Case Note & Summary
The High Court of Bombay at Goa heard a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging an order dated 13.05.2020 passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, North Goa, in her capacity as Chairperson of the District Disaster Management Authority, North Goa District, purportedly under Section 33 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 (DMA). The petitioner claimed ownership of property bearing Survey Nos. 21/1 and 21/1-A in village Baiguinim, Taluka Tiswadi, Goa, and stated that a portion was acquired by the State Government for construction of the Panaji-Old Goa bypass road through two awards dated 16.02.2008 and 17.08.2009. On the unacquired portion, the petitioner set up a petrol pump and gas pump and provided a dedicated road for vehicles accessing those facilities; this road was depicted in Part C of the plan at Exhibit D to the petition. In May 2020, Public Works Department (PWD) authorities allegedly began interfering with the unacquired property, specifically the dedicated road. The petitioner was orally informed that officials were directed to carry out repairs/reconstruction including asphalting. Consequently, on 18.05.2020, the petitioner instituted Civil Suit No. 15/2020 before the District Court, North Goa, seeking a permanent injunction restraining PWD and the State from interfering with the property or the road. On 21.05.2020, respondents No. 6 to 9 sought impleadment in that suit, and their application referred to the impugned order. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition on 26.05.2020, contending that the order was mala fide and in excess of jurisdiction under the DMA. The central legal issues were whether the Collector had jurisdiction to pass the order under Section 33 of the DMA; whether the complaint about road blockage and damage fell within the definition of "disaster" under Section 2(d); whether the Chairperson could exercise powers of the District Authority; and whether the order was a colourable exercise of power to defeat the petitioner's rights in the pending civil suit. The petitioner argued that a local complaint about road blockage did not constitute a disaster; that Section 33 powers vested in the District Authority and not the Chairperson alone; that no emergency existed to justify exercise of powers under Section 26(2); and that no ex post facto ratification was placed on record. The petitioner further relied on an administrative approval order dated 10.11.2011 which contained a condition that tenders shall not be invited until land acquisition, and submitted that the road remained unacquired private property. The State, through the Advocate General, defended the order by relying on the reasoning recorded therein, arguing that the road provided access to school children and residents, that the petitioner had damaged and blocked the road, and that such situation was covered by the definition of "disaster" under Section 2(d). The private respondents sought to highlight the road's importance for access. The High Court, after hearing submissions, made the rule returnable forthwith and stated that the petition would be disposed of finally at the stage of admission. However, the excerpt of the judgment does not include the court's final analysis or operative order; therefore, the specific decision, ratio decidendi, and direction are not available from the provided text. The court's deliberations revolved around the scope of the Disaster Management Act, the allocation of powers between the District Authority and its Chairperson, and the propriety of invoking statutory powers in the context of a private property dispute. The final holding as to whether the impugned order was quashed or upheld is not recorded in the available portion.
Headnote
A) Disaster Management - Definition of Disaster - Scope of Section 2(d) - Disaster Management Act, 2005, Section 2(d) - Petitioner contended that complaints regarding alleged blockage of a private road and its damaged condition did not fall within the statutory definition of 'disaster'; respondents argued that road damage threatened lives of commuters and was covered. The Court was called upon to determine whether the Collector's invocation of Section 33 was within the scope of the Act. (Paras 9, 13) B) Disaster Management - Exercise of Powers by Chairperson - Authority Under Section 33 vs Section 26(2) - Disaster Management Act, 2005, Sections 33, 26(2) - Petitioner argued that powers under Section 33 vest in the District Authority, not the Chairperson alone; the Chairperson could act under Section 26(2) only in a real emergency, which was absent, and no ex post facto ratification was produced. (Para 10) C) Administrative Law - Mala Fides and Colourable Exercise of Power - Nullity of Order - Disaster Management Act, 2005, Section 71 - Petitioner submitted that the State invoked the DMA provisions mala fide to defeat the petitioner's rights in pending Civil Suit No. 15/2020, and that Section 71's bar of civil court jurisdiction cannot protect an illegal, ultra vires order. (Para 12) D) Property Law - Private Road and Land Acquisition - Acquisition Condition Before Road Works - Not mentioned - Petitioner relied on administrative approval order dated 10.11.2011 which stipulated tenders not be invited until land acquired; argued that since subject road was unacquired private property, PWD interference was illegal. (Para 11)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the Collector and District Magistrate, as Chairperson of District Disaster Management Authority, had jurisdiction to direct repair/reconstruction of an alleged private road under Section 33 of Disaster Management Act, 2005; whether the order was ultra vires, mala fide, and contrary to the definition of 'disaster' under Section 2(d); whether powers under Section 33 could be exercised by Chairperson alone; whether Section 71 barred the writ petition
Law Points
- Section 2(d) of Disaster Management Act
- 2005 defines 'disaster' and excludes ordinary road blockage or damage
- Section 33 of Disaster Management Act
- 2005 vests powers in District Authority
- not Chairperson
- Section 26(2) of Disaster Management Act
- 2005 permits Chairperson to act in emergency only
- Section 71 of Disaster Management Act
- 2005 does not bar challenge to ultra vires orders
- private property cannot be interfered with without acquisition



