Case Note & Summary
The dispute involved lands situated within the limits of the Municipal Board, Bhadohi, Tehsil Gyanpur, governed by the Banaras State Tenancy Act, 1949. The respondent Sarabjeet was originally the sub-tenant of Damri Lal, the predecessor in title of the appellants. Damri Lal had filed Suit No.46 of 1955 against the respondent for ejectment under Section 154 of the Banaras State Tenancy Act, 1949. On 1 October 1955 the parties entered into a compromise, and a consent decree was passed on 4 November 1955. The compromise recorded that the respondent relinquished all rights in the land, including standing crops, thereby implying that possession was handed over to Damri Lal from the date of the compromise. Subsequently, the respondent interfered with Damri Lal's possession in July 1957, leading to proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bhadohi, held on 30 March 1959 that the respondent was in possession. Immediately thereafter, on 12 April 1959, Damri Lal filed a suit under Section 159 of the Banaras State Tenancy Act before the Revenue Court for ejectment and recovery of possession. During the pendency of the suit, Damri Lal died and the present appellants were brought on record. The respondent had also filed Suit No.709 of 1956 to set aside the compromise decree on the ground of fraud; that attempt ultimately failed, with the High Court upholding the compromise's validity on 28 April 1967. The Revenue Court, by judgment dated 26 July 1969, decreed the suit in favour of the appellants, holding that the suit was not barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 because the appellants had been dispossessed after the consent decree, giving rise to a fresh cause of action. On appeal, the Additional District Judge, Varanasi, allowed the appeal and set aside the decree, holding that the suit under Section 159 was barred by Section 47 CPC because the compromise decree had not been executed. The High Court in second appeal confirmed this conclusion. The Supreme Court examined the terms of the compromise decree and found that the respondent had given up all rights over the land and standing crops from the date of the compromise, clearly implying that possession was given to Damri Lal. The criminal proceedings under Section 145 CrPC were initiated because of the subsequent dispossession. The Court held that Section 47 CPC bars a separate suit only in respect of questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree. Where a decree for possession has been complied with and the judgment-debtor subsequently dispossesses the decree-holder, a fresh cause of action arises, and a separate suit is not barred. There was no occasion to execute the earlier decree since it had already been satisfied. The Court also referred to Section 159 of the Banaras State Tenancy Act, 1949, which provides for ejectment of a person taking possession of land without written consent and otherwise than in accordance with law. The decision in Brij Kishore Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Jaleshwar Prasad Singh and Ors. (AIR 1973 SC 1130) supported the appellants. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court, and restored the judgment and decree of the trial court with costs.
Headnote
A) Civil Procedure - Bar of Suit - Section 47 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - A separate suit is barred only for questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree; after a decree for possession has been fully complied with, subsequent dispossession gives a fresh cause of action, and a suit under Section 159 Banaras State Tenancy Act, 1949 is maintainable - The respondent had surrendered possession under a consent decree, later dispossessed the predecessor, and the Revenue Court rightly held the suit maintainable; High Court erred in applying Section 47 CPC (Paras 1-3). B) Tenancy Law - Ejectment of Unauthorized Occupant - Section 159 Banaras State Tenancy Act, 1949 - A person taking possession of land without written consent of the person entitled to admit occupation and otherwise than in accordance with law is liable to ejectment; the suit was properly filed under this provision (Paras 1-3).
Issue of Consideration
Whether a suit for ejectment under Section 159 of the Banaras State Tenancy Act, 1949 is barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when the plaintiff had earlier obtained a consent decree for possession which was complied with but was subsequently dispossessed.
Final Decision
Appeal allowed; judgment and decree of High Court set aside; judgment and decree of trial court restored with costs.
Law Points
- A separate suit is barred under Section 47 CPC only in respect of questions relating to execution
- discharge or satisfaction of the decree
- if a decree for possession has been complied with and there is subsequent dispossession
- a fresh cause of action arises and a suit under Section 159 of Banaras State Tenancy Act
- 1949 is maintainable
- a person taking possession of land without written consent of the person entitled to admit occupation and otherwise than in accordance with law is liable to ejectment under Section 159 Banaras State Tenancy Act
- 1949.
