High Court Upholds Decree Directing Plaintiffs in an Agricultural Land Dispute to Restore Possession to Defendants Despite Absence of Counterclaim. The High Court invoked inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the doctrine of restitution, holding that plaintiffs who regained possession only under an interim injunction could not retain it after losing on merits.

Case Note & Summary

The litigation arose from a dispute over agricultural land bearing Block No.164 at Village Ranjegaon, Taluka and District Beed. The plaintiffs, sons (and later their legal heirs) of Hariba, instituted Regular Civil Suit No.202 of 1990 before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Beed seeking declaration of ownership and perpetual injunction. They claimed that the suit land was ancestral property owned by their father Hariba, who died on 14 May 1989, and that after his death their names were mutated in revenue records. They alleged that the defendants, who were unconcerned with the suit property, obstructed their possession. The defendants admitted that Hariba was the owner but pleaded that on 24 April 1975 Hariba executed a registered sale deed in their favour, thereby transferring ownership and possession to them. They further contended that the consolidation authorities had wrongly continued Hariba's name in the records, and the plaintiffs had taken advantage of that mistake. During trial, the original sale deed was exhibited as Exhibit 68, and Mutation Entry No.366 was certified. The plaintiffs did not disclose the sale deed in the plaint. Plaintiff no.1 admitted in cross-examination that the sale deed was executed by his father to meet financial difficulties caused by his father's illness and that possession was delivered to the defendants. He also candidly admitted that the plaintiffs regained possession of the suit land only after an interim injunction was granted by the trial court in the present suit. Based on this evidence, the trial court dismissed the suit on 27 June 1994, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove ownership and possession. The trial court accepted the defendants' case of ownership under the registered sale deed and directed the plaintiffs to hand over possession to the defendants within 60 days. The District Judge, Beed dismissed Regular Civil Appeal No.194 of 1994 on 21 June 1995, affirming the trial court's judgment and decree. In the second appeal before the High Court, the appellants contended that the trial court could not pass a decree for possession in favour of the defendants in the absence of a counterclaim. They argued that the stray admission of obtaining possession under an interim injunction did not mean that the plaintiffs were not in possession at the institution of the suit, and that the Civil Procedure Code did not empower the court to grant a possession decree to the defendants in a suit filed by the plaintiffs. They also submitted that the appellate court failed to exercise jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC. The respondents argued that the plaintiffs had obtained possession only under the interim injunction, that the defendants were held to be the owners, and that the trial court rightly exercised inherent powers to restore possession. The High Court examined the principles of restitution. It referred to Section 144 CPC, which empowers the court to restitute a party who has lost possession under a decree later varied or reversed. Citing the Privy Council in Alexander Rodger Charles v. Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris and the Supreme Court in Binayak Swain v. Ramesh Chandra Panigrahi, the court observed that the duty of restitution is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the court to act rightly and fairly. Although Section 144 CPC was not strictly applicable, the High Court held that a party who received the benefit of an order that later proved unsustainable could not be permitted to retain that benefit. Since the plaintiffs admitted that they were not in possession at the institution of the suit and obtained possession only under the interim injunction, the defendants had positively established their ownership and possession on the basis of the registered sale deed. The court held that the trial court and the appellate court were justified in exercising inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to direct restoration of possession to the defendants. Accordingly, the second appeal was dismissed.

Headnote

Issue of Consideration

Final Decision

Second appeal dismissed. The High Court upheld the concurrent judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and Appellate Court, including the direction requiring plaintiffs to hand over possession of suit land to defendants within 60 days from the date of order. The Court held that although Section 144 CPC may not strictly apply, the courts have inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC and the doctrine of restitution to restore possession to defendants who were dispossessed under an interim injunction; plaintiffs could not retain the benefit of an order that proved unsustainable.

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