Case Note & Summary
This reference to a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court arose from a conflict between three-judge bench decisions regarding the proof of demand of illegal gratification under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The core issue was whether, in the absence of direct evidence from the complainant (due to death, hostility, or non-availability), the prosecution can rely on other evidence to prove demand, or whether conviction is impermissible without primary evidence of demand. The court traced the ingredients of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act, emphasizing that proof of demand is a sine qua non for both offences. It noted that Section 20 creates a presumption only after demand is proved. The court held that demand can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, including evidence of other witnesses, but mere recovery of money or acceptance without proof of demand is insufficient. The court overruled the strict view in P. Satyanarayana Murthy that inferential deductions are impermissible, and upheld the approach in M. Narsinga Rao that other evidence can establish demand. The reference was answered accordingly, clarifying that the prosecution must prove demand beyond reasonable doubt, but it need not be through the complainant's testimony alone.
Headnote
A) Prevention of Corruption Act - Proof of Demand - Sine Qua Non - Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 20 - The court examined whether demand for illegal gratification can be proved by other evidence when complainant is unavailable or hostile. Held that proof of demand is essential for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) and presumption under Section 20 arises only after demand is proved. Demand can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, including evidence of other witnesses, but not by mere recovery or acceptance without proof of demand. (Paras 2-6) B) Evidence Act - Proof of Fact - Circumstantial Evidence - Sections 3, 4 - The court discussed that in the absence of direct evidence of demand, the prosecution may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove demand. However, inferential deductions from recovery alone are impermissible. The standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. (Paras 2-6) C) Prevention of Corruption Act - Presumption under Section 20 - Condition Precedent - Section 20 - The court clarified that the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be invoked only after the prosecution proves the demand for illegal gratification. Mere acceptance or recovery of money does not attract the presumption unless demand is established. (Paras 2, 6)
Issue of Consideration
Whether in the absence of evidence of complainant/direct or primary evidence of demand of illegal gratification, is it permissible to draw inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Final Decision
The reference is answered by holding that proof of demand is sine qua non for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the absence of direct evidence from the complainant, demand can be proved by other evidence including circumstantial evidence. However, mere recovery of money or acceptance without proof of demand is insufficient. The presumption under Section 20 arises only after demand is proved. The conflict is resolved in favour of the view that other evidence can establish demand.
Law Points
- Proof of demand is sine qua non for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act
- 1988
- Presumption under Section 20 arises only after demand is proved
- Demand can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence including evidence of other witnesses
- Inferential deductions from recovery alone are impermissible
