Case Note & Summary
The matter arose from a long-standing dispute concerning the management of Lingadgudi Mutt and its properties. The appellant, B.R. Veerabasavaradhya, was the first defendant in Original Suit No. 22 of 1962, which had been filed against five persons by the devotees of the mutt. The suit related to the administration of the trust and the deities installed in the plaint schedule property. In that suit, the appellant entered into a compromise. A compromise memo dated June 7, 1972 was filed under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the court passed a decree in terms of the memo. The terms of the compromise stated that the appellant would continue to be in occupation as Manager of the trust for its administration and of the deities installed in the plaint schedule property. Two shops built by the appellant in the shrine were declared to continue in his possession subject to his performing the worship in the same way as was done by his ancestors. The money deposited by him in OS No. 463 of 1964 on the file of the Second Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore City, was agreed to be refunded to him, and half the institution fee was also to be refunded. Thereafter, the appeal was remanded to the trial court for consideration of the matter afresh only as against defendants 2 to 4. The suit came to be dismissed against them. Defendants 2 to 4 later filed a compromise memo in the High Court in RFA No. 176 of 1980. The High Court, by the impugned order dated January 25, 1993, recorded the compromise as against defendants 2 to 4 and disposed of the matter in terms thereof. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by special leave. The core legal issue was whether the appellant could challenge the later compromise decree recorded against defendants 2 to 4 when he had already compromised the matter and a decree had been passed against him in the first instance. Before the Supreme Court, counsel for the petitioner filed an affidavit proposing to delete respondent 1(iii) and respondent 2 from the array of parties because they had died and no steps had been taken against them. The Court observed that even accepting that stand, the substantive problem remained whether the decree as compromised against defendants 2 to 4 could be set aside at the instance of the appellant. The Court reasoned that the appellant had specifically compromised the matter in terms of the first compromise memo, which was recorded against him, and the litigation as against him had thereby come to an end. When the matter was remitted to the trial court, it was confined vis-à-vis defendants 2 to 4. After the disposal of the suit by the trial court, pending appeal, those defendants compromised with the respondents. The compromise decree recorded in that appeal did not affect the appellant's settled rights under the first decree. The first compromise decree continues to operate and binds the appellant, and he had no grievance against the later compromise by the other defendants. The Supreme Court therefore held that the appeal did not have any merit. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
Headnote
A) Civil Procedure - Compromise Decree - Binding Nature of Compromise Decree Under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 23 Rule 3 - The appellant, as first defendant in OS No.22/62, had entered into a compromise memo dated June 7, 1972, which was recorded and a decree passed in terms thereof; the litigation as against him came to an end. When the matter was remanded for fresh consideration only against defendants 2 to 4, those defendants later compromised with the respondents in RFA No.176/80, and the High Court recorded that compromise by order dated January 25, 1993. The Supreme Court held that the first compromise decree operates and binds the appellant, and he had no grievance against the later compromise by the other defendants; appeal dismissed with no costs (Paras 1-2).
Issue of Consideration
Whether the appellant, who had already compromised the original suit and obtained a decree, could challenge the subsequent compromise decree recorded against defendants 2 to 4 in a remanded appeal.
Final Decision
Appeal dismissed. No costs. The first compromise decree recorded against the appellant in OS No.22/62 continues to operate and binds him; the later compromise decree in RFA No.176/80 concerning defendants 2 to 4 gives the appellant no right to challenge.
Law Points
- A compromise decree passed under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is binding on parties who entered into it
- a subsequent compromise between other parties in a remanded proceeding does not reopen or affect the earlier decree
- a party cannot challenge a compromise to which he was not a party and which does not affect his rights
