Case Note & Summary
The dispute originated when the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Patiala, took possession of houses Nos. 915 and 916 in Patiala in the latter part of 1948 under the Patiala Evacuees (Administration of Property) Ordinance of Samvat 2004 (Ordinance IX of 2004) on the ground that they were evacuee properties. Dafedar Niranjan Singh, the first appellant, claimed ownership by inheritance and on June 6, 1949, the Custodian allowed the claim and released the properties. The second appellant, Major Bhagwant Singh, later purchased a part of the properties. Subsequently, a series of repealing ordinances were enacted: Ordinance IX of 2004 was repealed by Patiala and East Punjab States Union Ordinance No. XIII of Samvat 2006 on June 21, 1949, which was later repealed by Ordinance No. XVII of 2006, and that was repealed by Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 on October 18, 1949. The Central Ordinance was replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. More than six years later, on December 24, 1955, the Litigation Inspector of Evacuee Properties filed a review application before the Custodian. After the review powers were curtailed, the case was referred to the Custodian-General for suo motu revision under Section 27 of the Act. The Deputy Custodian-General, after issuing notice, set aside the Custodian's order on February 1, 1958 and remanded the case for further enquiry. The appellants challenged this revisional order before the Supreme Court by special leave. The primary legal questions were whether the deeming provisions of the repealing ordinances and Acts culminating in Section 58(3) of the 1950 Act applied to judicial orders or only administrative acts; whether the order dated June 6, 1949 could be deemed to have been passed under the Act despite the chain of fictions being broken; and whether a final order under Ordinance XXVII of 1949 could be revised under Section 27 of the Act. The State further argued that the Custodian had lacked jurisdiction to allow the original claim, making the order non est. The appellants contended that the deeming provisions were limited to administrative acts, that the chain of fiction was broken when Ordinance XIII of 2006 came into force because the order was passed by the Custodian rather than the Claims Officer as required under that Ordinance, and that Section 58(3) expressly saved the previous operation of Ordinance XXVII, thereby protecting the finality of the release order. The State contended that the Custodian had no jurisdiction to decide the claim in the first instance and therefore the order was null and void. The Supreme Court analyzed the legislative history and held that the deeming provision in Section 58(3) applied to judicial orders as well as administrative acts, relying on Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property. However, the Court found that the order dated June 6, 1949 was passed by the Custodian under Ordinance IX of 2004, not by the Claims Officer as prescribed by the later Ordinance XIII of 2006, so the chain of fictions was broken during that period. Even if the Custodian had acted as Claims Officer, the deeming would only operate for the limited purpose of appeal or revision. The Court further observed that under Sections 25 and 28 of Central Ordinance XXVII of 1949, the order was appealable, but no appeal was filed, so it became final. Section 58(3) did not contain any positive indication of retroactivity and expressly saved the previous operation of the repealed ordinance, so the finality could not be retrospectively destroyed. The Court also confined the scope of the words 'any time' and 'any Custodian' in Section 27 to orders that had not become final before the Act came into force. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Deputy Custodian-General's order, and restored the Custodian's order releasing the properties.
Headnote
A) Evacuee Property - Interpretation of Deeming Provision - Applicability to Judicial Orders - Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, Section 58(3) - The deeming provision in Section 58(3) is not limited to administrative acts but also applies to judicial orders passed by the Custodian under earlier ordinances. The court followed Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 117, holding that the section should be construed broadly to cover orders affecting rights. (Paras 1-13) B) Evacuee Property - Chain of Fictions under Repealing Ordinances - Order under Ordinance IX not deemed under later laws - Patiala Evacuees (Administration of Property) Ordinance of Samvat 2004 (No. IX of 2004); Patiala and East Punjab States Union Ordinance No. XIII of Samvat 2006, Section 10 - The order dated June 6, 1949 was passed by the Custodian under Ordinance IX of 2004, not by the Claims Officer as required under Ordinance XIII of 2006, thereby breaking the chain of fictions. Even if the Custodian acted as Claims Officer, the order could only be deemed to have been passed under the later ordinance for the limited purpose of appeal or revision. (Paras 1-13) C) Evacuee Property - Finality of Orders under Repealed Ordinance - Retroactive Effect of Section 58(3) - Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949, Sections 25, 28; Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, Section 58(3) - Under Section 25 of Central Ordinance XXVII of 1949, the Custodian's order was appealable, but no appeal was filed, so it became final under Section 28. Section 58(3) does not contain any positive indication giving it retroactivity and expressly saves the previous operation of that ordinance, so the finality could not be retrospectively destroyed. The court relied on Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) A.C. 69. (Paras 1-13) D) Evacuee Property - Scope of Revision under Section 27 - Words 'any time' and 'any Custodian' - Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, Section 27 - The words 'any time' or 'any Custodian' in Section 27 are confined only to orders of any one of the Custodians defined in the Act and to orders of Custodians deemed to have been made under the Act but had not become final before the Act came into force. The court disapproved Janki Prasad v. The Custodian Evacuee Property, Jullundur, (1955) I.L.R. 8 Punj. 823. (Paras 1-13)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the deeming provisions of repealing Ordinances and Acts culminating in s.58(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 applied to judicial orders and whether a final order under Ordinance XXVII of 1949 could be revised under s.27.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Deputy Custodian-General dated February 1, 1958, and restored the Custodian's order dated June 6, 1949 releasing the properties. The Court held that the order became final under Section 28 of Ordinance XXVII of 1949 and could not be revised under Section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.
Law Points
- Deeming provision under s.58(3) applies to judicial orders as well as administrative acts
- Chain of fiction broken when order passed by Custodian under Ordinance IX not by Claims Officer under Ordinance XIII
- Final order under repealed Ordinance cannot be revised under s.27 due to savings clause
- Words 'any time' and 'any Custodian' in s.27 confined to orders that had not become final before Act.
