could not override binding service conditions created by a statutory settlement under Section 12(3). The High Court erred in applying B.S. Reddy, which dealt only with the limited scope of Section 47 of the 1995 Act and did not address independent rights under industrial settlements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was entitled to alternate employment under the 1979 settlement with pay protection and continuity of service.
Headnote
A) Service Law - Alternate Employment - Medical Unfitness for Specific Post Does Not Imply Total Incapacity - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 12(3); APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 Regulation 6A(5)(b) - Colour blindness disqualified appellant from driving but not from non-driving posts; employer must assess feasibility of alternate employment before retirement; failure to consider appellant's request for Shramik post violated statutory obligations and administrative fairness - Held that retirement without bona fide assessment of alternate employment is unsustainable (Paras 12-14). B) Labour Law - Binding Industrial Settlement - Specific Clause Prevails Over General Settlement - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 12(3) - Clause 14 of MOS dated 17.12.1979 provided alternate job with pay protection to colour blind drivers; subsequent MOS dated 22.12.1986 did not expressly override or impliedly nullify the 1979 specific clause; both operate harmoniously - Held that appellant entitled to alternate employment under 1979 settlement despite later general settlement (Paras 10.2, 10.3, 14-15). C) Administrative Law - Administrative Instructions vs Statutory Settlement - Administrative circulars cannot override binding service conditions - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 12(3) - Internal circulars dated 10.11.2014 and 14.05.2015 denied alternate employment to colour-blind drivers; these instructions could not supersede a statutory settlement entered under Section 12(3) - Held that circulars are invalid to the extent they conflict with settlement rights (Para 10.4, 12). D) Persons with Disabilities - Scope of Section 47 - Independent Rights Under Settlement - Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 Sections 2(i), 47 - High Court applied B.S. Reddy which limited Section 47 applicability; but appellant's claim arose independently under industrial settlement, not solely under the Act - Held that reliance on B.S. Reddy was misplaced; independent contractual and statutory rights to alternate employment must be considered (Paras 10.5, 6, 8.3).
Issue of Consideration
Whether retirement of appellant on medical grounds due to colour blindness without offering alternate employment is legally sustainable in light of applicable service regulations and binding settlements; Whether Clause 14 of Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979 under Section 12(3) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 remains valid and enforceable despite subsequent 1986 settlement and internal circulars; Whether respondents complied with duty to make bona fide assessment of alternate employment options; Whether High Court correctly relied on B.S. Reddy in context of appellant's independent rights under industrial settlement
Final Decision
The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and allowed the appeal. It held that the appellant was entitled to alternate employment under Clause 14 of the binding 1979 Memorandum of Settlement with pay protection and continuity of service, and that the respondents' retirement order without bona fide assessment of alternate employment was unsustainable. The reliance on 1986 settlement and internal circulars was rejected.
Law Points
- Medical unfitness for a specific post does not automatically entail incapacity for all public service
- Employer must make bona fide assessment of alternate employment before retiring employee with acquired disability
- Binding settlement under Section 12(3) of Industrial Disputes Act
- 1947 overrides internal administrative circulars
- Specific settlement clause for colour blind drivers remains enforceable despite later general settlement
- Section 47 of Persons with Disabilities Act
- 1995 not sole basis when independent settlement rights exist
