Case Note & Summary
The dispute arose from the 1957 general elections to the Madras Legislative Assembly from the Alangulam constituency. Six persons were nominated, including the appellant, the second respondent Chellapandian, and the fourth respondent Arunachalam. During scrutiny on February 1, 1957, Chellapandian objected to Arunachalam's nomination on the ground that he was the Headmaster of a government-aided school and therefore held an office of profit under the government, disqualifying him under Section 7(d) and (e) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The returning officer upheld the objection and rejected Arunachalam's nomination. Five nominations were accepted, two candidates withdrew, and on March 10, 1957, the appellant, having secured the largest number of votes, was declared elected. On April 18, 1957, the first respondent, a voter, filed an election petition under Section 100(1)(c) seeking to declare the appellant's election void on the ground that the rejection of Arunachalam's nomination was improper because Arunachalam had ceased to be a Headmaster at the time of nomination and the institution was private. In his written statement, the appellant raised additional grounds of disqualification not previously raised before the returning officer, namely that Arunachalam was a partner in government contracts and had agreed to serve as a teacher under the District Board, Chittoor. The first respondent filed an application to strike out these additional grounds, contending that the Election Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider grounds not raised before the returning officer. The Tribunal dismissed the application on August 17, 1957, holding that it could go into grounds other than those put before the returning officer. The first respondent challenged this order by filing two writ petitions under Article 226 before the Madras High Court. The High Court, comprising Rajagopalan and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ., allowed the writs, quashed the Tribunal's order, and issued a mandamus directing the Tribunal to dispose of the application afresh in accordance with law, holding that the enquiry before the Tribunal must be restricted to the objections which the returning officer had to consider, though not necessarily to the material placed before him. The appellant then obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136. The Supreme Court considered the scope of an election petition under Section 100(1)(c). It held that an election petition is an original proceeding instituted under Section 81 and not an appeal from the returning officer's decision. Therefore, the Tribunal could consider grounds of disqualification other than those raised before the returning officer. The real question was whether the candidate was duly qualified and not subject to any disqualification under Section 36(2). The Court approved the decisions in Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas, Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, and Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Y. Tamaskar. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Tribunal's order dismissing the application to strike out the additional grounds.
Headnote
A) Election Law - Scope of Inquiry in Election Petition - Section 100(1)(c) Representation of the People Act, 1951 - An election petition is an original proceeding, not an appeal from returning officer's decision - Tribunal may consider grounds of disqualification not raised before returning officer - Held that real question is whether candidate was duly qualified and not disqualified under Section 36(2); the expression 'improperly rejected' requires examination of all disqualifications (Paras 1-11) B) Election Law - Jurisdiction of Election Tribunal - Section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain additional grounds of disqualification not put forward before returning officer - Held that returning officer's summary inquiry does not limit Tribunal's power to decide validity of nomination (Paras 1-11) C) Constitution - Writ Jurisdiction - Article 226 Constitution of India - Availability of writ against interlocutory order of Election Tribunal when alternative remedy under Section 116A exists - High Court issued certiorari and mandamus on ground of lack of jurisdiction; Supreme Court held Tribunal had jurisdiction, thereby setting aside writs (Paras 1-11)
Issue of Consideration
Whether in an election petition questioning the propriety of rejection of a nomination paper under Section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it is open to the parties to raise grounds of disqualification other than those put forward before the returning officer
Final Decision
Appeals allowed; judgment of Madras High Court set aside; order of Election Tribunal in I.A. No. 5 of 1957 restored. Held that in an election petition under Section 100(1)(c), the Tribunal may consider grounds of disqualification other than those raised before the Returning Officer; the proceeding is an original petition, not an appeal; the real question is whether candidate was duly qualified under Section 36(2).
Law Points
- Legal points not extracted
- An election petition under Section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act
- 1951 is an original proceeding
- not an appeal from the returning officer's decision
- the tribunal may consider grounds of disqualification not raised before the returning officer
- the real question is whether the candidate was duly qualified and not subject to any disqualification under Section 36(2)
- the expression 'improperly rejected' requires examination of all disqualifications
- precedents in Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas
- Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal
- Jaipur
- and Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Y. Tamaskar approved
