Supreme Court Upholds Employer in Industrial Disputes Act Case on Go-Slow Misconduct and Dismissal Permission. Section 33 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Empowers Tribunal Only to Grant or Refuse Dismissal Permission, Not Substitute Lesser Punishment; Finding of No Evidence Against Sixteen Workmen Perverse.

Industrial dispute arising out of applications under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for permission to dismiss workmen for go-slow, and a cross-application under Section 33A alleging illegal suspension.

The management sought permission under Section 33 to dismiss forty-eight workmen; the workmen sought a declaration of breach of Section 33 and relief under Section 33A.

The management alleged that the workmen resorted to an unjustified go-slow in January and February 1952 during pending conciliation and adjudication proceedings, leading to suspension and the need for dismissal permission.

The Industrial Tribunal granted permission only to suspend thirty-two workmen for seven days, refused permission for sixteen workmen, and dismissed the workmen's Section 33A application. The Labour Appellate Tribunal allowed withdrawal of the workmen's appeal under Section 33A, but dismissed the management's appeal holding that suspension was substantive punishment and the management's application was mala fide.

Whether the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act could substitute its own punishment instead of granting or refusing permission to dismiss. Whether the suspension of workmen pending enquiry and proceedings under Section 33 was punitive in the absence of Standing Orders. Whether the finding of no evidence against sixteen workmen was perverse when the same evidence applied to the other thirty-two workmen. Whether the management's application for permission to dismiss was made mala fide due to the wording of the suspension notices.

The management argued that the Industrial Tribunal could only grant or refuse permission to dismiss and could not substitute its own judgment about the quantum of punishment. The management contended that the suspension was not punishment but an interim order pending enquiry and proceedings under Section 33. The management asserted that the finding of no evidence against sixteen workmen was perverse as the same evidence existed against all forty-eight workmen. The workmen argued that the management's applications under Section 33 had not been preceded by any enquiry into the misconduct and were therefore liable to be rejected. The workmen claimed that the order of suspension amounted to punishment and thus Section 33 had been contravened. The workmen contended that there was no evidence against sixteen of them and that the go-slow was not unjustified.

The Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has no power to substitute its own punishment; it can only grant or refuse permission to dismiss. Suspension pending enquiry and proceedings under Section 33 is not punitive if no Standing Orders provide otherwise, though the employer remains liable to pay wages during suspension. A finding of no evidence against some workmen when the same evidence applies to others is perverse. Go-slow is serious misconduct, insidious in nature, and cannot be countenanced, particularly during pending conciliation proceedings.

The only possible order on the applications of the management under s. 33 of the Act was to permit it to dismiss the workmen provided there was evidence against them all. It was not open to the Industrial Tribunal to substitute some other form of punishment and give permission therefor. The finding of the Industrial Tribunal that there was no evidence against sixteen workmen was, on the face of it, perverse, since the evidence against them was the same as against the thirty-two others. Go-slow was serious misconduct, insidious in nature and could not be countenanced.

An adjudication proceeding was pending between the management and its workmen since September 8, 1951. On January 1, 1952, the union issued a notice with forty demands threatening go-slow. Go-slow occurred from January 9 to 12 and again from January 24 to 31, 1952, despite conciliation efforts. The management suspended thirty-three workmen on February 1, 1952, seven more on February 6, and eight more on February 7, giving notices of suspension until further orders. The management filed applications under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on February 6 and February 11, 1952, seeking permission to dismiss the forty-eight workmen. The workmen filed an application under Section 33A on March 29, 1952. The Industrial Tribunal, by award dated September 22, 1952, held that suspension was not punishment, go-slow was unjustified, refused permission for sixteen workmen, granted only seven days' suspension for thirty-two, and dismissed the Section 33A application. Both parties appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The workmen withdrew their appeal regarding Section 33A, and the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the management's appeal on June 3, 1955, and May 21, 1956. The management then appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.

• Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Section 33, Section 33A