Case Note & Summary
The appeal arose from a conviction for bribery and corruption. The appellant, A. C. Sharma, was a dealing clerk in the Labour Office, Delhi, in April 1965. He was tried by the Special Judge, Delhi, and convicted under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. He was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 with two months' further imprisonment in default; substantive sentences were concurrent. The Delhi High Court dismissed his appeal by a single judge on 29 October 1969. The Supreme Court granted special leave and permitted additional grounds. The prosecution case was that Bakht Ram, a labour supplier, was owed about Rs. 3,500 by contractor Umrao Singh. The Labour Officer stopped payment to the contractor to the extent of that amount. Bakht Ram wanted expedited disposal and approached the appellant, who demanded Rs. 100 as bribe, later settled at Rs. 50. Bakht Ram reported the matter to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Branch, produced three Rs. 10 notes, whose numbers were noted in the presence of two witnesses. Bakht Ram was instructed to pay in the presence of those witnesses. The party went to the Labour Office and then to the appellant's house; appellant and Bakht Ram went to a nearby tea shop, followed by the witnesses. Bakht Ram told appellant he brought Rs. 30 and would pay the balance later, requesting that the Labour Officer pass necessary orders. Appellant agreed and received Rs. 30, putting the notes in his pocket. On a signal, the D.S.P. came and recovered the notes with matching numbers. At trial, the appellant pleaded that Bakht Ram had borrowed Rs. 40 from him on April 1, 1965, and the recovered amount was repayment; he produced four witnesses. The Special Judge held that receipt of money was admitted and the onus was on the accused under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act to rebut the presumption, which he failed to do. The main legal issue was whether the investigation was illegal because the appellant was a Central Government employee and the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, allegedly vested exclusive jurisdiction in the D.S.P.E. for such offences, while the investigation was conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of the Anti-Corruption Department of Delhi Administration. A secondary issue was the interpretation of the word 'elsewhere' in Section 5A(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and the effect of any irregularity in investigation on the trial. The appellant argued that the D.S.P.E. Act prescribed special powers and procedure, that the appellant was a Central Public Works Department employee, and therefore only the Special Police Establishment could investigate. He also relied on a letter dated 10 February 1966 from the S.P. Anti-Corruption Branch stating that the branch was not competent to enquire into allegations against a CPWD employee. The respondent State contended that the investigation was lawful and the conviction proper. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act and held it was permissive and empowering, not exclusive; regular police authorities retained jurisdiction under the Criminal Procedure Code and other laws. The Court interpreted Section 5A(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and held that the word 'elsewhere' in clause (d) referred only to the Presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and did not exclude Deputy Superintendents of Police elsewhere from investigating when ordered by a First Class Magistrate. The Court found the two enactments were supplementary and harmonious. It also considered an administrative D.O. letter dated 5 October 1963 from the Central Bureau of Investigation, which supported the view that regular police could investigate; although administrative instructions, they had persuasive value. The Court held that investigation was not unauthorised and that even if there was irregularity in collecting evidence, it would not vitiate the trial by a competent court. On facts, the Court found no infirmity in the High Court's concurrent findings and declined to reappraise evidence. The appeal was dismissed and the conviction and sentences were upheld.
