Case Note & Summary
The applicant, an instructor, filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, seeking to quash FIR No.3468/2011 dated 26.5.2011 and the consequent charge-sheet No.770/2011 dated 3.10.2011. The FIR was registered for offences under Sections 66A and 66C of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The accusations stemmed from emails sent by the applicant on 18.11.2010 from his email ID alert aa@redoffmail.com to NSSO (FOD) offices, which were claimed to be objectionable. The applicant contended that no offence was made out. Previously, the applicant had approached the High Court through Criminal Application No.332/2013, which was disposed of on 26.6.2014 with liberty to renew the grievance if persecution continued. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 declared Section 66A of the IT Act unconstitutional. Relying on this, the applicant filed the present application. The State and the complainant opposed the application, arguing that it was not maintainable because a discharge application was pending and an earlier similar application had been disposed of. They further contended that the trial court could later frame charges under other provisions such as Section 67 of the IT Act. The core legal issues were whether the FIR and charge-sheet could be quashed given that Section 66A had been struck down and the allegations did not satisfy the requirements of Section 66C. The court first addressed the preliminary objections. Citing G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. (2000) 2 SCC 636 and Keki Hormusji Gharda v. Mehervan Rustom Irani (2009) 6 SCC 475, the court held that the High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings can be exercised even when a discharge application is pending. Regarding the earlier order, the court noted that it was passed when Section 66A was still on the statute book and liberty was granted, hence it did not bar the present application, especially after the provision had been struck down. On merits, the court observed that after Shreya Singhal, no prosecution under Section 66A is maintainable, and thus the FIR to that extent must be quashed. With respect to Section 66C, the court reproduced the provision, which punishes identity theft through fraudulent or dishonest use of another’s electronic signature, password, or any other unique identification feature. Examining the complaint, FIR, and charge-sheet, the court found no allegations whatsoever that the applicant had fraudulently or dishonestly made use of any electronic signature, password, or unique identification feature of any other person. The court rejected the State’s argument that the trial court could frame charges under Section 67, noting that the limited issue before it was whether the present FIR and charge-sheet could stand, and since they disclosed no offence, they deserved to be quashed. The court concluded that the FIR and charge-sheet did not disclose any offence under Section 66C and, applying the settled parameters for quashing, set them aside. The rule was made absolute with no order as to costs.
Headnote
A) Criminal Procedure - Quashing of FIR - Exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC during pendency of discharge application - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 482 - The High Court can quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 even if an application for discharge is pending before the trial court. The court relied on G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636 and Keki Hormusji Gharda v. Mehervan Rustom Irani, (2009) 6 SCC 475. Held that the objection regarding maintainability on this ground cannot be upheld. (Paras 5-6) B) Information Technology - Unconstitutionality of Section 66A - Prosecution not maintainable after striking down - Information Technology Act, 2000, Section 66A - The Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 declared Section 66A ultra vires and unconstitutional. Consequently, no prosecution can be maintained under Section 66A, and the FIR to that extent must be quashed. (Para 9) C) Information Technology - Identity Theft - Ingredients of Section 66C require specific allegations of fraudulent/dishonest use of another's electronic signature/password/unique identification feature - Information Technology Act, 2000, Section 66C - The FIR and charge-sheet did not contain any allegations that the applicant fraudulently or dishonestly made use of any electronic signature, password, or any other unique identification feature of another person. Therefore, the FIR and charge-sheet did not disclose an offence under Section 66C and were quashed. Held that in the absence of such allegations, no prosecution under Section 66C can lie. (Paras 10-13) D) Criminal Procedure - Res Judicata - Effect of prior court order and subsequent change in law - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 482 - The earlier order of 2014 did not bar the present application because the court had granted liberty to renew grievance and subsequently Section 66A was struck down, altering the legal landscape. Held that the applicant was not disabled from maintaining the present proceeding. (Para 8)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the FIR and charge-sheet under Sections 66A and 66C of the Information Technology Act, 2000 should be quashed under Section 482 CrPC in light of Section 66A being struck down and allegations not disclosing offence under Section 66C.
Final Decision
FIR No.3468/2011 dated 26.5.2011 and charge-sheet No.770/2011 dated 3.10.2011 are quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs.
Law Points
- Section 482 CrPC quashing power exercisable even when discharge application pending
- Section 66A IT Act struck down as unconstitutional
- prosecution under Section 66C IT Act requires allegations of fraudulent/dishonest use of electronic signature/password/unique identification feature
- if FIR allegations do not disclose offence FIR and charge-sheet liable to be quashed
- prior court order not bar if circumstances change due to subsequent declaration of law
