Case Note & Summary
The appellant, Shri Rajaram M. Caisukar, filed an appeal against an order dated 24/11/2015 passed by the learned Adhoc District Judge, Panaji, dismissing his application for temporary injunction. The appellant was the plaintiff in a suit seeking permanent injunction and declaration. The suit property was an open/vacant land owned by respondent no.1, St. Joseph Chapel. By a Deed of Lease dated 15/12/1974, a portion of the suit property was demised to the appellant's late father on lease basis for keeping a handcart. The lease was neither terminated nor expired by efflux of time. In 1982, with the consent of respondent no.1, the appellant's father continued business in the name of 'Mohan Auto Garage'. The appellant carried out repairs of electrical parts of motor vehicles on the suit property. The appellant contended that respondent no.1 attempted to dispossess him illegally. The trial court dismissed the injunction application. The High Court held that the appellant had made out a prima facie case as the lease deed was not terminated and the appellant was in possession. The balance of convenience was in favor of the appellant and irreparable injury would be caused if injunction was not granted. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court's order, and granted temporary injunction restraining respondent no.1 from interfering with the appellant's possession and business operations until disposal of the suit.
Headnote
A) Civil Procedure - Temporary Injunction - Prima Facie Case - Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - The appellant sought temporary injunction to restrain the respondent from interfering with his possession and business on the suit property based on a lease deed of 1974. The trial court dismissed the application. The High Court held that the appellant had established a prima facie case as the lease deed was not terminated and the appellant was in possession. The balance of convenience was in favor of the appellant and irreparable injury would be caused if injunction was not granted. (Paras 4-10) B) Property Law - Lease - Termination - Efflux of Time - The lease deed dated 15/12/1974 was for an indefinite period and not terminated by efflux of time. The appellant's father continued business with consent of the respondent. The court held that the lease was still subsisting and the appellant's possession was lawful. (Paras 4-6) C) Civil Procedure - Appeal from Order - Interference with Discretionary Order - Section 104, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - The High Court interfered with the trial court's order dismissing the temporary injunction application as the trial court had not properly appreciated the material on record and the appellant had made out a strong prima facie case. (Paras 7-10)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the appellant/plaintiff made out a prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with his possession and business operations on the suit property.
Final Decision
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order dated 24/11/2015 passed by the learned Adhoc District Judge, Panaji, and granted temporary injunction restraining respondent no.1 from interfering with the appellant's possession and business operations on the suit property until disposal of the suit.
Law Points
- Prima facie case
- balance of convenience
- irreparable injury
- temporary injunction
- lease deed
- possession
- termination of lease
- efflux of time
