Case Note & Summary
The Supreme Court addressed a narrow but significant evidentiary question arising from a criminal trial for criminal breach of trust. The appellant, a cashier of a company, was charged with embezzling Rs. 4,14,750 between July 1 and December 1, 1954. The trial was with the aid of a jury. When the defalcation was discovered, conversations took place between the company's Chairman Gopikisan, Secretary Modi, Solicitor Santook, and the appellant between January 21 and 27, 1955. Santook prepared notes of attendance of these conversations soon afterwards. At trial, these notes (Ex. V) were produced during Santook's examination-in-chief to corroborate his testimony about the conversations. The appellant objected to their admissibility on two grounds: first, that copies had not been supplied under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and second, that they could not be admitted under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as corroboration. The trial judge admitted the notes. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by a majority of 5:3. The trial judge made a reference to the High Court under Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court went through the entire evidence, including Ex. V, found the case proved, and convicted the appellant. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave, limited solely to the question of admissibility of the notes under Section 157. Learned counsel for the appellant abandoned the Section 173 objection in view of this Court's decision in Narayan Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh. The core legal issue was whether the word 'statement' in Section 157 requires communication of the statement by the maker to another person. The appellant contended that 'statement made by' in Section 157 implies communication, and that a personal memorandum not communicated to anyone is not a statement; such writing could only be used to refresh memory under Section 159 and would become evidence only if cross-examined upon under Section 161. The Court examined the dictionary meaning of 'statement' and its use in other sections of the Evidence Act. It found that the primary meaning is 'something that is stated', and communication is not essential. Sections 17 to 21 on admissions, Section 32 on statements by persons who cannot be called, Section 39 on statements in documents forming part of a book, and Section 145 on contradiction all use 'statement' without requiring communication. The Court held that Section 157 uses 'statement made by' similarly, and no element of communication should be imported. It distinguished between admissibility and weight: Section 157 makes such previous statements admissible, but their corroborative value depends on circumstances. The danger of self-corroboration by secret writing was considered illusory because the witness is subject to cross-examination, and main evidence is his testimony in court. Section 159 was held not to limit Section 157; a document may be used both to refresh memory and as a statement for corroboration. The Court concluded that the notes of attendance were admissible under Section 157. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's conviction.
Headnote
A) Evidence - Admissibility of Prior Statements - Section 157 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Definition of 'Statement' - The word 'statement' in Section 157 means 'something that is stated' and does not require communication to another person; notes of attendance prepared by a solicitor after conversations are admissible as former statements for corroboration - Held that notes of attendance were admissible, as communication is not essential for a statement under Section 157 (Paras Not mentioned). B) Evidence - Corroboration vs Refreshing Memory - Sections 157, 159 and 161 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Scope of Section 159 Does Not Limit Section 157 - A writing may be used to refresh memory under Section 159, but that does not exclude it from being a statement under Section 157; Section 159 deals with a particular set of circumstances and does not define 'statement' - Held that difference in language between Sections 157 and 159 does not cut down the meaning of 'statement' in Section 157 (Paras Not mentioned). C) Evidence - Weight vs Admissibility - Section 157 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Distinction between admissibility and weight - Even if a previous statement is admissible under Section 157, its corroborative value is a separate matter for the court to decide in circumstances of each case; cross-examination safeguards against danger of self-corroboration by secret writing - Held that the alleged danger is not real because the witness is subject to cross-examination and main evidence is the witness's testimony (Paras Not mentioned).
Issue of Consideration
Whether notes of attendance prepared by a solicitor soon after conversations are admissible under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as a former statement made by the witness, even though not communicated to another person.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court held that the notes of attendance were admissible under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The word 'statement' in Section 157 means 'something that is stated', and the element of communication to another person is not necessary. The notes could be used to corroborate the testimony of the solicitor. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.
Law Points
- Legal points not extracted
- Section 157 of Indian Evidence Act
- 1872
- 'statement' means 'something that is stated'
- communication to another person not essential
- notes of attendance are previous statements
- admissibility distinct from weight
- Section 159 does not restrict Section 157
