Supreme Court Upholds Conviction of Editor and Publisher for Contempt in Article Scandalizing Judge. Publication imputing improper motives to judge in connection with loan to brother's firm held to interfere with administration of justice and constitute contempt, rejecting arguments that contempt remedy is obsolete or that mere bias allegation is not contempt.

Contempt of court proceedings initiated by the State against the publisher and editor of a weekly periodical for publishing an article allegedly scandalizing a High Court judge and tending to interfere with the administration of justice.

The State sought conviction and punishment of the appellants for contempt of court.

An article titled 'STORY OF A LOAN and Blitz Thackersey Libel Case' published in 'Mainstream' suggested a connection between a loan granted to a firm in which the judge's brother was a partner and the judge's decree in a libel suit, imputing improper motives and lack of integrity to the judge.

The Bombay High Court found the appellants guilty of contempt, sentenced the second appellant to one month's imprisonment and fine, and ordered costs.

Whether the impugned article exceeded the bounds of fair and reasonable criticism and constituted contempt of court? Whether proceedings for contempt for scandalizing a judge have become obsolete and the proper remedy is an action for libel? Whether the allegation that the judge knew or must have known of the loan to his brother's firm was made in bona fide belief and whether such belief is a defence to contempt? Whether the statements, if at all, merely amounted to a charge of bias against the judge on the ground that his brother had a financial interest in the firm, and could not be regarded as contempt?

The article did not cast any aspersion on the integrity of the judge nor imputed dishonesty; it merely raised a question of propriety. Contempt for scandalizing a judge is obsolete; the aggrieved judge should file a libel suit. The allegations were published in bona fide belief that they were truthful; there was no evidence that the judge did not know about the loan. The statements only alleged bias based on the brother's financial interest, which does not amount to contempt.

Contempt of court is committed when a publication attributes improper motives to a judge in his judicial capacity, even without direct imputation of dishonesty, as it tends to lower the dignity and authority of the court and interfere with the administration of justice. The test to distinguish defamation from contempt is whether the publication is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law, and whether the wrong is done to the judge personally or to the public. Contempt jurisdiction for scandalizing the court is not obsolete and must be exercised when necessary. Bona fide belief is not a defence if the allegations are false and unsubstantiated. The mere fact that a judge's brother has a pecuniary interest does not per se establish legal bias.

It is open to anyone to express fair, reasonable and legitimate criticism of any act or conduct of a Judge in his judicial capacity or even to make a proper and fair comment on any decision given by him. But, if an article attributes improper motives to the Judge, it not only transgresses the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but has a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of the court and would amount to contempt of court. There is a distinction between a mere libel or defamation of a judge and what amounts to contempt of court. The tests are: (i) Is the impugned publication a mere defamatory attack on the Judge or is it calculated to interfere with the due course of Justice or the proper administration of law by his court? and (ii) Is the wrong done to the Judge personally or is it done to the public? The mere fact that his brother happened to have a pecuniary interest in the firm could not per se establish that the Judge would also have a financial interest therein so as to constitute legal bias.

Bombay High Court, in exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction, convicted the appellants of contempt of Justice Tarkunde and the court on November 24, 1965, sentencing D.R. Goel to one month's imprisonment and fine with costs. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.