Case Note & Summary
This appeal by certificate arose out of eviction proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The dispute concerned premises at Connaught Circus, New Delhi. The original lessee, Messrs Allen Berry & Co. Private Ltd., assigned its leasehold interest to South Asia Industries Private Ltd., the appellant. The respondents, who were the owners of the property, filed an eviction application before the Controller under Section 14 of the Act, alleging unauthorized assignment of the lease. The Controller allowed the eviction petition on October 10, 1962. The appellant's appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal was dismissed on January 23, 1963. The appellant then filed a second appeal before the Punjab High Court under Section 39 of the Act; a Single Judge dismissed that appeal on May 10, 1963. The appellant thereafter filed a further appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal as not maintainable, holding that no such appeal lay against a Single Judge's decision in a statutory second appeal. The appellant obtained a certificate and appealed to the Supreme Court. The core legal issue was whether Clause 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Lahore conferred a right of intra-court appeal against a Single Judge's judgment in a second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and whether Section 43 of that Act, which declared certain orders final, took away such right. The appellant contended that once an appeal under Section 39 reached the High Court, the High Court exercised its ordinary appellate jurisdiction, and therefore the Single Judge's judgment became subject to a Letters Patent appeal. The appellant further argued that Section 43 only barred collateral proceedings and did not make the Single Judge's judgment final, and that a Letters Patent appeal was merely a continuation of the same appeal. The respondents countered that the Act conferred a special jurisdiction on the High Court, Clause 10 applied only to original jurisdiction or appeals from courts, the Rent Control Tribunal was not a court, and Section 43 made the judgment final, thereby modifying Clause 10. The Supreme Court examined Clauses 10 and 11 of the Letters Patent and Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915. The Court reiterated that an appeal to the High Court is regulated by the practice and procedure of the High Court, and that a Single Judge's judgment in an appeal would ordinarily be subject to a Letters Patent appeal unless the legislature had expressly or by necessary implication taken away that right. However, the Court interpreted Section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act as a finality clause indicating that no further appeal was contemplated against the order passed on appeal against the Tribunal. The expression 'final' was given its full meaning, not a restrictive one. Relying on Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company and Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., the Court held that an appeal under Section 39 and a Letters Patent appeal are distinct and separate appeals, and the word 'appeal' in Section 39 does not include a Letters Patent appeal. Consequently, Section 43 operated to bar the further intra-court appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that no Letters Patent Appeal lay against the Single Judge's judgment under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, because Section 43 made the appellate order final. The Division Bench's order dismissing the appeal as not maintainable was upheld.
Headnote
A) Civil Procedure - Letters Patent Appeal - Intracourt Appeal Against Single Judge's Decision in Statutory Second Appeal - Letters Patent for the High Court of Lahore, Clause 10; Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, Section 39 - An appeal to the High Court is regulated by the practice and procedure of that High Court; a judgment of a Single Judge in a second appeal under Section 39 would ordinarily be subject to further appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent unless the legislature has expressly or by necessary implication taken away that right. Held that such right was ultimately barred by Section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Paras 1-12). B) Interpretation of Statutes - Meaning of 'Final' - Finality Clause Bars Further Appeal - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, Section 43 - The expression 'final' in Section 43 indicated that no further appeal was contemplated against the order passed on appeal against the Tribunal; the statutory finality operated to exclude a Letters Patent appeal under Clause 10 because the legislature had thereby taken away the right by necessary implication. Held that Section 43 expressly bars further intra-court appeal (Paras 1-12). C) Appellate Jurisdiction - Distinction Between Statutory Appeal and Letters Patent Appeal - Separate Appeals Not Single Continuation - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, Section 39; Letters Patent for the High Court of Lahore, Clause 10 - An appeal under Section 39(1) of the Act and an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent do not form part of a single appeal; they are in law and in fact different appeals, one given by the statute and the other by the Letters Patent. Held that the expression 'appeal' in Section 39 does not take in a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 (Paras 1-12). D) Constitutional Law - High Court Rules - Delegation of Appellate Jurisdiction to Single Judge - Government of India Act, 1915, Section 108 - Under rules made under Section 108 of the Government of India Act, appeals under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act were heard by a Single Judge; such judgment was a judgment for Clause 10 purposes, but the finality provision controlled. Held that the Single Judge's judgment was not subject to further appeal due to Section 43 finality (Paras 1-12).
Issue of Consideration
Whether an appeal lies under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Lahore to a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court against a judgment passed by a Single Judge of the said High Court in a second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, notwithstanding Section 43 of the Act.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that no Letters Patent Appeal lay against the Single Judge's judgment under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, because Section 43 of the Act made the appellate order final. The Division Bench's order dismissing the appeal as not maintainable was upheld.
Law Points
- An appeal to the High Court is regulated by the practice and procedure of the High Court
- A judgment of a Single Judge in a statutory second appeal is subject to Letters Patent appeal unless expressly excluded by legislature
- The expression 'final' in Section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act
- 1958 bars further appeal
- An appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act and an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent are separate appeals
- The word 'appeal' in Section 39 does not include a Letters Patent appeal
- Statutory finality under Section 43 operates as legislative prohibition against intra-court appeal
