Supreme Court Sets Aside Sessions Judge's Committal Order in CrPC Section 437 Matter, Holding Discretion Must Be Exercised Judicially Despite Jurisdiction to Order Commitment Absent Express Discharge. Refusal by Magistrate to Frame Charge for Offence Exclusively Triable by Court of Session Did Not Bar Sessions Judge's Revisional Power Under Section 437 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, but Delay, Harassment, and Lack of Locus Standi of Private Revisionist Made the Commitment Order Injudicious.

Case Note & Summary

The appeals arose from a judgment of the Patna High Court dismissing four revision applications filed by different sets of accused persons. The accused were charged under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code in the court of a Magistrate First Class at Motihari. Four informations were lodged at Ghora Saha police station on April 14, 1960, alleging that the accused, armed with deadly weapons, demanded large sums of money from informants and threatened them with death. After investigation, challans were presented on October 27, 1960. The Magistrate initially framed charges under Section 302 IPC against some accused and under Section 384 or 384/109 IPC against others, but the prosecution later sought to have the case committed to the Court of Session for offences under Sections 386 or 387 IPC, which are exclusively triable by a Court of Session. The Magistrate rejected these applications on January 25, 1962, and again on March 30, 1962, holding that the offence fell under Section 392 IPC and that the case was not exclusively triable by a Court of Session. Thereafter, one of the informants, Sagarmal, filed a revision before the Sessions Judge, Champaran, who allowed the revision and directed the Magistrate to commit the accused for trial by a Court of Session, observing that framing of charges under Sections 386 or 387 IPC could not be ruled out altogether. The accused then filed revision applications before the Patna High Court, contending that the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to order commitment as there was no order of discharge by the Magistrate. The High Court dismissed the revisions, holding that the Magistrate's refusal to frame a charge under Sections 386 or 387 IPC amounted to an implied discharge, thereby attracting the revisional power of the Sessions Judge under Section 437 CrPC. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. The main legal issue was the scope of Section 437 CrPC 1898: whether a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate could direct commitment of a case to the Court of Session in the absence of an express order of discharge by the Magistrate. The appellants argued that the power under Section 437 could be exercised only when the Magistrate had passed an express order of discharge, relying on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nahar Singh v. State and other rulings. The State contended that the Sessions Judge had jurisdiction because the Magistrate's refusal amounted to a discharge of the accused in respect of the major offence, and that the power was discretionary and properly exercised. The Supreme Court examined the language and scheme of the Code and held that there is nothing in Section 437 from which it could be said that the power is not exercisable during the pendency of a trial before a Magistrate or that it can be exercised only where the Magistrate had made an express order of discharge. The Court observed that an express order of discharge is contemplated only in a case where a Magistrate concludes that the act alleged against the accused does not amount to any offence at all, and therefore no question of trying him either himself or by another court arises. The Court disapproved the Allahabad Full Bench decision and other contrary rulings, and approved decisions from the Madras, Patna, Sind, Lahore, and Andhra High Courts. The Court further held that the provisions of Section 437 do not make it obligatory upon a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate to order commitment in every case where an offence is exclusively triable by a Court of Session; the law gives a discretion which must be exercised judicially. Considering the delay in moving the Sessions Judge, the terrible harassment that the accused would face if committed, and the fact that a private party with no locus standi went up in revision after the prosecution's last attempt failed, the Supreme Court concluded that it was injudicious for the Sessions Judge to order commitment. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed and the Sessions Judge's committal order was set aside.

Headnote

Issue of Consideration

Final Decision

Supreme Court held that Sessions Judge had jurisdiction under Section 437 CrPC 1898 to order commitment without an express order of discharge, but that in the circumstances the discretion was exercised injudiciously due to delay, harassment, and lack of locus standi of the private revisionist; accordingly, the appeals were allowed and the Sessions Judge's committal order was set aside.

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