Supreme Court Dismisses Writ Petition Challenging Seniority of Income Tax Officers on Grounds of Pre-Constitution Acts and Laches. Seniority Rules of 1949-52 and Appointments Made Before 1950 Are Beyond the Reach of Articles 14 and 16, and a 15-Year Delay in Filing Under Article 32 Disentitles the Petitioners to Relief.

The petitioners, confirmed Assistant Commissioners of Income Tax, challenged the seniority assigned to them vis-à-vis respondents 6-39, alleging that the appointments and seniority rules implemented before the Constitution infringed their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16, and sought to gain seniority to be considered earlier for promotion to Commissioner of Income Tax.

The petitioners sought the setting aside of the seniority list and consequential directions to postdate the appointments of the respondents to conform to the 80% direct recruitment quota rule prescribed in 1944, and to grant them seniority over the respondents.

The petitioners were aggrieved that despite being direct recruits under the reorganisation scheme, the seniority rules and lists gave advantage to promotees (respondents) whose appointments were allegedly irregular and outside the prescribed quota, resulting in the respondents being confirmed earlier as Assistant Commissioners and becoming senior to the petitioners.

In S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, this Court had invalidated post-Constitution promotions made in violation of the quota rule but expressly protected those promotees who had already been confirmed as Assistant Commissioners. The petitioners were not parties to that case, and their subsequent petition challenged pre-Constitution acts.

Whether the acts done before the Constitution came into force (appointments of respondents, seniority list as on 1-1-1950, and the 1949 and 1950 seniority rules) could be challenged under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Whether the writ petition under Article 32 was barred by laches due to a delay of approximately 15 years after the impugned seniority rules and list were made. Whether granting the relief sought would be contrary to the decision in Jaisinghani's case, which had protected confirmed Assistant Commissioners.

Petitioners contended that the respondents' initial appointments were irregular and illegal, being outside the quota rule, and that the seniority rules discriminated against direct recruits like them. They relied on the principle laid down in Jaisinghani's case to assert that their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 were violated. The Union of India and respondents, through the Attorney General, argued that all challenged acts occurred before the Constitution came into force, rendering Articles 14 and 16 inapplicable; that the petition suffered from gross delay of 15 years and must be dismissed for laches; and that the relief sought would undercut the protection granted to confirmed Assistant Commissioners in Jaisinghani.

The Constitution has no retrospective operation, so acts done before its commencement cannot be challenged under Articles 14 and 16. A petition under Article 32 filed after inordinate delay can be dismissed on grounds of laches, as it would be unjust to disturb long-settled rights and confirmed promotions. The protection of confirmed officers, as held in Jaisinghani, reinforces the principle against unsettling vested service rights.

It is settled law that the Constitution has no retrospective operation. The petitioners therefore could not complain of breach of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution in respect of acts done before the Constitution came into force. Even though Art. 32 is a guaranteed right it does not follow that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which had accrued to them. In Jaisinghani’s case this Court observed that the order in that case would not affect Class II Officers who had been appointed permanently as Assistant Commissioners. In the present case the Court was being asked to consider the validity of appointments and promotions made during the period 1945 and 1950. Thus there was all the more reason that officers who had become permanent Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax and who were appointed and promoted to their original posts during 1945 to 1950 should be left alone.

The petitioners were directly recruited as Income-tax Officers Class I Grade II through competitive examinations held between 1945 and 1950. In 1944, the Government had introduced a reorganisation scheme with an 80:20 quota for direct recruitment and promotion. The respondents were promoted from Class II to Class I Grade II during the same period. Seniority rules were framed in 1949 and modified in 1950. A seniority list as on 1 January 1950 was prepared but not finalized. In 1951, new statutory rules altered the quota, and in 1952, a committee finalized fresh seniority rules and issued a revised list in 1953, making the respondents senior. The petitioners made representations without success. In 1962, one Jaisinghani filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging post-1950 promotions that violated the quota rule; the High Court dismissed it, but on appeal, the Supreme Court in 1967 invalidated such promotions while protecting confirmed Assistant Commissioners. Shortly after that decision, the petitioners filed the present writ petition in 1967 under Article 32.

• Constitution of India, 1950: Article 14, Article 16, Article 32