Headnote
A) Statutory Interpretation - Statement of Objects and Reasons - Admissibility as Aid to Construction - Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - Sections 3 and 5A - The Court held that the Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing a Bill is not admissible as an aid to construction of the statute as enacted and cannot control the meaning of the actual words used; it may be referred only to ascertain the circumstances which actuated the sponsor of the Bill and the purpose for doing so. This principle was applied to interpret the D.S.P.E. Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act. (Paras [484G-H]) B) Statutory Interpretation - Preamble - Use in Construction - Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - Sections 3 and 5A - The preamble of a statute may be consulted to solve an ambiguity or fix meaning of words with multiple meanings, but if the enactment is clear and unambiguous, the preamble cannot vary its meaning; the Court also noted the presumption that the legislature does not intend to make substantial alteration beyond what it expressly declares. Held that these principles guided the interpretation of the two enactments. (Paras [485A-B]) C) Criminal Law - Investigation Jurisdiction - DSPE Act Permissive and Not Exclusive - Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 - Section 3 - The scheme of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act did not expressly or by necessary implication divest regular police authorities of their jurisdiction, power, and competence to investigate offences under any other competent law; clear and express language would be required to exclude such power and vest it exclusively in the D.S.P.E. Held that the D.S.P.E. Act is permissive or empowering, intended to enable the D.S.P.E. to investigate specified offences without impairing other laws empowering police authorities. (Paras [486B-F]) D) Criminal Law - Investigation Powers Under Section 5A(1) - Meaning of 'Elsewhere' - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - Section 5A(1) - The plain meaning of Section 5A(1) authorises Inspectors of D.S.P.E. in all places, Assistant Commissioners of Police in Calcutta and Madras, Superintendent of Police in Bombay, and Deputy Superintendents of Police in all places other than those Presidency towns to investigate the specified offences; the word 'elsewhere' in clause (d) refers only to the three Presidency towns mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) and does not debar a Deputy Superintendent of Police from investigating when ordered by a First Class Magistrate in areas where D.S.P.E. functions. Held that this subsection does not confer sole power on D.S.P.E. to the exclusion of regular police; it is concerned with safeguarding against arbitrary use of power by officers below certain ranks. (Paras [488D-G]) E) Statutory Interpretation - Harmonious Construction - Supplementary Operation of D.S.P.E. Act and Prevention of Corruption Act - Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - Sections 3 and 5A(1) - The schemes of the two enactments suggested that they were intended to serve as supplementary provisions of law designed to function harmoniously in aid of each other and of existing regular police investigating agencies for effectively achieving successful investigation into serious offences without unreasonably exposing public servants to frivolous and vexatious proceedings. Held that both Acts operate together and do not oust regular police jurisdiction. (Paras [488G-H; 489A]) F) Administrative Law - Administrative Instructions - Persuasive Value in Statutory Interpretation - Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - Sections 3 and 5A - A D.O. letter dated October 5, 1963 from Central Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Home Affairs to Inspectors General of Police supported the construction that regular police including Delhi police could investigate; although only administrative instructions, if not clearly against the language and scheme of the Act, they are entitled to due consideration and have persuasive value. Held that this letter reinforced the court's interpretation. (Paras [489F-H; 490A]) G) Criminal Trial - Effect of Defect or Illegality in Investigation - Legality of Trial - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 - General Principles - The function of investigation is merely to collect evidence; any irregularity or even illegality in the course of collection of evidence can scarcely be considered by itself to affect the legality of the trial by an otherwise competent court of the offence investigated. Held that the investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in the present case was not unauthorised or contrary to law, and in any event would not vitiate the trial. (Paras [490A-C]) H) Supreme Court Practice - Reappraisal of Evidence - Concurrent Findings of Fact - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 - General Principles - The Court found no infirmity in the High Court's judgment upholding the prosecution story and convicting the appellant; there was no cogent ground for reappraising evidence and no extraordinary reason to depart from the normal rule that conclusions of facts arrived at by the High Court are final unless grave injustice resulted from irregularity. Held that the appeal was dismissed. (Paras [491D-F])
Issue of Consideration
Whether investigation by Deputy Superintendent of Anti-Corruption Department of Delhi Administration, and not by Delhi Special Police Establishment, into offences under Prevention of Corruption Act and Indian Penal Code against a Central Government employee was illegal and vitiated trial; and whether the word 'elsewhere' in Section 5A(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 excludes jurisdiction of regular police.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentences of A. C. Sharma under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court held that the investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of Anti-Corruption Department of Delhi Administration was valid and not contrary to law.
Law Points
- Delhi Special Police Establishment Act
- 1946 is permissive and does not exclude regular police investigation
- Prevention of Corruption Act
- 1947 Section 5A(1) does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on DSPE
- word 'elsewhere' in Section 5A(1)(d) refers to Presidency towns
- irregularity in investigation does not vitiate trial
- administrative instructions have persuasive value
- Supreme Court accepts findings of fact of High Court unless grave injustice
