Bombay High Court Quashes Condonation of Delay in Gratuity Appeal — Delay Beyond 120 Days Cannot Be Condoned Under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Section 7(7) First Proviso Imposes Absolute Bar on Entertaining Appeal Filed After 120 Days from Receipt of Controlling Authority's Order.

High Court: Bombay High Court Bench: AURANGABAD In Favour of Prosecution
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Case Note & Summary

The petitioner, Changunabai Sambhaji Gaware, a retired employee, filed a writ petition challenging the order of the Industrial Court dated 18.11.2014, which allowed the respondent's application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The Controlling Authority had allowed the petitioner's gratuity applications on 25.2.2013, and the petitioner served a copy of that judgment on the respondent on 15.3.2013, as evidenced by the respondent's inward stamp. The respondent filed an appeal along with a delay condonation application on 15.10.2013, which was 214 days after receipt of the judgment. The Industrial Court allowed the delay condonation application without considering the petitioner's say and the documentary evidence (Exhibit U-9) showing the date of receipt. The petitioner argued that the first proviso to Section 7(7) of the Act imposes an absolute bar on entertaining any appeal after 120 days from the date of receipt of the Controlling Authority's order. The respondent contended that the delay was due to administrative reasons and should be condoned. The High Court held that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the statutory period of 120 days, as the first proviso to Section 7(7) is a mandatory provision that prohibits admission of appeals after 120 days. The court noted that the appeal was filed on 15.10.2013, which is beyond 120 days from 15.3.2013, and therefore the Industrial Court's order was without jurisdiction. The writ petition was allowed, the impugned order was quashed, and the respondent's appeal before the Industrial Court was dismissed as barred by limitation.

Headnote

A) Gratuity Law - Limitation for Appeal - Section 7(7) Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - First Proviso - Absolute Bar - The first proviso to Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 prescribes that no appeal shall be admitted after 120 days from the date of receipt of the order of the Controlling Authority. The Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond this period. In the present case, the appeal was filed on 15.10.2013, while the judgment of the Controlling Authority was received by the respondent on 15.3.2013, resulting in a delay of 214 days, which is beyond the permissible 120 days. The Industrial Court's order condoning the delay was held to be without jurisdiction and was quashed. (Paras 7-10)

B) Gratuity Law - Computation of Limitation - Date of Receipt of Judgment - Section 7(7) Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - The limitation period of 120 days for filing an appeal under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 commences from the date of receipt of the judgment of the Controlling Authority by the party. In this case, the respondent received the judgment on 15.3.2013, as evidenced by the inward stamp, and the appeal was filed on 15.10.2013, which is beyond 120 days. The court held that the delay cannot be condoned as the statutory period had expired. (Paras 5-8)

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Issue of Consideration

Whether the Industrial Court could condone a delay of more than 120 days in filing an appeal under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, given the first proviso which prescribes a maximum period of 120 days for filing an appeal.

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Final Decision

The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 18.11.2014 passed by the Industrial Court in Misc. PGA Delay No. 3 of 2013 is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the appeal filed by the respondents before the Industrial Court is dismissed as barred by limitation.

Law Points

  • Condonation of delay beyond 120 days is prohibited under Section 7(7) first proviso of Payment of Gratuity Act
  • 1972
  • Computation of limitation period begins from date of receipt of judgment
  • Industrial Court cannot condone delay beyond statutory limit
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Case Details

2015 LawText (BOM) (10) 33

WRIT PETITION NO. 1237 OF 2015

2015-10-05

RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.

Shri Shelke Avishkar S. for Petitioner, Shri Navandar Manish N. for Respondents

Changunabai Sambhaji Gaware

Kapus Visheshadnya, Kapus Sanshodhan Kendra, Nanded and The Principal, Krishi Tantra Vidyalaya, Nanded

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Nature of Litigation

Writ petition challenging the order of the Industrial Court condoning delay in filing an appeal under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Remedy Sought

The petitioner sought quashing of the Industrial Court's order dated 18.11.2014 allowing the respondent's application for condonation of delay (Misc. PGA Delay No. 3 of 2013).

Filing Reason

The petitioner was aggrieved by the Industrial Court's order condoning a delay of 214 days in filing an appeal, which was beyond the 120-day limit prescribed under the first proviso to Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Previous Decisions

The Controlling Authority allowed the petitioner's gratuity applications on 25.2.2013. The respondent filed an appeal on 15.10.2013 along with a delay condonation application. The Industrial Court allowed the delay condonation application on 18.11.2014.

Issues

Whether the Industrial Court could condone a delay of more than 120 days in filing an appeal under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, given the first proviso which prescribes a maximum period of 120 days for filing an appeal.

Submissions/Arguments

Petitioner: There is a clear prohibition under Section 7(7) read with the first proviso for entertaining any appeal beyond 120 days from the date of receipt of the judgment of the Controlling Authority. The respondent received the judgment on 15.3.2013, and the appeal was filed on 15.10.2013, which is beyond 120 days. The Industrial Court ignored the petitioner's say and Exhibit U-9 showing the date of receipt. Respondent: The delay was due to administrative reasons and should be condoned. The Industrial Court has discretion to condone delay.

Ratio Decidendi

The first proviso to Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 imposes an absolute bar on the admission of any appeal after 120 days from the date of receipt of the order of the Controlling Authority. The Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond this statutory period. The limitation period commences from the date of receipt of the judgment by the party, and any appeal filed after 120 days cannot be entertained.

Judgment Excerpts

There is a clear prohibition under Section 7(7) read with the first proviso for entertaining any appeal beyond 120 days from the date of the receipt of the judgment of the Controlling Authority. The application dated 13.3.2013, by which the copy of the judgment was served upon the respondent on 15.3.2013, was exhibited as U-9 before the Industrial Court. There is no whisper, much less reference to the SAY of the petitioner and Exhibit U-9, in the reasoning part of the impugned judgment, which has condoned the delay beyond the permitted 120 days.

Procedural History

The Controlling Authority allowed the petitioner's gratuity applications on 25.2.2013. The petitioner served a copy of the judgment on the respondent on 15.3.2013. The respondent filed an appeal on 15.10.2013 along with a delay condonation application (Misc. PGA Delay No. 3 of 2013). The Industrial Court allowed the delay condonation application on 18.11.2014. The petitioner filed the present writ petition on 8.10.2015 challenging that order.

Acts & Sections

  • Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972: Section 7(7), First Proviso to Section 7(7)
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