Case Note & Summary
The appeal arose from a conviction and death sentence for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellant was tried by the Additional Judicial Commissioner of Ranchi and convicted of killing a nine-year-old girl. The Patna High Court confirmed the conviction and dismissed the appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. The prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence and an extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant to village panchayat authorities. The deceased girl's younger sister Aghani had made statements to her mother and others that the deceased was last seen with the appellant, but Aghani died before her statements could be recorded in a judicial proceeding. The trial court and High Court relied on these statements, along with recovery of a blood-stained weapon and blood-stained human female scalp hair, and the extra-judicial confession. The appellant argued before the Supreme Court that Aghani's statements were inadmissible under Sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; that the extra-judicial confession was not voluntary and was made to persons in authority under Section 24; and that the remaining circumstantial evidence was insufficient. The State maintained that the confession was voluntary and adequately corroborated. The Supreme Court held that Aghani's statements were indeed inadmissible because they were not made in a judicial proceeding or before a person authorised by law to record them under Section 33, and they did not relate to the cause of her own death or any circumstances of her death but to her sister's death, so clause (1) of Section 32 did not apply. Regarding the extra-judicial confession, the Court found that although the Mukhia, Sarpanch and panch were persons in authority within the meaning of Section 24, no threat, promise or inducement was proved; the fact that the appellant was brought back by village volunteers and took two or three hours to confess did not render the confession involuntary. The Court also held that the circumstantial evidence, while not sufficient alone, provided sufficient corroboration to the confession and connected the appellant with the murder. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and death sentence.
Headnote
A) Evidence - Admissibility of Statements by Dead Person - Sections 32 and 33, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Statements made by Aghani to her mother and others about the deceased being last seen with the appellant were not admissible; Section 33 had no application as her statement was not made in a judicial proceeding or before a person authorised by law to record it; the statements did not relate to the cause of her death or any circumstances relating to her death but to the death of her sister, so clause (1) of Section 32 did not apply. Held that the courts below erred in relying on such statements. (Paras Not mentioned) B) Evidence - Extra-Judicial Confession - Voluntariness under Section 24, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - The Mukhia, Sarpanch and panch of Gram Panchayat were persons in authority within the meaning of Section 24, but no threat, promise or inducement for making the confession was proved; the fact that the appellant was brought back by village volunteer force and took two or three hours to confess did not render confession involuntary; nothing showed the confession contained untrue or inaccurate statements. Held that the extra-judicial confession was voluntary and admissible. (Paras Not mentioned) C) Evidence - Circumstantial Evidence - Corroboration of Extra-Judicial Confession - Circumstantial evidence may not be sufficient by itself to prove guilt but afforded sufficient corroboration to the confession and connected the appellant with the murder. Held that confession corroborated by recovery of blood-stained weapon and strands of human female scalp hair led to only one reasonable inference of guilt. (Paras Not mentioned)
Issue of Consideration
Whether statements made by deceased Aghani to her mother and others were admissible under Sections 32 or 33 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872; whether extra-judicial confession made to village panchayat authorities was voluntary and admissible under Section 24 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872; whether circumstantial evidence was sufficient, independently or as corroboration, to establish guilt of accused.
Final Decision
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and death sentence. The Court held that Aghani's statements were inadmissible, but the extra-judicial confession was voluntary and admissible under Section 24 of Indian Evidence Act, and the circumstantial evidence, though not sufficient alone, corroborated the confession and connected the appellant with the murder.
Law Points
- Legal points not extracted
- Statements of dead person not admissible under Sections 32 or 33 of Indian Evidence Act
- 1872 unless made in judicial proceeding or before person authorised by law
- or relating to cause of death
- Extra-judicial confession to person in authority admissible if voluntary under Section 24 of Indian Evidence Act
- 1872
- Circumstantial evidence can corroborate extra-judicial confession and connect accused with murder
- Extra-judicial confession must be voluntary and not caused by threat
- promise or inducement
