Case Note & Summary
The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition challenging concurrent orders of the trial court and the High Court refusing amendment of a plaint to add a relief of specific performance. The dispute arose from an alleged concluded contract for sale of trust property. The petitioners, a construction company and another, had filed a civil suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondents from alienating or dealing with the suit property. In the plaint, the petitioners averred that although they had a concluded contract and were ready and willing to perform their part, the respondents had refused to abide by the terms. The plaint referred to letters dated 29 April 1987 and 4 May 1987, and expressly stated that the cause of action had arisen on 29 April 1987. About seven years after filing the original suit, on 25 November 1994, the petitioners filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking to amend the plaint to claim specific performance. The ground advanced was that they subsequently discovered that the Charity Commissioner had granted permission for sale of the trust property, and therefore they were entitled to a decree of specific performance. The trial court dismissed the amendment application on 20 January 1995, and the High Court affirmed the dismissal on 21 February 1995 in Civil Revision Petition No. 510/95. The core legal issue was whether the amendment could be allowed despite the expiry of the limitation period for specific performance and the delay of seven years. The petitioners argued that they had not introduced any new plea; all material allegations were already in the plaint, and only a formal relief had been omitted. They contended that the relief was founded on facts already pleaded and that the subsequent knowledge of the Charity Commissioner's permission necessitated the amendment. They relied on A.K. Gupta v. D.V.C. (1966) 1 SCR 796, where this Court had allowed an amendment because the plaintiff had expressly reserved the right to claim a specific amount in the original plaint. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' contention. It held that permission for alienation is not a condition precedent to filing a suit for specific performance; a decree of specific performance would always be subject to the condition of grant of permission by the competent authority. Thus, the subsequent discovery of the Charity Commissioner's permission did not provide a valid ground for amendment. The Court further observed that the petitioners had expressly admitted that the respondents had refused to abide by the terms of the contract, and therefore they should have asked for specific performance in the original suit itself. Allowing seven years to elapse, while the limitation period under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was three years, meant that any amendment on the grounds set out would defeat the valuable right of limitation that had accrued to the respondents. The Court distinguished A.K. Gupta v. D.V.C. on the ground that in that case the plaintiff had expressly reserved the right to claim the amount in the original plaint, whereas no such reservation existed here. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the application for amendment was barred by limitation and dismissed the Special Leave Petition.
Headnote
A) Civil Procedure - Amendment of Pleadings - Bar of Limitation - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 6 Rule 17; Limitation Act, 1963, Article 54 - Application for amendment to include specific performance relief filed seven years after original suit for permanent injunction, after expiry of three-year limitation, was held barred as it would defeat accrued right of limitation; plaintiff had admitted refusal of contract and should have sought specific performance originally - Held amendment not permissible (Paras Not mentioned). B) Specific Performance - Condition Precedent - Permission of Charity Commissioner - Specific Relief Act, 1963; Limitation Act, 1963 - Court held that permission for alienation is not a condition precedent to filing suit for specific performance; decree of specific performance would always be subject to grant of permission by competent authority - Thus subsequent discovery of permission did not justify amendment - Held no new cause of action (Paras Not mentioned). C) Precedent - Applicability of A.K. Gupta v. D.V.C. - Reservation of Right in Original Plaint - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 6 Rule 17 - In A.K. Gupta v. D.V.C. the plaintiff had expressly reserved right to claim amount in original plaint, enabling later amendment; here no such reservation existed - Ratio distinguished and held inapplicable (Paras Not mentioned).
Issue of Consideration
Whether an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to amend plaint to seek specific performance, filed seven years after original suit for injunction and after expiry of limitation under Article 54 of Limitation Act 1963, is maintainable; whether subsequent discovery of Charity Commissioner's permission for alienation justifies amendment.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition, holding that the application for amendment was barred by limitation. It held that permission for alienation is not a condition precedent to filing suit for specific performance and that the decree would always be subject to such permission. Since petitioners admitted refusal of contract and allowed seven years to elapse, allowing amendment would defeat the accrued right of limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The decision in A.K. Gupta v. D.V.C. was distinguished as there the plaintiff had expressly reserved the right in the original plaint.
Law Points
- Permission for alienation is not a condition precedent to filing suit for specific performance
- decree of specific performance is subject to grant of permission by competent authority
- amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC cannot be allowed if it defeats accrued right of limitation
- Article 54 of Limitation Act 1963 provides three-year limitation for specific performance
- amendment after seven years barred by limitation
