Case Note & Summary
Background: The appeals before the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the Special Designated Judge, Ahmedabad, which convicted fifteen appellants belonging to the Darbar community for offences arising out of a caste-based attack on Koli community members in village Sarangpur. The incident occurred against the backdrop of an earlier altercation between a Darbar and a Koli over a bullock-cart passage, leading to alleged common object to murder and terrorize Kolis. Facts: On 14 March 1991, a Dayra musical performance was arranged at the house of accused Apabhai. After the performance ended around 2-3 a.m. on 15 March, the appellants allegedly remained there. Around 7-7.30 a.m., when the complainant Fuljibhai and other Kolis passed by on their way to fields, they were attacked with sticks and rods, and then 8-10 appellants fired from the terrace of Apabhai's house. Rajabhai sustained gunshot injuries and died; others including Sanjuben and Jagdishbhai were injured. Prosecution contended the gathering was a pretext to teach Kolis a lesson and that the acts struck terror. Legal Issues: The court considered (1) applicability of Section 149 IPC constructive liability; (2) applicability of Section 3 TADA; (3) individual liability for murder and attempt to murder; (4) identification of appellant No.13; and (5) Arms Act convictions. Arguments: Appellants argued that the assembly was for a legitimate musical event, no common object to murder existed because no bloodbath occurred despite firearms, TADA was not triggered as women continued normal activities, certain accused were not named earlier, and some arms were licensed or non-functional. The State argued the Dayra was a pretext, the firing from the terrace demonstrated common object and terror, and injuries supported attempt to murder. Court's Analysis: The court found force in the defence on Section 149, noting that if the object was to murder Kolis, it would have been easy given unarmed victims and firearms, yet only one death occurred; the invitation of an outside singer and continuation of Dayra supported the defence. Therefore Section 149 was unavailable. On TADA, the court observed that women going to fields after the incident showed no terror; so Section 3 TADA did not apply. For murder, direct testimony of five witnesses identified appellant No.1 as the shooter, leading to conviction under Section 302. For attempt to murder, the court distinguished injuries: Sanjuben's graze wound only attracted Section 324, while Jagdishbhai's multiple wounds and fracture attracted Section 307. The court acquitted appellant No.13 due to delayed identification. Arms Act convictions were set aside for licensed and non-functional weapons. Convictions under Sections 326, 325, 323 for certain appellants were not disturbed. Decision: The Supreme Court set aside all convictions under Section 302/149 and Section 3 TADA. Appellant No.1 was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment with fine; appellant No.3 under Section 307 IPC with 5 years rigorous imprisonment; appellant No.9 under Section 324 IPC with 1 year rigorous imprisonment; other appellants were acquitted of these charges. Appeal partly allowed.
Headnote
A) Criminal Law - Common Object - Applicability of Section 149 IPC - Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 149 - The prosecution alleged that appellants gathered with common object to murder Kolis after a prior altercation, but the court found that the assembly could have been for a musical programme, no bloodbath occurred despite firearms, and outside singers were invited; hence, common object to murder was not established. Held that Section 149 IPC was not available to the prosecution and convictions under Section 302/149 were set aside (Paras 6-8). B) Criminal Law - Terrorist Act - Applicability of Section 3 TADA - Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, Section 3 - The court held that the alleged acts did not strike terror among Kolis because women continued to go to fields for grazing cattle after the incident, indicating absence of pervasive fear. Held that trial under TADA was not warranted and convictions under Section 3 TADA were set aside (Paras 8-10). C) Criminal Law - Murder - Individual Liability for Fatal Shot - Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 302 - Direct evidence from PWs 2,3,4,5 and 7 consistently identified appellant No.1 as the person who fired the fatal shot at Rajabhai. Held that appellant No.1 alone was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment with fine, while other appellants were acquitted of Section 302/149 (Paras 11, 18). D) Criminal Law - Attempt to Murder - Distinction between Section 307 and Section 324 IPC - Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 307, 324 - For Sanjuben, a pellet grazed her head without fracture or deep injury, so only Section 324 was made out; appellant No.9 was convicted thereunder. For Jagdishbhai, multiple punctured wounds and fracture of ulna indicated an attempt to murder; appellant No.3 was convicted under Section 307 and sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment (Paras 12-15). E) Criminal Law - Identification and Presence - Benefit of Doubt - Indian Penal Code, 1860, various sections - Accused No.15 (appellant No.13) was not named in FIR, dying declaration, or early police statements; he was named only in court after delay. Held that doubt arose about his presence at the scene and he was acquitted of all charges (Para 16). F) Criminal Law - Arms Act - Licensed and Non-Functional Weapons - Arms Act, 1959, Sections 25, 27 - Some appellants possessed licensed arms and one pistol was not in working condition. Held that convictions under Arms Act Sections 25 and 27 for appellants 4,11,14,15 were set aside on these grounds (Para 17).
Issue of Consideration
Whether Section 149 IPC and Section 3 TADA applied to the alleged caste-based attack; which individual appellants were liable for murder and attempt to murder; sustainability of convictions under Arms Act
Final Decision
All convictions under Section 302/149 IPC and Section 3 TADA were set aside. Appellant No.1 was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000, in default simple imprisonment for 2 years, with fine to be paid to heirs of deceased Rajabhai. Appellant No.3 was convicted under Section 307 IPC and sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment; other appellants were acquitted of Section 307/149. Appellant No.9 was convicted under Section 324 IPC and sentenced to 1 year rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000, in default simple imprisonment for 1 month; other appellants acquitted for injuries to Sanjuben. Appellants 2,6,7 remained convicted under Section 326 IPC and appellant 8 under Sections 325 and 323 IPC. Appellant No.13 was acquitted entirely due to doubtful presence. Convictions under Sections 25/27 Arms Act were set aside for appellants 4,11,14,15 (licensed/non-functional weapons).
Law Points
- Section 149 IPC requires proof of common unlawful object
- mere gathering not sufficient
- TADA Section 3 requires actual striking of terror
- individual liability determined by direct evidence
- benefit of doubt for delayed identification
- licensed arms not an offence under Arms Act
