Case Note & Summary
The appeals arose from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated February 2, 1962, which had altered the convictions of the appellants, Moti Singh and Jagdamba Prasad, from offences under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 to those under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and enhanced their sentence to death. Initially, the Sessions Judge, Unnao had convicted seven persons, including the appellants, under Sections 148, 302 read with 149, and 307 read with 149 IPC, sentencing each to life imprisonment. The High Court acquitted five of the accused and set aside the conviction under Section 148 IPC, but upheld the appellants' convictions for murder and attempt to murder, relying primarily on the dying declaration of Gaya Charan (Ex. Kha 75) and, to some extent, on the previous statements of two court witnesses, Ram Shankar and Jageshwar (Ex. Kha 5 and Kha 8). The incident occurred on February 9, 1960, when members of the complainant party were fired upon. Gaya Charan sustained two gunshot wounds of entry on the abdomen, which the doctor declared dangerous to life. His statement was recorded at the hospital as a dying declaration, in which he stated that shots were fired from the front and named Jagdamba, Phunnar, Moti and another person as assailants. Gaya Charan left the hospital and died on March 1, 1960; his body was cremated at Bhairon Ghat before any postmortem examination could be conducted. There was no evidence on record to establish the cause of his death. The High Court treated the dying declaration as a complete account of the occurrence and used it to convict the appellants while giving the benefit of doubt to other accused who were not named in it. The appellants challenged the admissibility of the dying declaration on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that Gaya Charan died as a result of the injuries received in the incident. They also argued that the previous statements of Ram Shankar and Jageshwar could not be used as substantive evidence because those witnesses had been disbelieved. The Supreme Court held that under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a statement of a person who has died is relevant only when it relates to the cause of his death or to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. Since the prosecution had not established that Gaya Charan's death was caused by the gunshot injuries, his statement did not fall within the scope of Section 32(1) and was inadmissible. The court observed that the mere fact that the doctor considered the injuries dangerous to life was insufficient to prove that death three weeks later was due to those injuries, especially when the body was cremated without a postmortem and no other evidence of causation was adduced. The court further noted that the High Court had erred in relying on Ex. Kha 5 and Ex. Kha 8 as independent evidence; those statements could only have been used for corroboration or contradiction and not as substantive proof. As the High Court had mainly relied on the dying declaration to convict the appellants and to differentiate their roles from those of the acquitted accused, the convictions could not be sustained. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants.
Headnote
A) Evidence - Dying Declaration - Admissibility - Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 32(1) - A statement of a deceased person is relevant only when it relates to the cause of his death or to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death; the prosecution must prove that the declarant died from the injuries received in the incident - The prosecution failed to establish the cause of Gaya Charan's death as his body was cremated before any postmortem could be held and there was no evidence on record showing that he died due to the gunshot injuries; the mere fact that the doctor considered the injuries dangerous to life was not sufficient; Held that the dying declaration was inadmissible and could not be used to convict the appellants (Not mentioned). B) Evidence - Dying Declaration - Proof of Cause of Death - Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 32(1) - The nexus between the injuries and the death must be affirmatively established; a medical opinion that injuries were dangerous to life does not, by itself, prove causation - Gaya Charan died about three weeks after the incident; there was no postmortem and no evidence of the actual cause of death; the court held that the finding of the Sessions Judge that Gaya Charan must have died of the injuries was based on no evidence; the statement therefore did not fall within Section 32(1) (Not mentioned). C) Evidence - Previous Statements - Use for Corroboration or Contradiction - Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 145 and 157 (implied) - Previous statements of witnesses recorded by a Magistrate can be used only to corroborate or contradict the witness's testimony in court; they cannot be used as independent substantive evidence - The High Court erred in relying on Ex. Kha 5 and Ex. Kha 8, previous statements of Ram Shankar and Jageshwar, as independent evidence after those witnesses were disbelieved; such reliance was legally impermissible (Not mentioned). D) Criminal Law - Murder - Conviction Based on Inadmissible Evidence - Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 302, 307 read with 34 - A conviction cannot be maintained when it rests primarily on inadmissible evidence - The High Court mainly relied on the dying declaration to convict the appellants and to distinguish their roles from those of the acquitted accused; since the dying declaration was inadmissible, the convictions were set aside and the appellants were acquitted (Not mentioned).
Issue of Consideration
Whether the dying declaration of Gaya Charan (Ex. Kha 75) was admissible under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 when the prosecution failed to prove that his death was caused by the injuries received in the incident; whether previous statements of court witnesses (Ex. Kha 5 and Kha 8) could be used as substantive evidence; whether the convictions of the appellants could be maintained based on the evidence on record.
Final Decision
Appeals allowed; conviction and sentence of appellants set aside; appellants acquitted.
Law Points
- A dying declaration is admissible under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act
- 1872 only when it relates to the cause of the declarant's death or to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death
- the prosecution must prove that the declarant died from injuries received in the incident
- a doctor's opinion that injuries were dangerous to life is not sufficient to establish the cause of death
- previous statements of witnesses can be used only for corroboration or contradiction and not as substantive evidence
- conviction cannot be sustained when the primary evidence relied upon is inadmissible.
