Supreme Court Dismisses Appeal Against District Court's Jurisdiction to Direct Sale of Muth Property Under Scheme Despite Section 92 CPC. Clause (f) of Section 92(1) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Does Not Restrict Managers' Ordinary Administration Powers, and Directions Under Scheme Clauses Are Valid Without Separate Suit.

Case Note & Summary

The dispute arose from the administration of a muth in village Davanur. A suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed in 1942 for framing a scheme for management of the muth. The High Court passed a decree on March 17, 1948 settling the scheme and appointing two joint managers. In 1959 the joint managers were the appellant, Chairman Madappa, and the respondent, M. N. Mahanthadevaru. The scheme's paragraph 11 provided for appointment of two managers for five years and allowed the co-manager or any two interested Veerashaivas to apply for directions if the first defendant refused to cooperate. Paragraph 12 gave liberty to parties, any two interested Veerashaivas, or either manager to apply to the District Court for directions as and when occasion arose for carrying out the scheme. On May 12, 1959, the respondent applied to the Additional District Judge, Mysore, stating that the muth had more than 100 heads of cattle but insufficient income to maintain them. He prayed for an order to sell the cattle as a measure of economy and practical utility. He also suggested that certain lands belonging to the muth, which were cultivated through servants, be leased out for cultivation for one year by public auction for cash consideration to increase income. The appellant objected, contending the application was made without consulting him; he opposed sale of cattle as they were needed for milk supply and manure, and said selling them would be sacrilegious. He also objected to yearly leasing of lands on the ground that existing practice involved villagers cultivating and harvesting crops with no expense to the muth. The two managers were unable to agree. The Additional District Judge, by order dated June 7, 1960, directed that ten milch cows be retained for milk and the remainder sold by public auction, and that right of cultivation of lands belonging to the muth be sold for cash from year to year. The core question was whether the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to pass the order in view of Section 92(1) clause (f) of the CPC, which lists as a relief the authorisation of sale, mortgage, or exchange of trust property in a suit under Section 92, or whether the scheme clauses 11 and 12 conferred adequate jurisdiction. The appellant argued that the District Judge lacked jurisdiction because any authorisation for sale of trust property required a separate suit under Section 92(1)(f). He also contended that the scheme paragraphs only pertained to carrying out nitya poojas and vishesh poojas, not broad administration. The respondent relied on the scheme paragraphs to assert that the District Court had reserved power to give directions for carrying out the scheme, including ordinary administration of the muth. The Supreme Court held that it is open in a suit under Section 92 for settlement of a scheme to provide in the scheme itself for modification whenever necessary by inserting a clause to that effect. A suit for settlement of a scheme is analogous to an administration suit, and so long as modification is for administration purposes, it can be made by application under the relevant clause without a separate suit under Section 92. The Court rejected the appellant's narrow interpretation of the scheme clauses, holding that the generality of the words in paragraphs 11 and 12 reserved power for ordinary administration directions. The Court observed that the directions sought by the respondent for sale of cattle and lease of cultivation rights were clearly in the nature of ordinary administration to maximise income and ensure economy. The Court further held that clause (f) of Section 92(1) cannot be read to hamper the ordinary administration of trust properties by trustees or managers; the presence of such a relief in a Section 92 suit does not circumscribe trustees' ordinary powers. Thus the provision in the scheme allowing managers or even one manager to obtain court directions on disposal of trust property when they cannot agree was valid. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's order and the Additional District Judge's order. It held that the District Judge had jurisdiction to give directions under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the scheme, the directions fell within ordinary administration, and no separate suit under Section 92 CPC was necessary. The appeal was dismissed with the conclusion that clause (f) did not apply.

Headnote

Issue of Consideration

Final Decision

Appeal dismissed; Supreme Court held District Judge had jurisdiction to give directions under paras 11 and 12 of the scheme, as directions were for ordinary administration of muth and did not fall under Section 92(1)(f) CPC; no separate suit required. High Court order upheld.

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