Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose from a Development Agreement dated March 31, 2016 between the applicant-developer and the respondent-cooperative housing society for redevelopment of society property. The respondent terminated the agreement by notice dated June 30, 2021, leading the applicant to invoke arbitration by notice dated August 12, 2021. The right to approach the court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 accrued 30 days thereafter, on September 12, 2021. The applicant, however, filed the present Section 11 application only on February 28, 2025. The applicant claimed he became aware of the replacement of his name on the site notice board with a new developer, which prompted the filing. The respondent contended that a new developer was appointed pursuant to a public notice and a fresh development agreement dated October 17, 2024, and that the applicant had constructive knowledge of the replacement. The primary legal issue was whether the application was barred by limitation. The limitation period of three years under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 commenced on September 13, 2021 and would have expired on September 12, 2024. However, the Supreme Court's orders in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 suspended all limitation periods from March 15, 2020 to February 28, 2022. By applying the directions in the order dated January 10, 2022, the court added the balance period of two years, eleven months and ten days to the period available after March 1, 2022, resulting in the extended limitation expiring on February 12, 2025. The application, filed on February 28, 2025, was thus delayed by 15 days. The applicant sought condonation of this delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd. v. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad, which recognized the applicability of Section 5 to Section 11(6) applications. The applicant cited medical grounds of its promoter and WhatsApp conversations suggesting an impression that the agreement was not actually terminated. The court, after considering the submissions, noted that while Section 5 may be invoked, the discretion must be exercised only in exceptional cases where a strong case is made out. The court observed that the applicant had been vigilant during the Covid period to invoke arbitration but then remained inactive for years, even after the suspension of limitation was lifted with advance notice. The 15-day delay, though short, was not considered minor given the entire extended period of over two years that was available. The applicant's conduct suggested a lack of genuine pursuit of rights and an attempt to use the filing as a bargaining chip. Equitable considerations therefore weighed against condonation. Consequently, the court dismissed the application without making a reference to the arbitral tribunal. The judgment also noted the Secunderabad Cantonment Board case relied upon by the respondent but did not find it relevant to the facts.
Headnote
A) Arbitration - Limitation - Section 11(6) Application - Limitation Act, 1963, Article 137 - The limitation period of three years for filing a Section 11(6) application starts from the date when the right to apply accrues after the expiry of the 30-day period under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act; the court computed the extended limitation period after giving effect to the Covid-19 suspension of limitation per the Supreme Court's Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 orders, resulting in the deadline expiring on February 12, 2025; the application filed on February 28, 2025 was therefore delayed by 15 days (Paras 6-8). B) Arbitration - Condonation of Delay - Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963 - Application to Section 11(6) Proceedings - The Supreme Court in HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd. v. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3190, held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to applications under Section 11(6), but the court must exercise its discretion judiciously and only in exceptional cases where a strong case is made out; condonation should be granted to those who missed the deadline due to unavoidable circumstances and not to prolong litigation unnecessarily (Paras 9-10). C) Arbitration - Delay Condonation - Exercise of Discretion - Insufficient Grounds for Condonation - Despite the delay being only 15 days, the court found that the applicant had a long period after the suspension of limitation was lifted to file the application; the applicant was aware of his rights having invoked arbitration during the Covid period but did not act diligently; the medical grounds were vague and the applicant's conduct suggested he filed the application as a tactical bargaining chip rather than a genuine pursuit of rights; therefore, equitable considerations did not warrant condonation and the application was dismissed without reference to the arbitral tribunal (Paras 13-18).
Issue of Consideration
Whether the application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was barred by limitation and, if so, whether the delay of 15 days beyond the extended limitation period could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Final Decision
The application was dismissed. The court held that the delay of 15 days beyond the extended limitation period could not be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act because the applicant failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances; the applicant's conduct showed a lack of genuine pursuit and he had ample time to file the application. The application was disposed of without making a reference to the arbitral tribunal.
Law Points
- Legal points not extracted
- limitation for Section 11(6) application commences from end of 30-day period under Section 21
- Covid-19 suspension period excluded
- extended limitation computed by adding balance period from suspension end
- Section 5 Limitation Act applies to Section 11(6) applications per HPCL Bio-Fuels
- condonation only in exceptional cases
- equitable discretion must be exercised judiciously
- delay condonation refused when applicant failed to show diligence and genuine pursuit of rights



