Case Note & Summary
The Supreme Court dismissed a special leave petition arising from a land acquisition dispute concerning the applicability of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The dispute originated from a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act published on June 26, 1973, acquiring 133.24 acres of land in Village Dara Kalan, District Kurukshetra for residential purposes. The Collector awarded compensation at Rs. 3 per square yard on July 17, 1975. The petitioner's predecessor accepted the award without protest and did not seek a reference under Section 18. However, other landowners sought references, and the District Judge by award dated October 3, 1981, enhanced compensation to Rs. 7 per square yard. Those claimants appealed to the High Court, which by judgment dated March 14, 1990, further enhanced compensation to Rs. 37 per square yard. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application under Section 28A within 30 days of the High Court's judgment, seeking redetermination of compensation on par with the enhanced amount. The Land Acquisition Collector dismissed the application on September 5, 1990, but the District Judge redetermined compensation on December 24, 1991. On revision, the High Court set aside the District Judge's order. The Supreme Court considered whether an application under Section 28A could be filed within limitation from the date of the High Court's appellate judgment rather than from the reference court's award. The Court reviewed several precedents, including Scheduled Caste Co-op. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India, State of Punjab v. Raghbir Singh, D. Venkamma v. Special Tehsildar, and U.P. State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. v. State of U.P. It held that the award of the court under Section 28A means the award of the reference court under Section 18, not the appellate order of the High Court or Supreme Court. The limitation period of three months commences from the date of the reference court's award, and only the time taken to obtain a certified copy is excluded under the proviso. Since the petitioner did not file the application within that period, the remedy was barred. The Court also reiterated that Section 28A applies only to those who did not seek a reference under Section 18. Consequently, the special leave petition was dismissed, affirming that the High Court's judgment does not create a fresh cause of action for redetermination.
Headnote
A) Land Acquisition - Redetermination of Compensation under Section 28A - Limitation runs from reference court award, not appellate decree - Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 28A(1) - The petitioner did not seek reference under Section 18 but others did; the reference court enhanced compensation by award dated October 3, 1981; the High Court further enhanced by judgment dated March 14, 1990; the petitioner's application under Section 28A was filed within 30 days of High Court judgment but long after the reference court award; the Court held that the limitation period of three months commences from the date of the award of the reference court under Section 18, not from the High Court's order, and the proviso only excludes time for obtaining certified copy; Held application barred by limitation (Paras 1-4). B) Land Acquisition - Eligibility under Section 28A - Only claimants who failed to seek reference under Section 18 can apply - Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 28A(1) - The Court reiterated that Section 28A applies only to those who accepted the Collector's award without protest and did not seek reference; those who had sought reference or filed appeal against reference court award are not entitled to redetermination; Held petitioner's application not maintainable (Paras 1-4). C) Land Acquisition - Interpretation of 'any such award' - Excludes appellate orders of High Court and Supreme Court - Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 18, 28A, 30(2) - Relying on State of Punjab v. Raghubir Singh, a Constitution Bench decision, the Court held that the expression 'any such award' in Section 28A refers only to award of Collector or reference court, not appellate orders; therefore, the High Court's judgment does not trigger a fresh limitation period; Held no cause of action from appellate decree (Paras 1-4). D) Limitation - Computation of Limitation under Section 28A - Time for certified copy only excluded - Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 28A(1) proviso - The proviso to Section 28A(1) excludes only the time actually taken to obtain certified copy from the period of three months; once limitation starts running, it continues unless stayed by appropriate court; Held no exclusion for appeal period (Paras 1-4).
Issue of Consideration
Whether an application under Section 28-A(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for redetermination of compensation can be filed within 30 days of the High Court's appellate judgment enhancing compensation, when the reference court award was made earlier and no application was filed within limitation from that award.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court held that the limitation period under Section 28A(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 runs from the date of the award of the reference court under Section 18, not from the appellate judgment of the High Court. The proviso only excludes time taken to obtain certified copy. Since the petitioner filed the application after the High Court judgment, which was beyond the prescribed period from the reference court award, the application was barred by limitation. The Court also held that Section 28A applies only to those who did not seek a reference under Section 18. The special leave petition was dismissed.
Law Points
- Section 28A(1) Land Acquisition Act
- 1894
- limitation runs from reference court award
- not appellate decree
- only claimants who did not seek reference under Section 18 can apply
- proviso excludes only time for certified copy
- appellate orders do not trigger fresh limitation
