Case Note & Summary
By special leave, the Supreme Court considered an industrial dispute arising from suspension without pay pending permission of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appellant, management of Ranipur Colliery, a coal mining company in Dishergarh, West Bengal, employed the respondent workmen as tub-checkers. They were found to be making false reports about quality and quantity of coal, causing loss. The company served charge-sheets and held a regular domestic enquiry on April 13, 1955, where the workmen participated, cross-examined witnesses, and contested the charge. The company concluded that the workmen were guilty of misconduct and should be dismissed. Since an industrial dispute was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, the company applied under Section 33 for permission to dismiss the seven workmen. The application was made on April 29, 1955, and the workmen were suspended without pay on May 4, 1955, pending the Tribunal's order. Five of the seven workmen filed applications under Section 33A before the Industrial Tribunal, claiming that suspension without pay beyond ten days violated Clause 27 of the Standing Orders, which provided that suspension without pay, whether as punishment or pending enquiry, shall not exceed ten days. The Industrial Tribunal heard the Section 33 and Section 33A applications together and granted permission to dismiss the seven workmen, consequently dismissing the Section 33A applications. Six workmen appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal upheld the permission to dismiss but found a breach of Clause 27 and ordered payment of wages to five workmen from the date of suspension without pay to the date of the Industrial Tribunal's order, less ten days. The company appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. The core legal issue was whether the words 'pending enquiry' in Clause 27 of the Standing Orders included proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33. The workmen argued that they did, so suspension without pay beyond ten days pending the Tribunal's decision breached the Standing Orders. The company argued that 'pending enquiry' referred only to the employer's domestic enquiry, not the tribunal proceedings. The Supreme Court reasoned that Section 33 imposes a ban on the employer from dismissing a workman and gives the Industrial Tribunal power to grant or withhold permission to lift that ban. The employer's enquiry concludes when he finds the case proved and dismissal appropriate; only then does he apply under Section 33. Proceedings under Section 33 are not an enquiry into the rights or wrongs of dismissal; the Tribunal only sees whether a prima facie case exists and whether a fair domestic enquiry was held. Standing Orders are concerned with employers and employees, not with tribunals; therefore 'pending enquiry' in Clause 27 can only refer to the employer's enquiry into the employee's conduct. The Court explained that but for Section 33, the employer could dismiss immediately after the domestic enquiry and no further wages would be payable. Section 33 compels the employer to seek permission because of the pending industrial dispute, but the delay before the Tribunal is beyond the employer's control. Requiring the employer to continue paying wages during this period would be unfair merely because of the accidental circumstance of a pending industrial dispute. The Court followed Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup and disapproved Rampalat Chamar v. The Assam Oil Co. Ltd. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Labour Appellate Tribunal's order granting wages to the five workmen, and held that suspension without pay pending Section 33 permission was not a breach of Clause 27 of the Standing Orders.
Headnote
A) Industrial Dispute - Standing Orders Interpretation - 'Pending Enquiry' - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 33 - Clause 27 of the Standing Orders provided that suspension without pay, whether as punishment or pending enquiry, shall not exceed ten days. The workmen contended that 'pending enquiry' included proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33. The Supreme Court held that Standing Orders are concerned with employers and employees, not with tribunals, and 'pending enquiry' refers only to the employer's domestic enquiry into the employee's misconduct. Suspension without pay beyond ten days pending Section 33 permission was therefore not a breach of the Standing Orders. Held that the employer was justified in suspending without pay after completing the domestic enquiry and applying for permission. B) Industrial Dispute - Section 33 Permission - Scope of Tribunal Inquiry - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 33 - Proceedings under Section 33 are not an enquiry by the Industrial Tribunal into the rights or wrongs of dismissal; the Tribunal only sees whether a prima facie case has been made out and whether a fair enquiry was held by the employer. Once satisfied, the Tribunal is bound to grant permission. The time taken before the Tribunal is beyond the employer's control. Held that suspension without pay pending such proceedings did not violate the 'pending enquiry' clause. C) Industrial Dispute - Precedents - Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Applied - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 33 - The principle in Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup, [1956] S.C.R. 916, that workmen would not be entitled to payment of wages during the whole period of suspension if the Tribunal gave permission to dismiss them, was followed and explained. That principle applies where Section 33 imposes a ban and the employer must apply to lift it after completing the domestic enquiry. Held that requiring the employer to continue paying wages after finding guilt and before Tribunal permission would be unfair merely because an industrial dispute was pending. Rampalat Chamar v. The Assam Oil Co., Ltd. was dissented from.
Issue of Consideration
Whether the words 'pending enquiry' in Clause 27 of the Standing Orders include proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether suspension without pay beyond ten days pending such permission is a breach of the Standing Orders.
Final Decision
Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Labour Appellate Tribunal's order granting wages to the five workmen, and held that suspension without pay pending Section 33 permission was not a breach of Clause 27 of the Standing Orders. The words 'pending enquiry' were interpreted to refer only to the employer's domestic enquiry, not to proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal.
Law Points
- Legal points not extracted
- Standing Orders are concerned with employers and employees and not with tribunals
- 'pending enquiry' in Clause 27 refers only to employer's domestic enquiry
- proceedings under Section 33 of Industrial Disputes Act are not an enquiry into conduct of employee
- Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 only examines prima facie case and fairness of domestic enquiry
- employer may suspend without pay pending Section 33 permission after concluding domestic enquiry
