Case Note & Summary
The appeal before the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the Designated Court, Bhiwani at Hissar, convicting the appellants under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, and under the Arms Act, with no separate sentence for the Arms Act offence. The appellants had initially been charged with offences under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, besides IPC and Arms Act offences. On 19 December 1987, the Designated Court held that no offence under TADA was made out and ordered that the case be transferred to the appropriate criminal court for trial. This order was based on a Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bimal Kaur Khalsa, reported in AIR 1988 Punjab and Haryana 95. An appeal against that Full Bench decision was preferred to the Supreme Court, and an interim stay was granted. Due to this interim stay, the case was sent back to the Designated Court, which proceeded to try the appellants on merits and ultimately convicted them on 6 February 1988 in Sessions Trial No. 49.87. The appellants challenged the conviction, primarily contending that the Designated Court lacked jurisdiction to try the case after its order of 19 December 1987 transferring the matter to the regular court. They argued that the order had not been set aside by any competent court, and the mere pendency of an appeal and interim stay against the Full Bench decision did not authorize the retransfer. They relied on the Constitution Bench decision in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, and Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602, which approved the principles in Bimal Kaur Khalsa. They also cited Rambhai Nathubai Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 5 Scale 388, where this Court held that lack of jurisdiction due to absence of sanction vitiated the trial. Additionally, the appellants urged that the prolonged delay in trial, not attributable to them, warranted quashing of the proceedings. The Supreme Court accepted the jurisdictional challenge. It held that the Designated Court's order dated 19 December 1987 determining that no TADA offence was made out and directing transfer to regular court was fully justified. Since that order had not been set aside, there was no legal basis for retransferring the case to the Designated Court. Consequently, the subsequent trial and conviction by the Designated Court were without jurisdiction and could not be sustained. The Court set aside the conviction and sentence. However, it declined to quash the criminal case, observing that the case must be deemed pending before the regular criminal bench. The accused were given liberty to file an appropriate application for quashing before the appropriate court, and the Court expressed no opinion on that aspect. The interim bail order granted by the Supreme Court was continued for six weeks from the date of judgment to enable the accused to seek bail before the trial court. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.
Headnote
A) Criminal Procedure - Jurisdiction of Designated Court under TADA - Order of Designated Court finding no TADA offence and transferring case is binding unless set aside - Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985; Indian Penal Code, 1860 Sections 302, 307, 149; Arms Act, 1959 - The Designated Court initially held on 19.12.1987 that no TADA offence was made out and ordered transfer to regular court. Despite an interim stay on a Full Bench decision, that order remained valid. Held that the Designated Court had no jurisdiction to re-try the appellants on IPC and Arms Act charges, and its subsequent conviction was without jurisdiction and set aside. (Paras not numbered) B) Criminal Trial - Vitiation of trial for lack of jurisdiction - A trial conducted by a court lacking jurisdiction is void and conviction cannot stand - Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985; Indian Penal Code, 1860 - The Court relied on Rambhai Nathubai Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat, where lack of sanction made the Designated Court's trial void. Similarly, the Designated Court's re-assumption of jurisdiction after its transfer order rendered the entire trial vitiated. Held that the conviction and sentence passed by the Designated Court were set aside. (Paras not numbered) C) Criminal Procedure - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Delay and Prejudice - Not mentioned - The appellants sought quashing of proceedings due to prolonged delay not attributable to them. The Supreme Court declined to quash, leaving it to the accused to file appropriate application before the regular court, and continued interim bail for six weeks. Held that the case would be deemed pending before the regular criminal bench. (Paras not numbered)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the Designated Court had jurisdiction to try the appellants for IPC and Arms Act offences after passing order dated 19.12.1987 that no TADA offence was made out and transferring case to regular court; and whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed due to long delay.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Designated Court, holding that the Designated Court lacked jurisdiction to try the case after its order dated 19.12.1987. The Court declined to quash the criminal case, deeming it pending before the regular criminal court, and directed that the interim bail order continue for six weeks to enable accused to apply for bail before the trial court. Accused may file appropriate application for quashing before appropriate court.
Law Points
- A Designated Court under TADA
- after finding no TADA offence and ordering transfer to regular court
- cannot re-assume jurisdiction unless that order is set aside
- conviction by such court is nullity
- delay in trial not attributable to accused may be ground for quashing but not automatic
- order of transfer remains binding despite interim stay on a relied upon precedent
