Case Note & Summary
The appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court which dismissed a writ petition challenging an order of requisition under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947. The appellant was the owner of house No. 32, Balrampur House, Mumfordganj, Allahabad. The respondent was the District Magistrate, Allahabad and others. The dispute centred on whether a requisition order could be passed without prior notice and hearing to the owner. The appellant owned the house and had let it out to the State Government on September 9, 1964 for a period of five years at a monthly rent of Rs. 300, for the residence or office of the Directorate of Geology and Mining, U.P. The lease expired on September 9, 1969. On October 4, 1969, the District Magistrate passed an order under Section 3 of the Act requisitioning the house to provide accommodation to Shri P.N. Singh, Geologist, Directorate of Geology and Mining. The appellant was directed to hand over possession within 24 hours after the expiry of 15 days from service of the order. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court contending that the order was invalid as it was made without issuing any notice or giving a hearing. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that requisition for a temporary period did not require detailed procedure and Section 3 was not ultra vires for absence of a show cause notice. The core legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether Section 3 of the Act, though not expressly providing for notice and hearing, must be interpreted to require such procedural safeguards by necessary implication. The appellant argued that the right to hold and enjoy property is cherished and cannot be taken away without hearing; reliance was placed on A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, Daud Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Allahabad, and State of Punjab v. K.R. Erry and Sobhag Rai Mehta. The respondent contended that the argument was not raised before the High Court and that administrative orders do not require detailed hearing, distinguishing earlier decisions such as Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani. The Supreme Court first rejected the procedural objection, finding that the point had been raised before the High Court. It then analysed Section 3 in three parts: the main part and the two provisos. The Court observed that the section does not expressly provide for notice and hearing, but such a provision must be read by necessary implication because requisitioning deprives the owner of the right to hold and enjoy property, which is a cherished right. The Court noted that the Act is temporary but has remained in force for 25 years, and accommodation once requisitioned is ordinarily not restored early, making it difficult to assume the legislature intended deprivation without hearing. Under the main part, the District Magistrate must decide public purpose and the necessity of requisitioning a particular accommodation, considering adequacy, location, structure, and compensation. These are objective factors requiring owner's input. The first proviso exempts buildings exclusively used for religious worship, a factual question that demands hearing. The second proviso requires consideration of actual possession and alternative accommodation, also factual matters needing the person claiming occupation be heard. Further, the Act provides no appeal or revision, making the District Magistrate the plenary authority, which strengthens the inference that the legislature intended notice and hearing. The Court applied Kraipak, Daud Ahmad, and K.R. Erry to hold that natural justice applies to administrative orders and enactments depriving property imply a hearing. It distinguished older cases relied upon by the respondent. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, held the requisition order invalid for want of notice and hearing, set aside the High Court judgment, and declared the order of requisition illegal. The Court stated that the barest minimum of fair hearing requires show cause notice, reasonable time to reply, and, where necessary, opportunity to produce evidence.
Headnote
A) Constitutional Law - Natural Justice - Implied Requirement of Notice and Hearing - U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, Section 3 - The Supreme Court examined whether Section 3, which does not expressly provide for notice and hearing before requisition, requires such procedure by necessary implication. The Court held that requisitioning deprives the owner of the right to hold and enjoy property, a cherished right, and the Act having remained in force for 25 years amid acute scarcity of accommodation, the legislature could not have intended deprivation without notice and hearing. Held that a provision for notice and hearing must be read into Section 3 by necessary implication. (Paras 1-7) B) Administrative Law - Scope of Inquiry by District Magistrate - Objective Factors and Hearing - U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, Section 3 - The District Magistrate is required to form an opinion on public purpose and necessity of requisitioning a particular accommodation, considering adequacy, location, structure, and compensation payable. These are objective factors, and the owner should be heard to suggest equally good accommodation with lesser compensation. Held that no reason exists for not hearing the owner on these matters. (Paras 3-4) C) Constitutional Law - Religious Worship Exemption - First Proviso to Section 3 - U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, Section 3 first proviso - The first proviso exempts buildings exclusively used for religious worship, a question of fact that may be disputed. Fairness demands hearing the owner to establish exclusive religious use. Held that the first proviso strongly suggests implied notice and hearing in the main part of Section 3. (Paras 4-5) D) Constitutional Law - Actual Occupation and Alternative Accommodation - Second Proviso to Section 3 - U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, Section 3 second proviso - The second proviso requires the District Magistrate to determine actual possession and availability of suitable alternative accommodation. These factual determinations cannot be fairly made without hearing the person claiming occupation. Held that it is just and fair to hear at least the owner who may set up actual occupation. (Paras 4-5) E) Administrative Law - Absence of Appeal or Revision - Plenary Authority - U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, Section 3 - Since the Act provides no appeal or revision from the District Magistrate's order and constitutes him the plenary authority, the legislature intended that an order under Section 3 be made after notice and hearing. An elaborate procedure is not necessary; the barest minimum is a fair hearing with show cause notice and reasonable time to reply. Held that the order without hearing is illegal. (Paras 5-6) F) Administrative Law - Applicability of Natural Justice to Administrative Orders - Precedents - U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, Section 3 - The Court applied A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, Daud Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Allahabad, and State of Punjab v. K.R. Erry and Sobhag Rai Mehta to hold that rules of natural justice apply to administrative inquiries and that enactments depriving property imply a hearing. Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani, Ram Chandra v. District Magistrate of Aligarh, State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, and Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra were distinguished. Held that the contention that administrative orders need no hearing was rejected. (Paras 6-7)
Issue of Consideration
Whether an order of requisition under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 made without prior notice and hearing to the owner is valid.
Final Decision
Appeal allowed; order of District Magistrate requisitioning appellant's house under Section 3 of U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 held illegal and set aside as it was made without notice and hearing; High Court judgment reversed.
Law Points
- necessary implication of notice and hearing
- right to hold and enjoy property is cherished right
- natural justice applies to administrative orders
- District Magistrate must consider objective factors
- absence of appeal or revision strengthens fair hearing requirement
- barest minimum is fair hearing with show cause notice
- order without hearing invalid
