Case Note & Summary
This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of India arose from a judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh which had partly allowed an appeal against conviction. The appellant, Narayan Yadav, was the original accused who had himself lodged a First Information Report on 27.09.2019 at Korba Kotwali Police Station, District Korba, which was registered for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In the FIR, the appellant stated that on 24.09.2019 he had gone to the house of Ram Babu Sharma, where after consuming alcohol, an argument arose because Sharma asked him to bring his girlfriend and leave her with him for one night. The appellant admitted that in anger he picked up a knife from the house, inflicted blows on Sharma's neck and stomach, and then hit him with a log of wood on the head, legs, and private part, causing death. He then allegedly ransacked the room, took away a purse containing Rs. 7000 and car keys, locked the house, and drove away in a Bolero, later meeting with an accident. The post-mortem report exhibited as Exhibit PW-34 recorded multiple incised wounds on the deceased's forehead, parietal bones, abdomen, and chest, and the cause of death was shock resulting from excessive bleeding from the right side of the chest and injury to the upper lobe of the right lung. The prosecution examined witnesses including panch witnesses, police officials, and Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10) who conducted the post-mortem. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1538 of 2021 partly allowed the appeal, altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I IPC, giving the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. The appellant then preferred the present appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court identified several errors in the High Court's judgment. The first and foremost error was that the High Court examined the medical evidence in detail and then directly corroborated it with the contents of the FIR lodged by the appellant himself, thereby treating the confessional FIR as substantive evidence. The Court held that a first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence; it can only be used to corroborate the maker under Section 157 or contradict under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and cannot be used as evidence against the maker if he himself becomes an accused unless he offers himself as a witness. The Court referred to Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., Faddi v. State of M.P., and Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, emphasizing that a confessional FIR by an accused is inadmissible in evidence, and if it contains incriminating materials difficult to separate from exculpatory portions, the whole must be excluded. The High Court was found to have overlooked these fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence. The analysis in the provided excerpt focused on the admissibility of the confessional FIR; the index indicated further consideration of expert evidence being advisory, the implications of Sections 27 and 8 of the Evidence Act, and the incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, but the detailed reasoning and final operative order were not included in the excerpt. The final decision of the Supreme Court on the appeal is therefore not available from the provided text, though the court clearly found the High Court's approach erroneous.
Headnote
A) Evidence Law - Admissibility of First Information Report - Confessional FIR by Accused Cannot Be Used as Substantive Evidence - Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 145 and 157 - The High Court relied on the appellant's FIR which contained a confession of the offence, erroneously treating it as substantive proof corroborated by medical evidence; this violated the principle that an FIR can only be used to contradict or corroborate the maker under Sections 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and cannot be used against the maker if he is an accused, unless he offers himself as a witness. Held that the High Court's reliance on the confessional FIR was a fundamental error. (Paras 15-18) B) Evidence Law - Confessions and Admissions - Inculpatory Statements in FIR by Accused Must Be Excluded - Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 17, 21, 25 - The Supreme Court reiterated that while non-inculpatory admissions in an accused's FIR may be admissible under Section 21, a confessional FIR cannot be used against the maker; if the statement contains incriminating materials difficult to separate from exculpatory portions, the whole must be excluded under Section 25. The High Court failed to consider Nisar Ali, Faddi, and Aghnoo Nagesia, which establish that a first information report in the nature of a confession by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. Held that the High Court's approach was erroneous and the confessional FIR should have been excluded. (Paras 19-21)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in affirming conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC by relying on the appellant's confessional FIR and medical opinion, and whether Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC was correctly applied.
Law Points
- A first information report lodged by an accused which contains a confession is not substantive evidence and cannot be used against the maker at trial unless the maker offers himself as a witness
- It can only be used to contradict or corroborate under Sections 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act
- 1872
- If the FIR contains incriminating materials difficult to separate from exculpatory portions
- the whole must be excluded under Section 25
- Non-inculpatory admissions in an accused's FIR may be admissible under Sections 17 and 21
- The High Court's reliance on a confessional FIR to corroborate medical evidence is a fundamental error
