Case Note & Summary
The case arose from a civil suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The original plaintiff, N.P. Thirugnanam, entered into an agreement of sale dated 9.4.1979 with the first respondent, who acted as General Power of Attorney holder for himself, his mother, brothers and sisters, to alienate a house property in Madras city for a total consideration of Rs. 2,30,000. The plaintiff paid Rs. 10,000 as advance and later came into possession as a tenant, agreeing to pay Rs. 1,650 per month as rent. The plaintiff alleged that the respondents evaded execution of the sale deed, while the respondents contended that the plaintiff failed to pay a further advance of Rs. 20,000 by December 1979 to discharge a mortgage debt to Madras Corporation, and that this amount was adjusted towards rent with consent. The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance, which the High Court single judge dismissed on finding that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff's appeal OSA No. 195/83 was dismissed by the Division Bench on January 3, 1985. The plaintiff died on December 26, 1994, after arguments in the appeal had been heard and judgment was reserved. His legal representatives filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court. Two main legal issues were considered: first, whether the decree of dismissal against a dead plaintiff was a nullity due to his death before pronouncement; second, whether the plaintiff had continuously demonstrated readiness and willingness as required under Section 16(c) and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The petitioners argued that the decree was a nullity and that the plaintiff was always ready and willing, relying on PW-2's testimony about lending Rs. 2,00,000 on a promissory note. The respondents argued that they were ready and willing but the plaintiff failed to pay the agreed further advance and lacked financial capacity. The Supreme Court rejected the nullity contention by relying on Order 22 Rule 6 CPC, which provides no abatement if a party dies between conclusion of hearing and pronouncement of judgment. On readiness and willingness, the Court reiterated that specific performance is an equitable remedy under Section 20, not granted merely because a valid agreement exists. Section 16(c) requires the plaintiff to plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness; the court must consider conduct prior and subsequent to suit and attending circumstances, including financial capacity. The Court noted that the plaintiff failed to deposit Rs. 2,00,000 or furnish bank guarantee as directed on February 11, 1991, was dabbling in real estate, had arrears on a house with T.N. Housing Board, and lacked credible financial support from PW-2. The Court held that the concurrent findings of the High Court that the plaintiff showed reluctance rather than readiness were well supported and being findings of fact, no case for interference. The special leave petition was dismissed, affirming the dismissal of the suit for specific performance.
Headnote
A) Specific Performance - Readiness and Willingness - Section 16(c), Specific Relief Act, 1963 - A plaintiff seeking specific performance must plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform essential terms of contract; court must consider conduct prior and subsequent to suit and attending circumstances, including financial capacity - The Supreme Court upheld concurrent findings that plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness because he lacked financial resources, did not comply with the deposit order, and had speculative real estate dealings; the discretion under Section 20 was not exercised in his favour. Held that the plaintiff's conduct showed reluctance rather than readiness, and the suit for specific performance was rightly dismissed. B) Civil Procedure - Abatement of Suit - Order 22 Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - No abatement occurs if a party dies after conclusion of hearing but before pronouncement of judgment; judgment has same force as if pronounced before death - Supreme Court rejected the contention that decree against a dead plaintiff is nullity because the plaintiff died on 26.12.1994 after arguments were heard and judgment reserved; the judgment pronounced thereafter was valid under Rule 6. Held that the decree was not a nullity.
Issue of Consideration
Whether the judgment and decree passed against a dead plaintiff after conclusion of hearing but before pronouncement is a nullity under Order 22 Rule 6 CPC; and whether the plaintiff was continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as required under Sections 16(c) and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
Final Decision
Special leave petition dismissed; the Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the High Court that the plaintiff failed to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract; decree of dismissal of the suit for specific performance affirmed; contention that decree against dead plaintiff was nullity rejected under Order 22 Rule 6 CPC
Law Points
- Specific performance is an equitable remedy under Section 20 of Specific Relief Act
- 1963
- not granted merely because a valid agreement exists
- Section 16(c) requires plaintiff to plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness
- court must consider conduct prior and subsequent to suit and attending circumstances including financial capacity
- Order 22 Rule 6 CPC provides no abatement if party dies after conclusion of hearing but before pronouncement
- judgment has same force as if pronounced before death
