Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose from a prosecution under the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948. The Order was originally made by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, which was a temporary Act set to expire on 26 January 1955. Before its expiry, the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955, was promulgated on 21 January 1955, conferring similar powers on the Central Government. Section 16 of the Ordinance provided that all orders made under the 1946 Act, insofar as they could be made under the Ordinance, shall continue in force, and further provided that any appointment made, licence or permit granted or direction issued under any such order shall continue in force. The Ordinance was later replaced by the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, which by Section 16(i)(a) repealed the Ordinance and by Section 16(i)(b) repealed any other law in force in any State insofar as such law controlled the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any essential commodity. Section 16(2) of the 1955 Act contained a saving clause identical to Section 16 of the Ordinance. The respondents were accused of an offence under the Order on 30 August 1955. They contended that the Order had ceased to be in force because the 1946 Act had expired and that the saving clause in Section 16 of the Ordinance did not save the Order itself but only past acts done under it. They further argued that even if saved by the Ordinance, the Order was repealed by Section 16(i)(b) of the 1955 Act. The State of Bihar appealed by special leave to the Supreme Court after the lower court acquitted the respondents. The Supreme Court interpreted Section 16 of the Ordinance as having two distinct parts: the first part prospectively saved the orders for the future and acts done thereafter, while the second part retrospectively saved past acts done before the Ordinance. The Court held that the Order was saved by Section 16 of the Ordinance and was continued by Section 16(2) of the 1955 Act. The Order was therefore in force on the date of the alleged offence. The appeal was allowed, and the acquittal was set aside.
Headnote
A) Statutory Interpretation - Repeal and Savings Clauses - Interpretation of Saving Clause in Section 16 of the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955 - Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955, Section 16; Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, Sections 1(3) and 3(1) - The first part of Section 16 of the Ordinance saved orders made under the 1946 Act and permitted acts done under such orders after the Ordinance came into force; the second part saved past acts done before the Ordinance took effect. The Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948 was accordingly saved and continued in force. Held that the Order was valid on 30 August 1955 when the offence was committed (Paras not mentioned). B) Statutory Interpretation - Continuance of Subordinate Legislation - Effect of Section 16(2) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 - Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Section 16(2) - Section 16(2) of the 1955 Act reproduced the saving clause of Section 16 of the Ordinance and thereby continued the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948. The Order was not repealed by Section 16(i)(b) of the 1955 Act because it was expressly saved. Held that the Order remained in force (Paras not mentioned).
Issue of Consideration
Whether the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948, continued in force under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, after the expiry of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, in light of the saving clauses in the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955, and the Essential Commodities Act, 1955
Final Decision
The Supreme Court held that the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948 was saved by Section 16 of the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955 and was continued by Section 16(2) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It was in force on 30 August 1955 when the alleged offence was committed. The first part of Section 16 of the Ordinance saved the order and acts done subsequent to the Ordinance, while the second part saved past acts. The acquittal of the respondents was thus set aside.
Law Points
- Interpretation of saving clauses in repealing statutes
- distinction between saving of orders and saving of past acts
- continuation of subordinate legislation under new parent act
- an order made under a repealed statute continues in force if the repealing statute contains a saving provision
- scope of section 16 of the Essential Commodities Ordinance
- 1955
- scope of section 16(2) of the Essential Commodities Act
